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ABSTRACT 
Echoing the ambivalent relationship feminism has historically had with law, feminists 
working within the violence against women movement within England and Wales 
have shown little enthusiasm for a statutory Bill of Rights. Neither the European 
Convention on Human Rights nor the Human Rights Act 1998 has been the focus of 
feminist research or activism in this area. Indeed, the social sciences as a whole have 
been slow to engage with international human rights law and theorise any impact on 
law and policy. 
This thesis develops an analytical and conceptual framework in which to investigate 
the use, outcomes and policy impact of human rights arguments made by rape victims 
and defendants under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Documentary analysis of 31 law reports using this framework 
showed that rape defendants used human rights more often than rape victims did, but 
that rape victims were more likely to win their case. 
It is concluded that the European Convention on Human Rights has contributed to the 
development of some new pan-European standards in rape cases, despite the fact that 
few cases were taken by rape victims. There is a good understanding at the European 
Court of the impact rape has on its victims and also of the difficulties that exist in 
proving rape. Some suggestions for the future are offered, including the need for: 
clarity of procedures and funding for third party interventions; equal representation in 
the judiciary; feminists to think 'horizontally'; knowledge from and joint working 
with human rights experts. The time and space that human rights provide can provide 
an ideal opportunity to challenge existing criminal justice discourses around rape, 
victims and defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1987 Jennifer Temkin opened her book on rape and the legal process with the 
following statement: 
For over a decade public disquiet has been intermittently but veheinend expressed Y 
about rape and the way it is handled by the crindna1justice systeill. (pg. 1) 
Over fifteen years on, this quote is still an appropriate starting point for a discussion 
about rape and the criminal justice system. Although huge steps forward have been 
made, including the review and strengthening of the substantive law and an 
improvement in the way women are treated by the police, other fundamental 
problems described by Temkin in 1987 such as the low conviction rate and the male 
dominated judiciary still exist. The last decade has seen resources ploughed into 
tackling domestic violence which has resulted in some positive policy and attitudinal 
changes, however sexual violence has been treated as an 'add on' and rarely properly 
considered in its own right (Kelly, 2004). 
This thesis is about the use of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 by rape victims and by rape defendants within the 
prosecution process. In research terms, as with the study of other fianus of violence 
against women, we know far more about women and rape than we do about men and 
rape. Here, I am not talking about women and mens experiences of being the victim 
of rape - although there is much more research on female victims than male victims 
this is simply because many more women than men are raped. But for every rape 
victim, female or male, there is a male rapist, for every domestic violence victim a 
person (generally male) who is violent and abusive, for every woman involved in 
prostitution a pimp and a user (again, generally male). Feminist research, however, 
has generally focused more on the female victim than on the male perpetrator. With 
the exception of Dianna Scully (1990), we have little feminist research about why 
some men rape, and none at all in England and Wales. Similarly, we have only patchy 
knowledge about how men as rape defendants navigate (or are navigated through) the 
criminal justice system, with the exception of Jennifer Temkin's (2000a) interviews 
with ten banisters experienced in prosecuting and defending rape cases. Men as rape 
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defendants are included in this research sample to start to plug this gap and in 
acknowledgement that how they use human rights is likely to have some impact on 
how women and men as victims experience the rape prosecution process. 
This thesis is written from a multi-disciplinary, feminist perspective. It is multi- 
disciplinary in that it crosses the boundaries of law, sociology, politics, women's 
studies, policy studies and philosophy; boundaries which are increasingly 
acknowledged as being historical artefacts, reflective of the preoccupations of an era 
(Bacchi, 1999). Acknowledging these boundaries as being arbitrary however does not 
make them any easier to cross. Many of these disciplines have a number of internal 
boundaries as well, for example law is divided into civil, criminal, international, tort, 
human rights etc. and the scope of policy studies consists of the study of different 
areas of policy-making, for example environmental, criminal, family, child welfare, 
etc. This thesis is an example of the extension of policy studies boundaries into law, 
in acknowledgement of the ever-growing role of the judiciary within policy making 
and interpretation both in England and Wales and Europe: 
The work of governments and parliaments is today structured by an ever-expanding 
iveb of constitutional constraints. In a ivord, European policy-mak-ing has become 
judicialised. (Stone Sweet, 2000 pg. 1, emphasis in original) 
To justify its status as feminist is one that is more difficult, and there has been much 
discussion over what it is exactly that makes a piece of research 'feminist' (see for 
example Stanley and Wise, 1993; Maynard, 1994 and, for a debate over whether there 
is much a thing as feminist methodology, the one between Hammersley, 1992 and 
Gelsthorpe, 1992). There is no definitive 'tick list' of criteria that must be fulfilled to 
label research feminist; what may be classed as feminist to one person may not be to 
another and it is important to remember that there are also divisions 1vithin and 
between 'feminisms'. The days have passed where 'feminist research' was seen as 
synonymous with 'qualitative research', and discussions around what makes research 
feminist have moved away from individual methods and more towards how the 
method is used and what it is used for (Kelly et al., 1992). This research uses law 
reports as the data that are analysed using documentary analysis, hence neither the 
data nor the method of analysis could be argued to be inherently feminist in any way. 
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Feminism is a critical social movement that challenges, and ultimately aims to break 
down, the patriarchal structures that society is based upon. It means different things to 
different people at different times and has many overlaps, for example with 
movements against racism, poverty, war and violence. This thesis aspires to create 
socially significant knowledge that can be used by the feminist movement to work 
towards social change, a desire that is shared by many academic feminists: 
Our desire to do, and goal in doing, research is to create useful kizoivledge, 
knowledge which can be used by ourselves and others to 'Inake a difference' (Kelly et 
al., 1994 pg. 28) 
While this is clearly submitted as an academic piece of work it is hoped that the rape 
crisis movement and other anti-rape campaigns in particular will be able to use the 
findings from this research. 
Why focus on the ECHR and HRA? 
The development, machinery and impact of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereafter ECHR) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafler HRA) are 
explained in the next chapter. This section simply explains why the ECHR and HRA 
have been chosen as the focus of this research. In a thesis about rape, a gendered act 
that impacts predominantly upon the lives of women, it may appear strange to be 
focusing on a generic convention (i. e. the ECHR) rather than a convention aimed 
specifically at women (there are six international human rights instruments 
specifically designed to protect the rights of women). The reasons for this are 
threefold. 
The first reason is related to enforcement machinery. The ECHR allows the right of 
individual petition (since 1966 individuals have been able to take cases directly to a 
European court based in Strasbourg once all domestic remedies have been exhausted), 
which means that the rights contained within the ECHR are directly enforceable (at 
1 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1967, Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979, Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women 1993, Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1952, Declaration on 
the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict 1974, Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1999. 
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least in theory and in contrast to the more recent European Charter of Fundamental 
Freedoms). Likewise, since the introduction of the HRA all courts in the UK must, 
since 2000 when it came into force, take the convention rights it guarantees (which 
are almost identical to those contained within the ECHR) into consideration when 
making a judgment. All UK legislation must be compatible with the convention rights 
and all public authorities must act in a compliant manner. This means that the ECHR 
and HRA are likely to have more potential to have a direct impact on the lives of 
women in the UK than conventions that have no enforcement machinery. The need 
for enforcement machinery to guarantee rights is one that is readily acknowledged by 
those writing about women's rights: 
There are now about tivo dozen significant international instrunients purporting to 
protect the rights of ivoinen or renzedy-based inequalities. But rights niean little 
without corresponding reinedies, and relnedies are unlikely without institutions. 
(Fellmeth, 2000 pg. 727) 
When we look at some of the most extreme violations of women's human rights on a 
mass level, it is clear that conventions with no enforcement machinery mean little to 
women whose rights are being violated. Fraser (1999), for example, highlights that 
when the Taliban took power of Afghanistan in 1994 and insisted on human rights 
abuses such as forbidding women to work outside of the home, the acts of the Taliban 
clearly abrogated principles under both the UDHR and CEDAW but these were of 
little use to halt the abuse. Likewise, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
specifically prohibited rape in international and internal conflicts 2, yet (as a rhetorical 
commitment) women did not benefit from this in real terms (Human Rights Watch, 
1995). 
This is not to suggest that just because the ECHR and the HRA have the enforcement 
machinery to guarantee human rights that it can be taken as a given that they will be 
guaranteed; there can be substantial gaps between the guarantee of rights (rights in 
theory) and the actual ability to use and benefit from rights (rights in practice). This 
issue is explored in more depth in Chapter One. For now, the point is that both the 
2 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states 'Women shall be especially protected against any 
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault' 
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ECHR and the HRA are in theory enforceable which is the first reason they have been 
chosen. 
The second reason for focusing on the ECHR and HRA is that the analysis of generic 
convention rights allow comparisons to be made between how women and men, in 
their different positions within the criminal justice system (as victims and as 
defendants) are using rights and how such rights are balanced. Thirdly, and finally, 
because the HRA impacts on law at the national level it allows some analysis of any 
impact on problems that were identified before it was incorporated into domestic law. 
Violence against women and hunian rights 
Feminist theorising about violence against women and human rights is still very much 
in its formative years in the UK. This is in sharp contrast to the international arena, 
where this has been developing over previous decades, as acknowledged in relation to 
violence against women in the CEDAW thematic shadow report: 
The VA JV sector in the UK is just coining to see and hopefully to use the potential in 
international hunian rights laiv both to push for appropriate actions fi-oni our 
govenunent in the UK and to hold it to account through an inteniational arena. 
Monien's groups elsewhere in the world have been doing this for sonze years; ive 
would do ivell tofolloiv their lead. (Sen et al., 2004 pg. iii) 
It is unclear why the UK has been slow to follow, however it is important to note that 
this criticism is not solely aimed at feminists and 'women's issues'; the social 
sciences as a whole have been criticised by their legal colleagues for failing to 
research the social implications of the ECHR (Freeman, 2002; Greer, 2004). 
It is probably true to say that many people in the UK have not embraced the HRA 
with ftilly open arrns. The media have been quick to criticise some of the arguments 
that have been made under the HRA, using headlines such as 'INien does a right 
beconie vety ivrong? ' (Evening News, 2002 3) and "Hunian Rights' are iwongfoi- 
3 About a ban on the filming of a school nativity play in Edinburgh because of concerns over the right 
to privacy contained within the HRA (Article 10). The parents subsequently complained that the ban 
had infringed their right to a family life (Article 8). 
II 
Bi-itain' (The Daily Telegraph, 2004 4 ). Human rights claims made by high profile 
offenders such as Robert Thompson, Jon Venables and Dennis Nilsen have received 
particular attention because of the paradoxical nature of their argument (i. e. that they 
should have their human rights respected even though they have destroyed all human 
rights belonging to another). The Conservative Party have been quick to follow the 
path laid by the media, criticising the introduction of the HRA for creating a 
6compensation culture' and promising a full review of the HRA with the possibility of 
reforming or even repealing it if they were to gain power. In an Article in August 
2004 entitled 'Victim nation - Britain's compensation culture', which was 
subsequently cited in most of the day's media, shadow home secretary David Davies 
distinguished between 'Inanan fights'(i. c. he used inverted commas around the terrn) 
and genuine hunzan rights, complaining that 'human rights' reward 'criminal 
troublemakers' and 'compensation-chasers' (Davies, 2004). 
Rather than focusing on 'criminal troublemakers' and 'compensation-chasers', the 
feminist endeavour has been to focus on the role of gender and power: 
A perverse but consistent result of rights-based strategies is the reinforceinent of the 
inost privileged groups in society (Palmer, 1996 pg. 225). 
Experience of entrenched rights elsewhere has shown their tendency to operate in the 
interests of the poweiful, while leaving the powerless unprotected ... (McColgan, 2000 preface) 
The concern here is not'simply that women will not benefit through legal human 
rights, but that they might end up in aw orse position than they were without them. 
This is not a new concern specific to human rights, but one that has been identified in 
relation to legal rights more generally for some time (Smart, 1989). 
Rape defendants have used the right to a fair trial to challenge rape shield laws aimed 
at limiting questioning about a victim's sexual history evidence which has resulted in 
the interpretation of legislation changing in England and Wales (R vA5) and 
legislation struck down in Canada (R v Seaboyer). Under the right to a fair trial 
4 Describing how convicted men in prison may be able to father children through artificial 
insemination because of the HRA (Article 8). 
5 [2001] 1 WLR 789 
6 [1991] 83 DLR (4th) 193 
12 
provision within the Canadian Charter of Rights defendants have also being given 
access to personal records held on victims from schools therapists, counsellors and 
psychiatrists (R v O'Connoiý) and a rape case was discontinued because records from 
a rape crisis centre had been destroyed (R v Carosella 8). In the USA, McColgan 
(2000) describes how legislation allowing young rape victims to testify from behind a 
screen was classed as breaching the defendant's 'right to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him' under the Sixth Amendment (Coy v State qfkiva 9 ). 
Cases where rape victims have used human rights are more difficult to find. In 1998 
Jane Doe successfully used the Canadian Charter of Rights to sue for damages by 
demonstrating how the Toronto police had failed to protect her right to life, liberty 
and security and right to equality when she was raped by a serial rapist (Jane Doe v 
Board of Conunissioners of Police for Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto'). In 
another case, an application was made under the ECHR in JM v United Kingdoin H 
where Julia Mason argued that the ordeal she went through in court when she was 
cross-examined by the defendant in person constituted inhuman and degrading 
treatment 12 (in violation of Article 3 and/or 8), that she had had no effective remedy 
to address this through the UK courts (Article 13) and that this was discriminatory 
(Article 14) because child victims were protected from this form of cross-examination 
but adults were not. No judgement was made in this case because the government 
offered financial compensation to Julia Mason and agreed to change the law so that 
the situation would not occur again 13 . 
This is where the knowledge base on the impact that the ECHR and HRA might have 
on the rape prosecution process ends, and many of these cases come from outside of 
the UK. Until now there has been no systematic analysis (i. e. looking at all cases 
within clearly defined sample boundaries) of human rights arguments made in rape 
cases under the ECHR and HRA. 
7 [199514 SCR411 
8 [199711 SCR 80 
9 [1988] 487 US 1012 
[1998] 160 DLR (40) 697. See also Doe (2003). 
Application no. 41518/98 (decision of 280' September 2000) 
2 She was physically sick during cross-examination and was admitted to hospital after the hearing. 
13 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 prohibited defendants from cross-examining 
victim-witnesses in person. 
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Thesis structure 
The first two chapters in this thesis are literature reviews. However, because so little 
is known about how legal human rights are used in rape cases (the cases listed in the 
previous section being the extent of what is known) the chapters instead review legal 
and social science literature on human rights, women and human rights, and rape to 
set up a solid base for the data analysis chapters. The literature review chapters are 
quite lengthy and avoid discussing individual cases that are contained within the data 
analysis chapters, however they are necessary because they contain bodies of 
literature that have not previously been syntliesised. 
Chapter One describes the machinery of the ECHR and HRA and their implications 
for policy and legislative change. The chapter goes on to show that there is 
disagreement over the usefulness of legal human rights for women and describes the 
'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' pictures. The focus of Chapter Two is on rape, with 
theories of rape, substantive rape law and issues relating to the trial process discussed. 
The chapter then explains the 'attrition problem' at the base of many critiques of how 
rape is dealt with within the criminal justice system and shows how this can be 
theorised in relation to legal and criminological literature on miscarriages of justice 
and models of criminal justice. 
The methodology is explained in Chapter Three, starting with a discussion of the 
problems facing social science researchers using law to investigate a social problem. 
Avoiding the problems many theories of women and human rights have fallen into, 
Chapter Three clearly defines how the cases analysed were chosen and the boundaries 
(self and externally imposed) of the sample. The chapter describes the process of 
analysis and builds conceptual frameworks that may act as a starting point for 
research on other forms of violence against women or even other policy arenas. 
Chapter Four is the first of three data analysis chapters and focuses on holv human 
rights have been used by rape victims and defendants. Chapters Five and Six then 
analyse the outcomes of the victims' and defendants' cases (respectively), defining 
success here as whether the case was 'won' or 'lost'. Describing the reasoning behind 
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the judgments, these two chapters also answer more specific questions such as how 
the margin of appreciation was used. Chapter Seven takes the notion of 'success' 
further, looking at the impact of the judgment and its potential to create change. 
Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, drawing together the main findings with 
previous literature. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
1.1 Introduction 
The question 'what are hunian rights? ' is one that has been the subject of much 
theorising. There is no ahistorical, definitive, universally accepted definition of what 
the term 'human rights' actually means. Different ideologies produce different 
meanings of what human rights are, to the extent that '... the rhetoric of hunian rights 
is really a description of ideals - and a controversial set of ideals at that' (Heard, 
2001 pg. 1). This chapter describes the distinction between moral and legal human 
rights, shows how the human rights we have contained in law are socially constructed 
and provides an outline of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(generally shortened to the European Convention on Human Rights) and the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The later parts of the chapter summarise the development of the 
international women's human rights movement and set up 'optimistic' and 
4pessimistic' pictures based on an analysis of literature on women and legal human 
rights. 
1.2 What are human rights? 
Early discussions of human rights were based on the distinction between legal and 
moral rights, a distinction that is still sometimes made today. Legal, or Justiceable' 
rights are, quite simply, those that exist in and are enforceable under the law and are 
hence able to be tried in a court of justice. Conversely, 'moral' or 'natural' rights 
refer to those rights that, in their early days were based on religious beliefs; that 
which was perceived as being 'naturally right' in the eyes of God. The later basis for 
moral or natural rights moved away from religion to an entitlement that was derived 
from nature and, later still, the basic rights that an individual needs to fully participate 
in civil society. The term 'legal rights' is generally used to describe the rights that 
individuals actually hold, whereas the terrns 'moral' or 'natural rights' are used to 
describe the rights that a particular group of people argue they need to fully 
participate in society but are denied by the law. For example, women argued pre 1928 
that they had the moi-al Hght to vote but it was not until 1928 that they actually held 
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the legal right to vote on an equal basis to men. Individuals may therefore claim that 
they have a moral right to something without actually having the legal right to it, and 
legal rights may stem from what have previously been claimed as moral rights. 
Some well-known rights theorists, such as Hohfeld (1919) wrote exclusively about 
legal rights, and Bentham famously dismissed moral rights as 'conceptual nonsense' 
(Bentham, 1792; cited by Campbell, 2001), arguing that rights are created through 
law and hence that there could be no such thing as 'moral' or 'natural' rights. In an 
attack on the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which was 
based upon the 'natural' and 'sacred' rights of man, he famously stated: 
Right, the substantive right, is the child of law fi-onz real laws conle real rights; but 
fi-oin laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets, rhetoriticians, and dealers in 
inoral and intellectual poisons conie imaginmy rights, a bastard brood of nionsters, 
gorgons and chinieras dire. (pg. 69 in 1987 ed; emphasis in original). 
Others however, such as Mill, believed that moral and legal rights were closely 
connected: 
When ive call anything a person's right, ive Inean that he has a valid clahn on society 
to protect hinz in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of 
education and opinion (Mill, 186 1; cited by Campbell, 200 1) 
Nickel (2003) points out that most contemporary writers agree that the concept of a 
right relates to both law and morality. Logically, the ideal is that legal rights should 
emerge from moral rights and that moral rights should be transformed into legal 
rights. This, of course, is not always the case because different groups of individuals 
have different conceptions of what moral rights are and indeed what is and is not 
4moral'. 
The modem understanding of human rights is not solely limited to the distinctions 
between legal and moral rights though. The modem conception of hunian rights is of 
intei-national inoi-al and legal noi-nis that aspil-e to pl-otect all people evelylvIlere 
fi-oin sevei-e political, legal, and social abuses' (Nickel, 2003). Because only states 
can be held responsible for abuses of human rights, it follows that international 
human rights law is mainly concerned with the regulation of public power in the form 
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of the state. This follows liberal theorising that individuals need their private lives to 
be protected from the misuse of state power. 
This thesis is concerned exclusively with justiceable rights under the ECHR and their 
partial incorporation into domestic law under the HRA. However, it is acknowledged 
that these rights did not just 'appear' but are the outcome of a political process. They 
represent what are believed to be the basic rights needed to protect the individual 
from the state in civil society - at least by the individuals (predominantly white men) 
who have the power to draft such declarations and conventions. Just as there is no 
universally accepted definition of human rights, there is no universally accepted list 
of exactly what rights are necessary. Kennedy (2004) points out that while the right to 
carry weapons is a fiercely protected right in the USA this would never be accepted 
as a right in the UK. Even where rights in different charters appear similar on first 
sight, the way they are interpreted and the weight that they are accorded varies. For 
example, Lacey (2004) contrasts the right to free speech from its absolutist position in 
the USA (free speech highly valued and allowed in nearly all circumstances, even if 
this results in han-n to other individuals) with the wide derogation conditions in the 
ECHR (freedom of expression subject to wide ranging restrictions deemed necessary 
in a democratic society). Human rights as they are discussed in this thesis are 
accepted as being socially constructed, recognising that they are created and recreated 
in particular social conditions at particular times in history (Stammers, 1999). As with 
law as a whole, charters of human rights are 'living' documents in that they are 
always open to interpretation and reinterpretation. How they are interpreted, for what 
purposes, and by whom, vary between charters, but also over time and place. 
1.3 The development of international human rights law 
Following the atrocities of the Second World War, a new organisation was 
established to prevent further conflict on this scale occurring in the future. The United 
Nations (hereafter UN) was established in 1945, replacing the League of Nations, 
with the primary aim of maintaining international peace and security (UN Charter, 
Article 1 (1)). While the UN Charter was radical in its inclusion of human rights, it 
did not contain any detail on what the term 'human rights' was to cover, and nor did it 
specify any State responsibility for the respect and promotion of them (Smith, 2003). 
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However, the UN has since become crucial in the development of international 
human rights. So much so, that the origin of international human rights law is 
generally acknowledged as being the LJN's adoption of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (hereafter UDHR) in 1948. 
In the introduction to the UDHR the UN proclaim it as: 
... a coinnion standard of achievenzentfor all peoples and all nations, 
to the end that 
eveg individual and evety organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to proniote respect for these rights and 
fi-eedoins and by progressive ineasures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both anzong the peoples of 
Meniber States theniselves and aniong the peoples of territories under their 
Jurisdiction. (UDHR: proclamation) 
The rights set out in the UDHR are listed as thirty numbered 'Articles'. These include 
civil and political rights, such as: 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. (UDHR, Article 1) 
Evegone is entitled to all the rights and fi-eedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status ... (UDHR, 
Article 2) 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty andsecurity ofperson. (UDHR, Article 3) 
Also included in the UDHR are what are known as 'second generation' rights. These 
are economic, social and cultural rights such as: 
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, inchiding reasonable limitation of working 
hours andperiodic holidays with pay. (UDHR, Article 24) 
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of ivedlock-, shall eiýqy the same social protection. (UDHR, 
Article 25, part 2) 
Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children. (UDHR, Article 26, part 3) 
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This list of rights is impressive, even from the limited selection quoted above. They 
are clearly designed to be inclusive, despite a masculine linguistic bias (e. g. the use of 
the word brotherhood in Article 1) and the male majority of the group who drafted the 
rights 14) . However, the UDHR is just as its name implies -a 'declaration' and nothing 
more, despite the drafters' hopes that an enforceable version would soon follow. 
There has never been, and it is highly unlikely that there ever will be, any 
enforcement machinery although it is said to have 'strong moral force' (Smith, 2003, 
pg. 39). What this means is that neither states nor individuals have any form of 
redress if they believe any of their rights contained within the UDHR had been 
breached. Additionally, states were not required to sign up to the declaration (as they 
would if it had been a treaty) in order to join the UN, which has resulted in states 
paying 'lip service' rather than actually complying with the UDHR (Nickel, 2003). 
The criticisms outlined above however are not meant to suggest that the UDHR was 
unimportant in the development of international human rights law, because this is far 
from the case. The significance of the UDHR lay in setting a standard and a blueprint 
for subsequent human rights treaties (Morsink, 1999), many of which do have 
enforcement machinery and are capable of effecting real change. Fifty-five years ago, 
pre UN and UDHR, there was no international human rights law whereas there now 
exists an impressive body of such law (Shestack, 1998). Since the UDHR over a 
hundred international human rights instruments have been developed., These include 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - (and its two Optional Protocols) and the 
Convention against Torture. Regional conventions have also been developed, most 
significantly the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention 
on Human Rights, the African Char-ter on Human and People's Rights and, more 
recently, the European Charter of Fundamental Freedoms. Although these treaties and 
conventions should, theoretically, protect the rights of all humans, a number of 
conventions have also been developed which focus specifically on the rights of 
15 certain 'groups of humans' . These include the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 1989, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the 
14 Although 10 of the 12 main participants involved in drafting the declaration were mate the body was 
actually chaired by a woman (Eleanor Roosevelt). See Eide et al. (1992) for a fuller commentary of the 
development of the UDHR. 
15 1 avoid the term 'minority' rights here because women are clearly not a minority group numerically. 
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (and 
its Optional Protocol). 
1.4 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The Council of Europe is the organization responsible for the protection of human 
rights in Europe. It was founded in 1949 by ten member states that were concerned 
about security and a perceived threat from the East. Since then many more countries 
have signed up to the Council of Europe, with a huge increase during the 1990s when 
the Council was able to expand East. The Council of Europe introduced the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950, and it is now widely acknowledged 
as being the most developed of the regional organisations with jurisdiction for the 
protection of human rights (e. g. Smith, 2003). It was initially designed for states to be 
able to take other states to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in respect 
of alleged violations of human rights (known as inter-state applications) but in 1966 it 
also became possible for an individual to pursue their rights in the ECtHR once all 
domestic remedies had been exhausted (known as 'individual petitions' or 
capplications') 16 . The ECHR therefore acts 
both as a contract between European 
signatory states but also as a framework in which individuals' rights are promoted 
and guaranteed. To date, 45 states have signed and ratified the ECHR 17 . Some states 
signed up to and ratified the ECHR more or less immediately 18 while others joined 
more recently 19 . 
The human rights contained within the ECHR are civil and political in nature, with 
their basis in those in the previously described UDHR (particularly from the first 
part)20 . The rights and freedoms are set out as 'protocols' and 'Articles'. Article 12 
1 
is rarely mentioned as it simply refers to an 'obligation to respect human rights', 
meaning that the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR shall be available to 
16 The compulsory nature of individual petition however did not come in to force until November 1998 
(Protocol Eleven). 
17 There is a common misunderstanding that a country must be part of the EU to ratify the ECHR. This 
is not the case and there are many states which have ratified the ECHR but who are not part of the EU. 
18 The UK signed in 1950 and were one of the first to ratify it (in 195 1) 
19 Serbia and Montenegro were the most recent to sign (in 2004) 
20 Social and economic human rights are guaranteed under the European Social Charter 1961. 
21 1 generally follow the standard convention of writing the number in words if it is ten or below and 
numbers thereafter except when referring to the Articles where for ease I use numbers throughout. 
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everyone within their jurisdiction. Articles 2 -14 contain the substantive fights and 
freedoms: the right to life (Article 2); prohibition of torture (Article 3); prohibition of 
slavery and forced labour (Article 4); fight to liberty and security (Article 5); right to 
a fair trial (Article 6); no punishment without law (Article 7); right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 8); freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(Article 9); freedom of expression (Article 10); freedom of assembly and association 
(Article 11); fight to marry (Article 12); fight to an effective remedy (Article 13); and 
prohibition of discrimination (Article 14). 
The ftill text of the Articles is too lengthy to be included here and can be found in 
Appendix One to this thesis. Likewise, it is not possible to explain here the uses and 
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limitations of the Articles except for an extremely short overview . Briefly, Articles 
2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 4 (1) (no-one shall be held in slavery or 
servitude) and 7 (no punishment without law) are 'non-derogable' rights, meaning 
that states may not 'opt out' or 'derogate' from these rights even in times of 
emergency or war 23 States can derogate from any of the other rights in times of 
emergency or war 24 as the UK did (controversially) regarding Article 5 in 2001 
following the September 1 Ith terrorist attacks. All the rights with the exception of 
Article 3 (prohibition of torture) have exceptions listed against them. For Articles 2- 
7 (excluding 3) these exceptions are very specific, whereas for Articles 8- 11 there is 
a second paragraph listing a wide range of restrictions which generally relate to 
national security, the protection of morals, the rights of others and public safety 
(Fenwick, 2002). The margin of appreciation (area of discretion) is particularly 
important when considering Articles 8-11. This is discussed in the next section. 
Article 12 (right to marry) does not contain a second such limitations paragraph, 
however it has a broad qualification in the first paragraph as 'according to the 
national laws'. Articles 13 (right to an effective remedy) and 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) are not freestanding rights and can only be used if there is also an 
alleged violation of one of the substantive rights. However, a violation of 13 or 14 
can still be found even if it is judged that the substantive right has not been violated. 
22 For a well-written in-depth examination of the Articles see Fenwick (2002) 
23 Article 2 is generally classed as being non-derogable although it does not apply to lawful acts of war 
24 Article 15 concerns derogation from the rights and freedoms in case of public emergency 
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Some Articles are used less frequently than others. For example, there have been 
very few cases brought under Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) and 
those that have been brought have failed. It has been argued that this right is largely 
irrelevant in modem Europe (Fenwick, 2002). Although forced labour clearly does 
exist in modem Europe (e. g. forced housework in some domestic violence situations, 
forced prostitution of 'pimped' or trafficked women and children) no applications 
have been made under this Article, perhaps because of an inability to argue state 
liability or because of a lack of access to legal remedies of those groups who 
experience the abuses. In fact, the only applications that have been made relate to 
lawyers objecting to compulsory 'legal aid' style work (no violations have been found 
using this argument). Article 6 (right to a fair trial) is the right most frequently found 
to be violated because of its wide scope whereby even if a claim under another 
Article fails there may still be a violation of Article 6 if the procedure was found to be 
unfair (Fenwick, 2002). The same rationale applies to Article 13 (right to an effective 
remedy) and Article 14 (right to freedom from discrimination) although to find a 
violation of these Articles a 'stand-alone' Article must have also been considered. 
There are three key issues that need to be explained in relation to the ECHR as a 
backdrop to the chapters that follow: the margin of appreciation; the issue of 
competing rights; and the 'horizontal' effect. The margin of appreciation applies only 
to the ECHR whereas the issue of conflicting rights and the 'horizontal' effect applies 
to both the ECHR and the HRA, though in slightly different ways. Because the 
'horizontal' effect has the potential to have more impact in relation to the HRA than 
the ECHR this is discussed under the HRA section. 
1.4.1 The Margin of Appreciation 
The tenn 'margin of appreciation' is taken from the French 'marge d'appreciation' 
which is a form of judicial review used by the Counscil d'Ettat (O'Donnell, 1982). 
The margin of appreciation doctrine refers to a degree of discretion allowed to 
member states in respect of convention rights. The rationale for this is that national 
legal systems are thought to be better placed to balance individual's rights with 
societal interests than international judges sitting in Strasbourg. Where the margin of 
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appreciation lies is far from static, and different Articles and individual judges choose 
where the parameters of the margin lie in any particular case (in theory but not always 
in practice following case law). Although the margin of appreciation has occasionally 
been used in cases concerning Articles 2-7 it is intended, and is used mostly, in cases 
relating to Articles 8-11 where the restrictions are less specific (as discussed above). 
Some have argued that the margin of appreciation is an important part of the 
Convention's machinery (see for example Merrills, 1993). It plays a key role in 
ensuring that the Convention remains a 'living instrument' in that it allows the current 
societal context to be taken into consideration when making judgments. For example, 
it allowed the evolution of democratic societies responses to terrorism to be 
considered in the case of Klass v Gerniany 25 when judging whether surveillance 
interfered with an individual's freedom of correspondence under Article 8 (Waldock, 
1980). 
Others have been more critical of the margin doctrine. The most frequent criticism is 
that the Court fails to demonstrate consistency when deciding the breadth of the 
margin of appreciation (e. g. Lavender, 1997, Schokkenbrock, 1998). Jones (1995) 
argues that because of this lack of consistency the margin of appreciation devalues 
the rights, and European Court Judge De Meyer has argued that the margin of 
appreciation should be abandoned altogether: 
I believe that it is high timefor the Court to banish that conceptftom its reasoning. It 
has already delayed too long in abandoning this haclazeyed phrase and recanting the 
relativism it implies ... where human rights are concerned, there is no room for a 
margin of appreciation which would enable the states to decide what is acceptable 
and what is not ... the boundwy not to be overste ed must be as clear andprecise as TP 
possible. It isfor the Court, not each state individually, to decide that issue, and the 
Court's views must apply to eveiyone within the jurisdiction of each state. (Z v 
Finland 26 , partly dissenting opinion of De Meyer J. ) 
The margin of appreciation therefore reduces the universality of Convention rights, 
resulting in different levels of rights for different individuals depending upon their 
particular state's attitude towards different issues - often those relating to morality. 
25 [1978] 2 EHRR 214 
26 [1998] 25 EHRR 371 
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This was found in the case of Handyside v UK27 in 1976 where the publisher of a 
book called 'The Little Red Schoolbook' (which contained a section on sexual acts) 
had criminal charges brought against him for having in his possession an obscene 
publication for gain. Because the book was originally written and published in 
Denmark and had subsequently been published in a number of other countries 
(including Sweden, Italy, France and Italy) and no proceedings had been taken 
against him in Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, the applicant 
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complained that his right to freedom of expression (Article 10) had been breached . 
The UK Government argued that they had not breached the applicant's right to 
freedom of expression because the actions they took were necessary for the protection 
of morals in a democratic society. Both the Commission and the Court agreed with 
the Government that there had been no violation of Article 10, relying upon the states 
margin of appreciation. 
What this case demonstrates is the way the margin of appreciation allows variation 
depending on the state's moral convictions (which are likely to be in turn guided by 
the values advocated by the political party in power). The question then, is what role 
(if any) cultural relativism should play in a Convention that makes qlaims to 
guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms in a unh, ei-sal fashion and 
whether or not the margin of appreciation is gendered. There is no literature available 
as to whether the margin of appreciation is applied differently to women's rights 
claims, and this will be one of the issues considered within this thesis in terms of rape 
cases. 
1.4.2 Dealing with competing rights 
Rights may compete or conflict with other rights on two levels. On the first level, an 
individual's rights may compete or conflict with another's rights - an individual 
enforcing their individual rights may in turn result in a breach of another individual's 
rights. An example of this is if one individual uses their right to free speech and in 
doing so infringes another individual's right to a fair trial (example given by Fenwick, 
27 [ 1976] 1 EHRR 737 
28 An unsuccessful prosecution took place in Scotland 
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2002). On the second level, an individual's rights may compete or be in conflict with 
the rights of society or a particular group of individuals (e. g. women, religious groups 
or black and minority ethnic groups) where a right to free speech may 'damage' 
society in some way. 
Such 'damage' to society is generally explained in terms of morality, and Nowlin 
(2002) highlights that the legal enforcement of morality often focuses on sexual 
behaviour. This is the case even where there appears to be little or no hann to society 
by the actions of individuals. For example, in Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v UK29 the 
applicants were convicted under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 when they 
videoed themselves engaging in consensual sadomasochistic, activities; acts which 
they had voluntarily participated in over a period of ten years. The ECtHR accepted 
that their conviction interfered with their right to a private life (Article 8) but judged 
that the interference was proportional and necessary in a democratic society. Fenwick 
(2002) argues that both the House of Lords and the ECtHR judgment showed distaste 
for sadomasochistic, acts and suggests that it was this lack of sympathy for the 
activities in question that was actually the guiding force in their judgments. 
There are also examples where judgments appear to be at best inconsistent, and at 
worst completely contradictory, suggesting that rights may be balanced in different 
ways in different cases. For example, Norrie (2001) highlights that in the case of 
McCann v UK30 it was found that the UK violated the right to life of three suspected 
IRA members who were shot in Gibraltar, but in the case of Andi-onicou and 
Constantinou v Cyprus 31 Cyprus was not found to have breached the right to life 
following intentional shooting by the state. Norrie (2001) also argues that there are 
some cases that he describes as being 'seeiningly sti-ong coniplaints' (pg. 266) (of 
which he cites a rape within marriage case which is discussed later) where the 
complaints were not upheld. 
29 [1997] 24 EHRR 39 
30 [ 1996] 21 EHRR 97 
31 [ 1998] 25 EHRR 491 
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1.5 The Human Rights Act 1998 
The HRA came into force in England and Wales on the 2 nd October 2000 and has 
been argued by some to be the most important piece of legislation of the 20th Century 
(e. g. Ashcroft et al, 2000), or even since the Magna Carta in relation to the legal 
status of individuals if the potential of the horizontal effect is fully realised (Davies, 
2000). However, the HRA does not actually give individuals any additional rights to 
those guaranteed under the ECHR. Individuals have had the right to life, a fair trial 
etc. since 1966 because the rights in the HRA are essentially identical to those in the 
ECHR. This is not to undermine the significance of the HRA or to suggest it is 
inconsequential. Prior to its introduction pursuing a human rights claim was an 
expensive and lengthy procedure, often taking five years or more to reach a judgment 
from the ECtHR in Strasbourg if the case got as far as a judgment 32 . Additionally, 
because most other European countries had already developed 'Bills' or 'Charters' of 
Rights which protected rights in domestic courts this meant that the UK was seen on 
the surface to have an extremely poor human rights record because cases were taken 
33 directly to the ECtHR since there were no domestic remedies available 
The substantive rights and freedoms contained within the HRA are effectively the 
same as those described earlier in the ECHR. The exception is Article 13 (right to 
effective remedy), which was not incorporated into the HRA. Importantly, section six 
of the HRA states that 'It is unlaivfulfor a public authority to act in a way 10lich is 
inconipatible with a Convention right'. Exactly what constitutes a 'public authority' is 
not defined within the HRA but it is accepted as including government departments, 
local authorities, courts and tribunals, and any individuals whose duties are of a 
public nature; for example the police, local authorities, social workers, probation 
officers etc. This section also applies to 'quasi-public authorities', such as Group Four 
security, whose duties are carried out on behalf of a public authority. In simple tenris, 
anyone who is carrying out a public function falls under this section with two 
32 The ECtHR is notoriously overworked and is only able to hear a fraction of the applications it 
receives (Fenwick, 2002; Greer, 2004). It was reformed in 1998 (when the Commission was abolished) 
but the number of applications it receives is rising very swiftly. In 2003 it received 17,787 applications 
relating to 18,028 individual applicants (Council of Europe, 2003) and in 2004 it received 21,084 
applications relating to 21,191 individual applicants (Council of Europe, 2004). This compares with 
1,648 applications in 1991 (i. e. nearly thirteen times as many) (1991 figure cited in Fenwick, 2002). 
33 Prior to the introduction of the HRA only one country (Italy) had had more judgments against them 
than the UK. 
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exceptions. Firstly, parliament is not classed as a public authority and need not act in 
a compatible manner. The second exception is if a High Court or Court of Appeal 
rules that the domestic law in question is incompatible and cannot be read in a way to 
make it compatible. If this is the case then the court must make a declaration of 
incompatibility and parliament must decide what action to take (a declaration of 
incompatibility does not automatically invalidate the law in question). This is 
because the model of 'parliamentary sovereignty' was chosen when the HRA was 
introduced. This is explained further in the section on the impact of human rights. 
Assuming that domestic law is not declared incompatible with the HRA, if a public 
authority acts in a way that is incompatible with a right then, as with the ECHR, there 
are no criminal penalties associated with their actions. Rather, the situation must be 
remedied by reversing a decision or, as in many cases the actions have already taken 
place (for example an individual spending too long imprisoned), by awarding a 
financial award of damages. 
All new legislation must be compatible with the HRA and all existing legislation 
must be interpreted in a compatible manner as far as possible. ECHR case law must 
be taken into consideration in the domestic courts, but UK courts are not bound by 
34 decisions made in Strasbourg . It is also important to note that because of the case 
law approach both the ECHR and the HRA are 'living instruments', in that they are 
dynamic and evolving. In theory the interpretation of convention rights should 
change in line with societal attitudes and circumstances. However, this may not 
always be the case in practice as different members of society and, crucially, judges 
hold different attitudes about different issues (e. g. morality, as discussed earlier). 
However, it is this dynamic and uncertain future of how the HRA will be used and 
interpreted that makes it particularly interesting and relevant to study and monitor. It 
is also important to note that an 'interest group' or campaign cannot claim that their 
rights have been violated under the HRA, nor can they take a case to the European 
Court. This means that campaigns against specific domestic laws, for example 
advocates of rape law reform, cannot use the HRA or the ECHR directly as a 
campaign vehicle. A case can only be brought by someone who is a direct victim 
34 ECHR judgments should be used to inform judgments made in domestic courts but are not 
considered to be a binding precedent that must be followed. 
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(who must meet a 'victim test'), although they may be assisted in their case by 
campaigners or interest groups. 
1.5.1 The 'horizontal effect' 
The main effect of the ECHR and the HRA is a 'vertical' one. Vertical proceedings 
are those that are brought by individuals ('non-state actors') against the state for 
something the state has directly 'done' or 'not done'. If a 'state actor' (someone 
working on behalf of the state) directly violates an individual's human rights, for 
example if a police officer physically or sexually assaults someone in their custody 
and the state does not take appropriate actions against the police officer, then this 
would be a fairly 'clear cut' example of vertical human rights proceedings. In 
contrast, the 'horizontal effect' or 'drittwirkung' refers to the use of human rights in 
relation to state responsibility for actions between individual citizens (between two 
6non-state actors'). If, taking the above example, it was a non-state actor who 
physically or sexually assaulted another citizen then the assaulted citizen could not 
legally claim that the citizen who perpetrated the assaults had violated their human 
rights. The proceedings against the citizen would be criminal rather than rights based. 
However, the horizontal effect could come into play if it could be shown that the state 
had failed to properly protect the individual whose rights were violated. 
The case of X and Yv the NetherlandS35 is the one often cited in legal journals and 
textbooks as a prime example of the horizontal effect - how the state can be held as 
violating an individual's human rights based on han-n that was perpetrated by other 
(non-state) individuals. This case, which is analysed later in this thesis, involved a 
girl who was raped by another (non-state) individual. It was held that the state had 
failed to protect the girl from another individual because of a legal loophole and that 
the state therefore failed to fulfil its positive obligations to protect human rights. This 
case is discussed in detail later in this thesis, but for now is used simply to 
demonstrate that the ECHR has accepted that it is conceptually possible for the state 
to be held liable for the actions of non-state individuals. This suggests that the path is 
also clear for the horizontal effect to work under the HRA (Davies, 2000). 
35 [1985] 8 EHRR 235 
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Of utmost importance when considering the potential impact of the horizontal effect 
under the HRA is Section 6 which, as described above, states: 'It is unlawful for a 
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right'. 
Because a court is a public authority this means that it is unlawful for them to act in a 
way that is incompatible with a Convention right. As Davies (2000) explains, the 
logical argument therefore stands that if an individual claims that they have had their 
human rights violated then it would be unlawful for ajudge not to hear the case. Also 
of importance is that the HRA requires that all legislation be interpreted in a 
compatible manner with the rights contained within the HRA, regardless of the 
relationship or identity between the parties: 
So far as it is possible to do so, priniaty legislation and subordinate legislation nuist 
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. 
(HRA, Section 3 (1)) 
This horizontal effect under the HRA was demonstrated in Douglas and Others v 
36 Hello! Lta . In this case Catherine Zeta Jones and Michael Douglas 
had granted 
exclusive rights to OK! magazine to run an article on their wedding for a large 
amount of money. Hello! magazine and others had also bid for exclusive rights but 
their bids were rejected in favour of OK! magazine's bid. Despite high security 
including a camera ban for all staff and guests at the wedding, some photographs 
were taken other than those by OK! and these were sold to Hello! who prepared that 
months edition with these photographs. as the lead story. The applicants were 
informed that Hello! intended to distribute these magazines and the couple obtained 
an injunction which restrained the magazine's publication. At the Court of Appeal the 
decision had to be made whether or not to uphold the injunction which would mean 
destroying a whole issue of Hello! Based on the recently introduced HRA, the court's 
requirement to interpret legislation in a manner compatible with convention rights, to 
take into account the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and as a public authority to not 
violate individuals convention rights, Sedley U decided that Article 8 (right to family 
and private life) was relevant in this case. It was, nevertheless, judged that the 
injunction should be removed and Hello! were able to distribute photographs of the 
36 [2001] 2 WLR 992 
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wedding because the couple's right to privacy was outweighed by the right of 
publication (particularly since they had already sold their privacy to others). Although 
no breach was found, this judgment highlights that the UK courts are willing to 
accept that there can be a horizontal effect under the HRA because it showed that the 
courts took human rights into consideration in a case between two private parties. 
1.5.2 The politicisation of hunian rights under the HRA 
The introduction of the HRA was done amid a great deal of political 'spin'. The 
Labour government that introduced it used slogans such as 'Intinan rights come to 
life', 'bringing rights hoine', 'safeguarding your rights' and poster campaigns using 
wording such as ýyou'll probably never need it, but its nice to 10iow it's there'. Its 
introduction was one of a number of constitutional changes aimed at modernising the 
government, which has also included Scottish and Welsh devolution, freedom of 
information, an elected mayor of London, and reform of the House of Lords: 
Me believe it is right to increase individual fights, to decentralise polvel', to open lip 
government and to i-efbiwi Parliament (Tony Blair in his introduction to the Human 
Rights Bill, October 1997). 
However, political campaigns concerning the incorporation of human rights have 
been around far longer than New Labour has been. Disagreement has tended to centre 
more on how they should be incorporated rather than whether or what rights should 
be incorporated, with notable exceptions such as John Major who stated 'We have no 
need of a Bill of Rights because ive have fi-eedom' (cited by Lord Chancellor Irving, 
2002, no page no. ). A Bill of Rights has been in the Liberal Democratic Manifesto 
since 1987 and although the Conservative Manifesto of 1979 pledged to consider a 
Bill of Rights, this was not given priority once they gained power (Young, 1999). The 
Labour Party was traditionally against a Bill of Rights in the form of the 
incorporation of the ECHR but changed its policy after its 1992 defeat and put it into 
their 1997 manifesto, resulting in the HRA (Young, 1999). 
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1.6 How human rights impact on law and policy 
Any decentralisation of power through constitutional reforrn means a change to the 
policy arena. Feldman (2004a) describes the UK situation as the injection of law into 
politics and politics into law. On the one hand judges under the HRA are making 
political decisions, for example whether an infringement of a defendant's rights is 
gnecessary in a democratic society'. On the other hand, the introduction of such 
rights and the additional power that was handed over to the judiciary was a wholly 
political enterprise. 
Although there are variants of each, the incorporation of human rights follows one of 
two models; 'constitutional Bills of Rights' or 'statutory Bills of Rights'. 
Constitutional Bills of Rights, as suggested by the term, are those that have 
constitutional status. Under this model, which is the one used in the USA and Canada, 
judges have the power to 'strike down' any legislation as being incompatible with the 
Bill of Rights. Effectively, judges can replace a state's policy with one of their own. 
Under a statutory Bill of Rights however, judicial power is more restrained. Under 
this model, which is the one used by the UK and New Zealand, parliamentary 
sovereignty remains supreme over the judiciary. The 'last word' remains, at least in 
theory, with Parliament. 
Parliamentary sovereignty, or supremacy, means that Parliament has the right to pass 
whatever legislation it chooses to and no'one, including the courts, can override this 
power. There is no written, codified constitution whose rules they must operate 
37 within . In line with the statutory Bill of Rights model, under the ECHR and HRA 
parliament is supreme. Some concerns have still been raised however. Even with the 
retention of parliamentary sovereignty, it has been argued that it is still problematic 
for a democratic state to enhance to this degree the political power held by judges 
(Campbell, 2001), particularly since they have no democratic legitimacy and their 
political priorities may be far from representative of society as a whole (Loughin, 
1992). Tomkins (2001), for example, is highly sceptical about the appropriateness of 
37 Although the UK's joining of the European Union (EU) has undermined parliamentary sovereignty 
because they are bound by EU law and decisions of the European Court of Justice, sovereignty is still 
ultimately maintained because they do have the possibility of withdrawing from the EU, unlikely as 
that prospect may be. 
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judges to interpret the HRA arguing that other, perhaps more suitable, institutions 
were overlooked: 
Why should it be the unrepresentative, ovei-wheliningly white male upper-middle- 
class judiciaq of the UK's creaking courts who eiyoy the emancipation that will 
come to thein with the Hinnan Rights Act? ... why give power to these people, and 
why not give it to others? (pg. 9, emphasis in original) 
Tomkins (2001) cites ombudsmen, the Press Complaints Commission and the 
Broadcasting Standards Council as examples of how non-judicial institutions have 
been able to administrate good practice in other arenas. 
In addition to concerns about whether judges are the right people to be giving 
additional power to, it is possible that they may take more power than intended. New 
Zealand has had a statutory Bill of Rights with parliamentary supremacy since 1990 
and is the nearest model to the UK's HRA. Allan (2000) describes how the impact of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights upon the judiciary has resulted in 'turning Cal* Kent 
into Stpernzan' (pg. 613). By this he means that the judiciary has attempted to 
'upgrade' the statutory model closer towards the constitutional model and has taken 
much more political power than was originally envisaged: 
There are few differences between what judges could accomplish (ill the way of 
'giving life' to fundamental rights ) when operating a New Zealand-type Bill of 
Rights Act and what they do accomplish when operating constitutionalized and 
entrenched models. (Allan 200 1, pg. 390 emphasis in original) 
As the New Zealand Bill of Rights actually gave slightly less power to the judiciary 
than the HRA does, Allan (2001) warns that the UK may find that the line the HRA 
attempted to draw between law and politics may be even more illusionary than 
sceptics first imagined. 
Both constitutional and statutory Bills of Rights therefore entail a shifting of power 
from Parliament to individual judges, and the New Zealand experience suggests that 
the extent of this power shift may be greater in statutory Bills of Rights than is 
sometimes thought. But is giving judges more power necessarily a bad thing? With no 
political accountability, it is possible that the judiciary may be more likely to uphold 
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minority rights claims, particularly ones around recognition, that the legislature would 
not, in fear of losing support from the electorate majority. Indeed, the idea that the 
judiciary could be 'hijacked' or 'hoodwinked' by a wave of feminist demands was 
raised as a concern in Canada (Fudge, 2001). 
Unfortunately, this situation has been found to lead to some degree of 'game playing' 
between the judges and the executive elsewhere. Feldman (2004a) describes the 
constitutional Bill of Rights model as the 'give it a run and see if ive can get away 
ivith it' model, because laws which appeal to the majority (and hence gain votes in 
elections) can be introduced which will simply be struck down in the court when they 
fail to protect the rights of minorities. McColgan (2000) gives an example of this 
where politicians in the USA have introduced strong anti-abortion legislation to 
6score points' from right wing voters while being content that the legislation will be 
struck down as being unconstitutional and the right to abortion will be protected. 
Although in this example the judiciary may be seen as pro-feminist, it must ultimately 
be remembered that feminists do not hold a monopoly of the 'hijacking' and 
'hoodwinking' of the judiciary. 
1.6.1 The interpretation of legislation under the HRA 
Judges have always had to 'interpret' law, but the degree to which they have had to 
'make' law is debatable and changes over time and between judges. This is what is 
known as 'judicial politics' or sometimes 'judge made law'. Legal reasoning is key to 
the legitimacy of law. Most of the time a judge will carefully follow legal reasoning. 
In other cases there may appear to be different reasons guiding their judgement such 
as extra-legal factors. In very rare instances a judge will actually admit to this. 
Holland and Webb (2001) for example cite a 'surprise admission' made by Lord 
Denning in lVestei-n Excavating v Shaip that he would not be following his own legal 
reasoning from a previous judgement because his previous reasoning was not actually 
'correct'. He argued that his previous judgement had, however, been necessary in the 
name of 'justice': 
It was not i-eally [a case thatfell within the definition of disinissal] ... but we had to 
sti, etch it a bit ... 
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So what is 'correct' legal reasoning? It is generally acknowledged that three 'rules' 
exist as primary aids to the interpretation of law (the literal rule, the golden or 
purposive rule, and the mischief rule). In reality, these 'rules' are far from discrete, 
are imprecise and rather vague. Judges can choose which rules to apply, and may 
apply more than one rule in the same case and should be viewed more as crude labels 
than as actual 'rules' (Holland and Webb, 2001). 
The literal rule states that judges should simply apply legislation and case law to the 
material facts that they have in front of them. From this perspective, judges should 
have no role at all in 'making law' or even 'doing justice': 
Ifpeople and Parliament come to think that the judicial power is to be confined by 
nothing other than the judge's sense of what is right ... confidence in the judicial 
system will be replaced by fear of it becoming uncertain and arbitrary in its 
application (Lord Scannan in Duport Steels v Sirs 38) 
TPhere the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is notfor the 
judges to inventfanciful ambiguities as an excuseforfailing to give effect to its plain 
meaning because they consider the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, 
or even unjust or inintoral (Lord Diplock in Duport Steel v Sirs3) 
Applying the literal rule means that judges are not called upon to consider the 
consequence of their judgement; the important factor is that their analysis is 
linguistically correct (Holland and Webb, 2001). Where a term is ambiguous the 
meaning should be found in a dictionary rather than what a judge interprets it to 
mean. This means that the application of the literal rule can sometimes lead to 
judgements that seem 'odd' and a feeling that justice may not have been done 
(Holland and Webb, 2001). 
The golden or pinposive i-itle is sometimes used when adoption of the literal rule 
would produce an 'absurd' result. As such, it can be seen as an accessory to or a 
'shadow' of the literal rule (Holland and Webb, 2001). According to Lord Simon in 
38 [ 198011 All ER 529, at 55 1. 
39 Duport Steel v Sirs [198011 WLR 142, [1980] 1 All ER 529 at 541 
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Stock v Frank Jones (Tipton) LtcI4O the golden rule should be used in favour of the 
literal rule in cases where: 
a) there is a clear andgross anomaly; 
b) Parliament could not have envisaged the anoynaly and would not have accepted its 
presence; 
c) the anomaly can be obviated without detriment to the legislative intent; and 
d) the language of the statute allowsfor such modification. 
This rule appears to take more of a 'common sense' approach when compared with 
the literal rule, however a degree of interpretation is needed in order to apply this 
rule. For example, a statute must be interpreted as having a clear and gross anomaly. 
Finally, the inischiefritle, or the grand inischiefrule when taken to its extremes, is not 
as its name suggests a rule allowing judges to make 'mischievous' judgements! 
Rather it means looking at what 'mischief' Parliament were intending to deal with in 
the legislation under question and asking what judgement would correlate with 
Parliaments intentions as opposed to the draflspersons words (the latter being the 
literal rule). 
The use of the mischief rule was widened in 1992 in a landmark judgement that has 
since allowed judges to consult and cite Hansard (Pepper v Hart 41) in certain cases in 
order to clarify Parliamentary intention. Pre-Parlimentary documents, for example the 
Law Commission's reports may also be consulted. Again, it is Lord Denning who has 
pushed the mischief rule to its extremity (known as the 'grand' style of the purposive 
approach when pushed this far). In a domestic violence case concerning an injunction 
under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (1976), he went 
against previous case law, arguing that: 
Socialfitstice requires that personal rights should, in a proper sense, be given over 
rights ofproperty ... Iprefer to go by the principles underlying the out-dated notions 
of the past (Lord Denning) 
40 [ 19781 ICR 347, [197811 All ER 948 
41 [ 1992] 3 WLR 1032, [199311 All ER 42. 
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Hence, Lord Denning chose to rebel against previous interpretations in order to do 
what he thought was socially just, although there is no accepted legal definition of 
what is meant by 'social justice'. 
These three 'rules' therefore range along the spectrum from the strict following of the 
black letter law (the literal rule), to a more common-sense interpretation (the 
purposive rule), to attempts to investigate exactly what parliament intended (the 
mischief rule) which can sometimes veer towards 'judge made' law (the grand 
mischief rule). 
England and Wales have traditionally tried to draw a clean line between law and 
politics; the judiciary and the legislature. This line has always been a somewhat false 
one, or at the very least a messy one, but it is only recently that judges in England and 
Wales have been willing to accept this (in contrast to the USA where judges generally 
appear to relish their political role). In his Hamyln lectures on judicial activism, The 
Hon Justice Michael Kirkby (Kirkby, 2004) explained that until recently the 
fundamental doctrine that a judge applied rather than made the law remained. The 
accepted position was that judges do not make law, but simply apply it. Occasional 
doctrinal advances were seen as legitimate, so long as they grew strictly out of past 
precedents, not policy and certainly not social policy. This, he argues, has resulted in 
a move away from the rule of literal interpretation towards the principle of purposive 
construction. 
The HRA massively increases the amount of interpretive powers held by the 
judiciary. 
Under the HRA judges have the power to do four things: 
1) To make a 'declaration of incompatibility' - to declare that it is not possible to 
read a section of primary legislation in a way that is compatible with the HRA42. 
Making such a declaration does not mean that the legislation in question becomes 
42 To date, declarations of incompatibility have been made in ten cases (in a further five cases 
declarations were made but overturned on appeal). These ten cases relate to 13 sections of eight pieces 
of legislation. 
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invalid (as it would under a constitutional Bill of Rights) and parliament is not 
obliged to change it, although the consequences of not changing it would be 
significant. Apart from the political implications of a government aware of non 
HRA compliant legislation failing to remedy the situation, each person whose 
rights were then violated through the use of this legislation would have a strong 
case to take under the ECHR. 
2) To read primary legislation in a way that makes it compatible with the HRA, hence 
avoiding making a declaration of incompatibility. This may mean reading the 
legislation in a different way than that intended by parliament. The scope for 
judicial politics is potentially largest here, particularly if judges are trying too hard 
not to make a declaration of incompatibility. 
3) To strike down secondary legislation 43 that is incompatible and not able to be read 
in a compatible way. 
4) To judge that there is no incompatibility with the HRA and/or if some rights are 
infiinged that this infringement is necessary and proportionate. 
The second option described above has the greatest potential for judicial politics, 
which has the potential to go beyond the purposive or the mischief approaches to 
legal interpretation. This is because it might be necessary to read the legislation in a 
way that was not intended by Parlianient in order for it to be compatible with the 
HRA. Where the line is drawn between being able to 'read down' (using section 3) or 
having to make a declaration of incompatibility (using section 4) is in itself a matter 
of interpretation, and one that may potentially cross the boundary into politics: 
'... a meaning which departs substantially fi-om a fiaidamental feature of an Act of 
Pai-lianzent is likely to have ci-ossed the boundwy between inteipi, etatioll and 
amendment. '(Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Hoopei- v Secl-etaly of State for Mork 
and Pensions 44 , para. 40) 
43 Secondary legislation (also known as delegated or subordinate legislation) is that made by ministers 
using powers given to them through a piece of primary legislation (an Act of Parliament). 
44 Hooper v Secretaq ofStatefor Work and Pensions [2002] UKHL 10 [2002] 2 AC 291 
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Depending on how judges interpret their powers under the HRA, the potential is 
certainly there forjudges to be situated much closer to politics than ever before: 
The HRA has extended the boundaries ofpwposive inteipretation in the UK because 
of the instruction that statutoty language should be given a meaning that is 
conformable with the ECHR. Indeed, the judges are eiyoined by that Act to adopt 
such all inteipretation so long as this is ýpossible'. There is nothing quite like this ... 
anYwhere else to my knowledge ... A party oil the receiving end might complain that 
such a stretching of the meaning of the authoritative text (where a construction is 
ýpossible' but not preferable) does not conform to ail impartial exercise of the 
judicialpower. (Kirkby, 2004, pg. 32-33) 
1.6.2 How the ECHR can change policy 
Under the ECHR judges have the power to find that a right has or has not been 
breached. As under the HRA it may be judged that, although there has been an 
infringement, this was necessary and proportional, meaning that there was no breach. 
If a breach of human rights is found there are two ways that this is dealt with (through 
individual and general measures). The aims of the measures are to put an end to the 
violations that had taken place (and which may still be taking place) and to erase the 
consequences of these violations (as far as this is possible). 
1) Individual measures are the way in which most breaches are dealt with. This 
generally means the payment of just satisfaction, which covers damages and 
expenses. Legal fees are also refunded minus any legal aid already used by the 
applicant. Other individual measures are more specific to the nature of the 
violation. These may include the re-opening and re-examination of domestic 
proceedings to reconsider the applicant's position in light of the judgment. 
2) General measures have the greatest policy-making potential and are aimed at 
ensuring that similar violations do not take place. Ultimately, general measures 
may result in a change in primary legislation. Although in theory it is up to 
government(s) to decide how their legislation should be changed in order to 
prevent similar violations taking place, in practice this is often almost dictated 
because of the nature of the breach. Sometimes it is new legislation that is needed. 
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1.7 Feminist jurisprudence and hunian rights 
The terms 'feminist jurisprudence' and 'feminist legal theory' refer to the study of 
law through a feminist lens. From its marginal place in the academy in the 1960s, 
feminist ideas now permeate every area of law from equality and family through to 
tort and tax. Books and journals now exist dedicated to the study of feminism and the 
law, while many of the central tenets (particularly around discrimination) have 
become mainstreamed. Taken together as a body of knowledge, feminist legal theory 
arguably represents 'one of today's most significant challenges to contempoi-ary law 
and legal institutions' (Bartlett and Kennedy, 1991 pg. 1). Dismantling the myth of 
law's neutrality to unmask its gendered nature is a political as well as a legal task, and 
the methods used have included: 'consciousness raising/unsilencing women; asking 
'the woman question'/critique/textual deconstruction; theorising law's gendered 
nature; and feminist practical reasoning' (Barnett, 1998 pg. 19). Perhaps the most 
radical denunciation and challenge to 'malestream' law of recent times came from the 
45 Oslo school where a Department of Women's Law was established in the 1980s 
Feminist legal theory is constructed from analytic and political-ethical claims, and 
varies in many ways, including by political orientation, and methodological and 
written styles (Lacey, 2004). It is probably best thought of as a 'framework of 
analysis' (Lacey, 2004 pg. 19). In ternis of women and human rights, Bunch (1990) 
has identified four overlapping approaches. The first approach is 'women's rights as 
political and civil rights'. This involves identifying and then highlighting general 
human rights violations and linking them to gender-based violations. Women are 
'added' on to general human rights, an approach that Bunch argues does not go far 
enough. The second approach she identifies is 'women's rights as socio-economic 
fights'. With its origins among socialists and labour activists, this approach is based 
on the notion that political fights for women are meaningless without economic 
rights. The ferninisation of poverty is a main focus of this approach and this is said to 
be the root of other human rights abuses such as violence against women. Bunch 
argues that this approach focuses too narrowly upon women's economic needs, with 
the misguided assumption that other rights will follow. She points out that it has not 
45 The University of Zimbabwe and others have followed suite in the 1990s. 
40 
been proven that third world development leads to further rights for women and that a 
more transformative development process is needed. Bunch identifies the third 
approach as 'women's rights and the law'. This approach aims to make states 
accountable for violations of women's rights and involves the development of legal 
mechanisms such as CEDAW. This approach therefore envisages the realisation of 
women's rights through political and legal means. Bunch acknowledges the 
usefulness of this approach as a whole, but argues that CEDAW in particular is of 
little use in relation to violence against women. She highlights that it is seen as a 
document of secondary rights (i. e. women's rights) rather than human rights per se. 
The final approach identified by Bunch is the 'feminist transformation' of human 
rights. This involves using a feminist perspective in order to transform the whole 
concepts of human rights, which: 
relates ivoinens rights and hunzan rights, looking first at the violations ill 
wonien's lives and then asking how the hunian rights concept call change to be more 
responsive to ivonzen'(pg. 496). 
By taking women as its starting point, Bunch argues that this approach to human 
rights is the most distinctly feminist. It names women's violations as human rights 
violations without waiting for others to do so. Although now somewhat dated, 
Bunch's article has since been described as an 'inspirational call' (Friedman, 1995 pg. 
18) and even been cited, alongside Bunch's work as the Director of the Centre for 
Women's Global Leadership, as acting as a stimulus to the start of the international 
women's human rights movement (Friedman, 1995). Section 1.9 on women and legal 
human rights (below) elaborates on feminist jurisprudence issues as they relate to 
human rights. 
1.8 The role of the United Nations in advancing the wonien's human rights 
agenda 
When the United Nations was established in 1945 it represented the first international 
organization to have gender equality both as an objective and as an obligation 
(Reanda, 1999). In 1946 the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) was 
established (although it has only been known under this name since 1978). Since 
1993, DAW has been based in New York under the Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (DESA). The DAW is responsible for servicing the Committee of the 
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Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, which began work 
in 1982. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) is one of the most widely ratified (180 states as of late 2005), however it is 
also subject to a very high number of reservations that undermine its effectiveness 
(Smith, 2003) and the USA still refuse to ratify it at all. In ratifying CEDAW, 
countries become legally bound to submit national reports every four years on the 
activities they have undertaken to comply with their treaty obligations. However, the 
Committee is so under-resourced that it currently has a two-year backlog of reports 
(Kelly, 2005). In addition, with the exception of trafficking and prostitution, the issue 
of violence against women was completely missing from CEDAW (Coomaraswamy, 
1997). Kelly (2005) suggests that this was because women's experiences were 
marginalized unless they were mirrored by or could be compared directly to men's 
experiences in public life. 
It was not until the early 1990s that violence against women was taken seriously in 
the international arena, and since then things have moved forwards at an incredible 
pace. Gender-based violence was classified as a forrn of discrimination by the 
CEDAW Committee, resulting in 1993 in the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), and in 1994 it was decided that 
a Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences should 
be appointed 46 . 
In 1993 delegates lobbied for women's rights to be clearly identified as human rights 
at the UN World Conference on Human Rights (Friedman, 1995), a conference that 
has subsequently been seen as representing a breakthrough in advancing women's 
human rights (Coomaraswamy, 1997; Bunch, 2004). The conference led to 
newspaper headlines such as Uoinen Seize Focus at Rights Foritin' (New York 
Times, 6/16/1993, cited by Friedman, 1995 pg. 18), over sixty of the Conference 
sessions concerned women's human rights, and campaign badges declaring 'Moinen's 
Rights are Hunian Rights' were worn by many of the delegates (Friedman, 1995). 
This led to women's human rights and violence against women being explicitly 
recognised in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action: 
46 Radhika Coomaraswarny was the first appointed to this post. She held the post until 2003 when 
Yakin Ertbrk took over the role. 
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The hinnan rights of women and of the gh-l child ai-e an inalienable, integi-al and 
indivisible pai-t of huntan i-ights ... Gendei-based violence and all 
Jbi-nis of sexual 
hai-assnient and exploitation, including those I-esulting fi-oin cultin-al pi-ejudices and 
ti-affick-ing are incoinpatible with the dignity and worth of hunian beings and inust be 
elindnated. (excerpt from Section one of the Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action). 
Even more advances were made at the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in 
1995 in Beijing, where a platfonn of action was developed which had a specific 
section on violence against women: 
Violence against wonien is an obstacle to the achievenzent of the objectives of 
equality, development and peace. Violence against women both violates and inipairs 
or nullifies the eiYoyinent by wonzen of their hunian rights andfittidainentalfreedonis. 
The long-standing failure to protect and proinote those rights and fteedonis in the 
case of violence against wonzen is a inatter of concern to all States and should be 
addressed. Knowledge about its causes and consequences, as well as its incidence 
and ineasures to coinbat it, have been greatly expanded since the Nairobi Conference. 
In all societies, to a greater of lesser degree, wonien and girls are subjected to 
physical, sexual and psychological abuse that citts across lines of inconle, class and 
culture. The low social and econoinic status of wonien can be both a cause and a 
consequence of violence against wonien. (Fourth World Conference on Women 
Beijing, China, 4-15 September 1995. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995), section D para 112, 
cited in Kelly, 2005 pg. 481) 
Ten years on from its beginning of almost invisibility at the global level, sexual and 
gender-bascd violence is now identified and named by the UN as a pandemic, not 
only as a criminal law issue but as a human rights issue, and one that requires multi- 
sectoral and multi-dimensional responses: 
It is no exaggei-ation to i-efer to sexual and gendei-based violence as a pandemic. 
Globally, women and children are most in danger of being targets of this insidious 
fornz of human rights abuse, and those displaced or caught-up in conflict ai-e often at 
greatest fisk The problem is pei-vasive and spans evegthingfi-om domestic violence 
to rape as a ivat- ci-ime. No community, society, counhy oi- i-egion is immune to sexual 
and gendeiý-based violence. (UNHCR, 2001 foreword) 
The last decade has, therefore, seen a huge shift towards labelling women's rights as 
human rights which some have argued has contributed, alongside globalisation, to a 
re-shaping of feminism (Walby, 2002). 
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1.9 Optimism and pessitnism: women and legal hunian rights 
Despite the advances made at the level of the UN, there is also a critical and 
pessimistic stance towards the role of human rights in women's lives. The 
goptimistic' and 'pessimistic' pictures below position the arguments made, rather than 
the theorists themselves, whose arguments sometimes fit into both pictures. 
1.9.1 The pessimistic picture 
The 'pessimistic picture', as I am calling it, is made up of those who are sceptical of 
how useful legal human rights can be to women. Four overlapping areas of critique 
can be identified, concerned with: male dominated judiciaries; the public nature of 
human rights law; the weak anti-discrimination provision; and the gap between legal 
human rights (law in the books) and 'practical' rights (law in action). 
Male dominated judiciaries 
Women 47 have historically been disadvantaged through the law, as both victims and 
offenders. Men have always dominated the higher echelons of the criminal justice 
system, law and politics 48 ,a situation which in the past has led to allegations that the 
law functions as a form of male propaganda (Olsen, 1983,1984) representative of a 
ýparadignz of maleness' (Rifkin, 1980 pg. 84). MacKinnon (1989) went on to argue 
that this male standpoint does not even appear to function as a standpoint because it is 
so dominant that it takes the form of the objective standard where the maleness of this 
standard is rendered invisible. By taking the male standpoint as given, MacKinnon 
argues that Vaiv becoines legitimate, and social doininance becoines invisible' (pg. 
237) whereby the law adopts the male 'objective' position, which in turn enforces that 
same constructed view on society. For MacKinnon, the fact that male dominance does 
47 Although it is increasingly unpopular to use the term 'women' with such a sweeping brush, I use it 
while acknowledging that different groups of women are likely to experience such disadvantage to 
different degrees and, simultaneously, that some groups of men are also disadvantaged through the 
law. 
48 Only one of the twelve judges in the House of Lords is female (until 2003 there were none), five of 
the 43 Chief Constables are female and seven of the 42 Chief Crown Prosecutors are female (Fawcett 
Society, 2004). Although the number of women in the House of Commons doubled between 1992 and 
1997 (Shepherd-Robinson and Lovenduski, 2002) it still remains that less than one in five MPs are 
female (following the 2005 election). 
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not appear to be epistemological is the very reason why it succeeds so effectively 
ontologically. More recently, the Fawcett Society (2003a) has talked of women being 
4shoehorned' into the criminal justice system (both as 'criminals' and as 'victims'). 
By this they mean that women are forced into a mould that does not really fit because 
it was designed for others; namely men (and particular men at that). Some advances 
have been made over the years; the appointment of the first woman into the House of 
Lords in 2003 marked a significant step forwards, however this still leaves the 
balance in the House of Lords at 1: 11 in favour of men. In addition, Lady Justice 
Brenda Hale has herself suggested that her appointment may be partly due to not 
being seen as a 'normal' woman because of her unusual, academia-based career path 
(Hale, 2004). 
Men also dominate the judiciary at the level of international law. O'Hare (1999) 
refers to this as the 'gendei- inyopia' of international human rights law (pg. 364) and 
Charlesworth et al. (1991) suggest that international legal structures would be more 
accurately described as 'international men's laiv' (pg. 644), pointing out that at the 
time of writing (in 199 1) only one judge had been female at the International Court of 
Justice and no woman had ever been a member of the International Law Commission. 
Little has changed over time, more than a decade later, with only one female judge 
out of 15 at the International Court of Justice in 2004 49 , and still no female members 
of the International Law Commission at the turn of the century (Paulus, 2001 )50. The 
ECHR is also far from having equal representation in terms of gender. Men dominate 
all levels, from the President down to the. Assistant Registrars. In 2003 the President 
was male, both Vice-Presidents were male and both Section Presidents were male. 
Men therefore held all the highest posts within the Court. Overall, 31 out of the 41 
judges were male (76%) and the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar were also both 
male5l despite a rule regarding the 'balanced representation of the sexes 152 . 
Charlesworth (1995) highlights that it is striking that the only time the gender 
49 Information collected for this thesis by investigating the composition of the court through its website 
(as of November 2004). 
50 It is not possible to calculate a more recent figure because the gender of the members is not clear 
through its website. Literature with more recent figures could not be found. 
51 Counted for the purposes of this thesis. 
52 Rule 14 of the ECHR reads: 'In relation to the making of appointments governed by this [Ch. 11 - 
Presidency of the Court] and the following chapter [Ch. III - The Registry] of the present Rules, the 
Court shall pursue a policy aimed at securing a balanced representation of the sexes. ' 
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imbalance was ever officially criticised was in relation to the nominations for the 
CEDAW Committee. 
Exactly what impact, if any, gender imbalanced judiciaries have is debatable. Female 
attorneys and judges have been found to be more aware of gender bias in the courts 
and are likely to have a higher level of feminist consciousness 53 than their male 
colleagues (Martin et al., 2002). It may be the case that the impact of higher numbers 
of women in the judiciary will increase over time and that any change at the moment 
may be too subtle for the methodologies that have been designed to measure such 
change. This has been found in research on the government. In analysing the impact 
of the election of 120 women MPs in 1997 Norris and Lovenduski (2001) concluded 
that the increase in the number of women had not resulted in any radical political 
changes in the Westminster culture but that there was evidence of different, gendered 
values towards women's equality. 
In addition to the male biased court compositions, most human rights instruments 
refer only to 'men' within their text, and this masculine vocabulary is argued to subtly 
exclude women (Charlesworth, 1994). The male pronoun is used throughout the 
ECHR, for example Article 8 (1) reads: 'Eveiyone has the right to respect for his 
private andjandly life, his honze and his correspondence' (my emphasis). In fact, the 
only time 'woman' is mentioned in the ECHR is in relation to Article 12 (Right to 
marry). This may sound like a semantic quibble in terms of the age of the ECHR, but 
this was not amended when it was incorporated into domestic law (the HRA has 
retained the masculine wording). However, even if the male pronoun were to be 
changed there is no evidence that this would substantially change the use or 
interpretation of the ECHR or the HRA. Talking about the more recent European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (that uses gender-neutral language), Baer (2004) 
highlights that: 
The extinction of explicit sexing ... does not soNe the problenz of iniplicit se. -Cing, or of 
references to gendered or sexually and ethnically charged concepts and nietaphors 
(Baer, 2004 pg. 109). 
53 Measured by respondent's dis/agreement to a range of statements around issues such as rape, 
domestic violence and divorce property rights. 
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The public nature of human rights law. 
Many have pointed to the distinction made between public and private life as one of 
the principle reasons, if not the reason, why the human rights framework has been 
unresponsive to the human rights of women (e. g. Chinkin, 1999; Romany, 1994; 
Sullivan, 1995). This is particularly evident in terms of domestic violence (Copelon, 
1994; Moore, 2003; Thomas and Beasley, 1993), which has traditionally been seen as 
falling within the private sphere and outside the boundaries of state control. 
The questioning of the public/private divide has been central to the feminist 
movement (see for example O'Donovan, 1985; Pateman, 1988). Second wave 
feminists pointed out not only that the distinction between the public and private 
spheres supported the oppression of women and served to exclude them from ftill 
citizenship, but also that the idea that life could be split into two distinct spheres was 
an untenable one. The feminist slogan 'the personal is the political' emphasised not 
only that issues the state drew the line under as being 'private' should in theory and 
practice be important political issues (such as childcare and domestic violence) but 
also that the line was a arbitrary and mythological one because in fact the state chose 
to intervene in some 'private' issues but not others: 
Theframework-forfamily is eveiywhere within a collective policy arena. Rules about 
who may marry, at what age, and with what rights and ditties are made by the state 
(or itsfinictional equivalent). Rules governing divorce, child custody, and inheritance 
are likeivise a matter of ýpitblicpolicy (Binion, 1995, pg. 519). 
In addition, what is seen as being 'public' and what is seen as being 'private' varies 
widely both historically and geographically which has led feminists to conclude that 
where the line is drawn between the private and the public is in itself a political act 
(Lister, 1997). 
It is clear from the text of the ECHR that the primary concern of human rights is with 
the regulation of the public sphere and, in classic liberal style, the protection of the 
private sphere. The rights that cover the private sphere are concerned more with the 
right to a private life rather than what happens within such a private life. For example, 
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Article 12 guarantees the right to marry (albeit a heavily qualified one because of the 
reference to national law in the latter part of the Article): 
Men and women of marriageable age have the fight to nzariy and to found a jandly, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
However, there are no rights protecting individuals once they have married, nor is 
there a corresponding right to leave a marriage (i. e. a right to divorce) or any rights 
for those in relationships that do not fit into what the state decides constitutes 
marriage. 
Similarly, Article 8 reads that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respectfor his private andjandly life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no inteiference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessag in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
countty, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, orfor the protection of the rights andfreedoms ofothers. 
Again, and in spite of its heavy qualifications in section 2, the essence of the right is 
about the respect for private and family life rather than respect for what happens 
within a private and family life. 
The issue of human rights and their applicability to women in the private sphere goes 
deeper than the substantive nature of the Articles. If human rights are limited to the 
public sphere (as they were intended to be under the 'vertical' effect described 
earlier) then this may be seen as disadvantaging those who may be particularly 
vulnerable to oppression in the hidden private sphere, primarily women and children 
(Palmer, 1996). However, social science literature about women and human rights has 
not tended to use the tenns 'horizontal' and 'vertical' effects to describe the 
unresponsiveness of human rights law to women in the private sphere; the terms 
horizontal and vertical are rarely used within social science literature and the terms 
public and private are rarely used within legal literature. 
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Weak anti-discrimination provision 
Legislation aimed at preventing sexual discrimination started to come under criticism 
in the UK following the introduction of the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, when it became clear that sexual equality legislation in 
theory did not necessarily equate with sexual equality in practice and had (and 
continues to have) a disappointingly low level of court enforcement (Fredman, 
54 1996) . It became clear that 'formal equality' would not necessarily lead to 
'substantive equality' (Gregory, 1987). 
Others have argued that legislation based on treating people equally may be worse 
than 'meaningless'. Kennedy (1992) states that Wealing equally with those who are 
unequal creates Ynore inequality' (pg. 31); a statement that she continues to make in 
her more recent work (Kennedy, 2004). Likewise, Barnett (1998) points out that 'to 
treat all equally gives no guarantee that all should benefit: indeed all inay suffer as a 
result of equal treatnient' (pg. 117). Fredman (1996) identified six 'problems of 
equality': structural inertia - the male norm (the 'equal to whomT question); the 
problem of difference (how are equality and difference measured and how are any 
differences dealt with? ); that equality guarantees consistency but not substance 
(equality legislation may result in a 'levelling down' rather than a 'levelling up'); that 
equality is individualised (ignoring the collective dimension of discrimination); 
equality within a market order (that the capitalist economy is based upon inequality 
and competition); and the shifting meanings of equality (that the notion of equality is 
continuously stretched but always return to the traditional central values). These 
'problems of equality' are present not only at the level of national law55 but also in 
international human rights law, and Charlesworth (1994) argues that only women 
who attempt to conform to a male model (whose lives are based to some extent within 
the public sphere) will find any forrn of equality through the international Prohibition 
54 Very few cases brought under the Sex Discrimination Act are successfiil at hearing. In Great Britain 
in 2000/1 only 7% (322/17,200) were successful and in 2001/2 only 3% (239/10,092 were successful). 
Similarly, in 2000/1 only 1% (11/6,586) of cases brought under the Equal Pay Act were successful at 
hearing and in 2001/2 this figure was 7% (149/5,314) (Women and Equality Unit, 2003). 
55 The problems associated with discrimination and the law are already well known within feminist 
literature and it is not necessary to describe these issues in any further depth (see for over-view. 
Similarly, there is not room here to describe the approach that European Community law has taken in 
relation to these issues (see Fenwick, 2002, chapters 16 for overview). 
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of sex discrimination. Because nearly all human rights instruments deal with 
discrimination/equality issues, it is not possible here to attempt to review the 
literature on them (see McColgan, 2003 for over-view) and the focus must return to 
the provision within the ECHR. 
It is Article 14 of the ECHR and the HRA that is concerned with freedom from 
discrimination: 
The eiYoyment of the rights andfi-eedoms setforth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status. 
As explained earlier in this chapter, Article 14 has no 'independent existence' and can 
only be used alongside Articles 2-12. Article 14 therefore does not actually guarantee 
freedom from discrimination in its absolute sense or even in law in general, but is 
limited to the rights and freedoms within the Convention - to simply be discriminated 
against is 'not enough'. This is a much weaker forrn of freedom from discrimination 
than in other charters of rights. For example the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees that: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrinfination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability 
(section 15 (1)) 
Possibly in light of Article 14's weaknesses, the Council of Europe added Protocol 12 
to the ECHR in November 2000. In the preamble to the Articles contained within the 
Protocol the Council of Europe stressed their commitment to equality and confinned 
that what is often termed 'positive discrimination' would not constitute a violation of 
the Protocol: 
Having regard to thefitndamentalprinciple according to which all persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled to the equalprotection of the law; 
Being resolved to tak-efia-ther steps to promote the equality of all persons through the 
collective enforcement ofa generalprohibition oftliscrimination ... 
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Reaffirining that the principle of non-discrindnation does not prevent State Parties 
fi-oni taking ineasures in order to proinotefidl and effective equality, provided that 
there is an objective and reasonablejustiflicationfor those ineasilres. 
Article I of Protocol 12 is called 'General prohibition of discrimination' and, as 
suggested by its name contains a wider, more 'general', right to be free from 
discrimination. It is 'freestanding' (it does not need to be used alongside another 
Article), includes equality under law (as with the provision in the Canadian Charter) 
and goes as far as prohibiting discrimination by any public authority on any ground: 
1. The eqjoyment of any right setforth by law shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status. 
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such 
as those mentioned in paragrapli 1. 
While this sounds a huge step forward when compared with the limited protection 
under Article 14, because the Protocol is an addition to the Convention it requires that 
states sign to ratify it. The UK has not, to date, ratified the Protocol and therefore UK 
citizens are not afforded the protections contained within it. 
Probably the most regularly used example in human rights textbooks regarding sex 
discrimination in under Article 14 is the case of Abdidaziz, Cabales and Balkandali56, 
which provides a prime example of one of the aforementioned six problems listed by 
Fredman (1996): that equality guarantees consistency but not substance (that equality 
legislation may result in a 'levelling down' rather than a 'levelling up'). In this case 
the female applicants alleged that their rights under Article 8 (Right to private and 
family life) had been violated because they were not allowed to have their non- 
national spouses join them in the UK. Although their application under Article 8 
failed, their related argument under Article 14 - that this situation was discriminatory 
- Was successful because it was easier for men to have their non-national spouses join 
them in the UK than for women. However, the way the UK remedied this 
discrimination was to 'level down' to place both men and women wanting their non- 
national spouses to enter the UK in an equallypoor situation. 
56 [ 198517 EHRR 471 
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Similar problems have been reported under other Charters of Rights. McColgan 
(2000) describes how the equality rights within the Canadian Charter allowed judges 
to strike down legislation such as that banning male prison officers from strip- 
searching women prisoners and a law that provided benefits for single mothers on the 
basis that men were not treated equally. 
There is also some evidence that the ECHR regularly fails to consider arguments 
under Article 14 if they have already judged that a different Article has been 
breached. McCafferty (2003) calls this the 'no need' approach to Article 14, the 
impact of such an approach resulting in relatively few cases finding a breach on the 
grounds of discrimination. One of the regularly used examples of this is the case of 
ADT v United Kingdoin 57 where some gay men were prosecuted for having sexual 
intercourse with more than two men present. They argued this breached their right to 
private life (Article 8) and their right to be free from discrimination (Article 14) 
because their behaviour would have been legal if they had been lesbian or 
heterosexual. After finding a breach of Article 8 the ECHR argued there was 'no 
need' to examine Article 14. While this may not seem an important issue on first sight 
(it had already been acknowledged that the applicants had had their human rights 
breached), it is important to bear in mind the symbolic value of a judgment as well as 
the issue of just satisfaction 58 . 
The weak anti-discrimination provision and the ECHRs 'no need' approach to Article 
14 have therefore led to criticisms that gender-based discrimination is not taken 
seriously within the ECHR and HRA. 
The gap between law on the books and law in practice 
Feminists (and also socio-legal scholars) have pointed to the disparity between legal 
rights that exist in 'black letter law' and those that are actually capable of creating 
substantive, 'real' change for women (the gap between law on the books and law in 
practice). Using the domestic violence legislation introduced in the 1970's as an 
57 ADTv UnitedKingdoni, no. 35765/97, ECHR judgment of 31 July 2000 
58 This is what the court awards to the applicants for the breach, usually a financial award 
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example, Smart (1986) distinguishes between 'law as legislation' and 'law in 
practice', describing how legislation introduced by the government can result in 
minimal change if support from criminal justice and legal structures is not available 
(Smart, 1986). However, the gap between law on the books and law in practice is not 
limited to criminal justice and legal structures. 
McColgan (2000) argues that the disparity between formal legal rights and practical 
enforceable rights is most clearly visible when considering the history of abortion 
rights in the USA. Women in the USA have a constitutionally protected right to 
abortion, despite continuous strong oppositional lobbying from a large proportion of 
the population. However, although the court restricted the powers of states to prohibit 
abortion there was no corresponding positive right attached to the ruling. This meant 
that states were under no obligation to fund abortion clinics or permit them to be 
carried out using public money. Abortions have not been carried out by Medicaid 59 
since 1997 unless it was deemed necessary to save a woman's life or in cases of rape 
or incest. McColgan reports on a case where Nebraska charged a young woman with 
welfare fraud in 1997 for applying for an abortion after she was raped. Although 
corroborative evidence existed that the young woman had come home crying, with 
torn clothing and had phoned a rape crisis helpline Nebraska filed the fraud claim 
against her on the basis she had not reported the rape to the police 60 . This lack of 
positive right means that, particularly for women who cannot afford private abortion 
centres (which may not even exist in their area), the constitutional right to abortion 
means very little. This is an example of what McColgan (2000) calls 'the false 
promise of hunian rights' (the subtitle of her book). This point has also been made by 
Smart (1989) as an example of what she calls an 'enipty right': 
The law inay concede a right, but if the state refuses to fitnd abortions or abortion 
clinics, it is an enipty riglit. (pg. 144) 
There is very little literature around regarding 'how' and 'why' a person comes to 
frame their problem in tenns of rights, and how they come to 'adopt i-ights talk-' 
59 Who provide free health care for those on low incomes. 
"0 The prosecution was eventually dropped. 
53 
(Merry, 2003, pg. 346). Barriers are thought to include a lack of support, knowledge, 
resources and access, which Baer (2004) argues contribute to a 'hidden i-ightlessizess 
of individuals' (pg. 102). Although there are a number of ways in which human 
rights cases may be financially supported, (through legal aid, through a human rights 
organisation such as Liberty funding it as a 'test case' or through a 'no win no fee' 
contract) there is no literature on whether such financial support is discriminatory to 
women. 
Despite limited research, the pessimistic picture has importantly highlighted that a 
right may not be as positive as it first seems and that it is necessary to fully 
investigate the implications and resources associated with human rights. 
1.9.2 The optimistic picture 
The optimistic picture emphasises the possibility of change. It accepts that rights may 
sometimes have worked in the past to the detriment of women but does not accept 
that this need be the future or that this is consistently the case. The optimistic picture 
suggests more agency and power in women's ability to re-frame human rights, which 
may then be used to legitimise claims and provide spaces to challenge existing 
discourses. Those advocating the optimistic picture point to the ability to transform 
4women's issues' into 'human rights issues' and the need to think horizontally instead 
of vertically (questioning the public/private divide). 
Transforming 'women's issues'into 'human rights issues' 
To transform something that is perceived as being an everyday occurrence (such as 
pornography or sexual harassment) into a matter of rights (such as civil rights or 
employment rights) can serve to legitimise the claim (MacKinnon, 1987) and act as a 
ýpoiveifzd Hietoricalforce' (Bridgeman and Millns, 1998 pg. 27). The legal forum 
has been identified as an ideal place for feminists to engage in such re-definitional 
processes: 
... 
fendnisliz can (re)define harmless flirtation into sexual harassment, misplaced 
parental affection into child sexual abuse, enthusiastic seduction into rape, foetal 
rights into enforced reproduction, and so on. (Smart, 1989 pg. 165) 
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it has long been recognised outside of the women's movement that to transform an 
issue not only into a legal rigbts issue but also into a human rights issue is likely to 
legitimise the claim even further: 
To assert that a particular social clahn is a hunian right is to vest it einotionally and 
inorally with an especially high order of legithnacy (Wilder, 1969 pg. 17 1) 
in Phillips' (1991) theory of women and citizenship she suggests that it may be 
possible to reshape a tenn rather than simply reject it. She calls this 'gendered 
substitution', and this may also be possible in terms of women and human rights. 
Medina (1994) argues that this neglect can be remedied if women start to consistently 
use human rights laws to their benefit. Feminist theorists have therefore 
acknowledged that it may be possible to reframe human rights law to be more 
responsive to women and, even more optimistically, that it might actually be an ideal 
place in which to do so: 
The inti-oduction of the European Convention into doinestic laiv inay provide an 
opportunity to unsettle existing discourses. A space may be ci-eated which would 
allow ivoinen's pei-spectives and experiences to enter into the laiv. Them could be 
openings to ask'previously unasked questions and to refraine debates ... 
(Palmer, 
1996 pg. 242). 
Central to the ability to transform 'women's issues' into 'human rights' issues, 
however, is the challenging of the public/private divide and the need to think 
horizontally instead of vertically. 
Thinking horizontally instead of vertically 
As described earlier, the horizontal effect of the ECHR means that states can be held 
responsible for their inaction to protect against human rights violations as well as 
their direct actions. While feminist theorists have argued this may be key to unlocking 
the usefulness of human rights for women, as with the vertical effect/public nature of 
human rights law discussed under the pessimistic picture, the language used in social 
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science literature has tended to talk in tenns of challenging the public/private divide 
rather than in terms of thinking horizontally. 
Many have argued nonetheless that it is this dimension that can be useful to address 
the issues women face in the private sphere, particularly in relation to violence 
against women (e. g. Roth, 1994; Copelon, 1994). Roth (1994) argues that violence 
against women can be seen to be reinforcing the subjugation of women by acting as a 
form of social control. In this sense, the human rights violation is caused by the 
systematic failure of a government to do something rather than something they have 
done. He explains: 
Implicit in this approach is that a state has some ditty to protect those within its 
territoryfroin private acts of violence and illicitforce. Wien the state makes little or 
no effort to stop a certain forin ofprivate violence, it tacitly condones that violence. 
This coniplicity transforms what would othenvise be wholly private conduct into a 
constructive act of the state. (pg. 330) 
The notion of 'non-intervention' being as politically significant as 'intervention' has 
also been highlighted in relation to national law and provides yet another example of 
how the lack of public policies can impact on the private sphere, whereby 'non- 
intervention is as potent an ideology as regulation' (O'Donovan, 1985 pg 184). 
Similarly, in the area of constitutional law, it is the horizontal effect of rights that are 
pointed to as particularly important (Baines and Rubio-Marin, 2005). 
It is possible that the pessimistic picture's critique of the public nature of human 
rights law has been over centralised in the debate over the usefulness of human rights 
law for women. As discussed earlier in the chapter, ECHR case law has shown that 
the Court are quite willing to hold states responsible for violations within the private 
sphere, and this has been the case from a relatively early stage; as mentioned earlier 
the ECtHR found the Netherlands guilty of violating an individuals human rights after 
she was raped by another (non-state) individual in 1985. In other landmark cases, the 
UK have been held responsible for acts perpetrated within a private school by (non- 
state) individuals (Costello-Roberts v the United Kingdom 6 ') and for failing to 
adequately respond to a situation which resulted in murder committed by an (non- 
61 Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom [ 1995] 19 EHRR 116 
56 
state) individual (Osman v the United Kingdoin 62) . This means that while criticisms 
are being made of the inability of human rights to respond to violations of women's 
rights in the private sphere the case law shows that, at least in ECHR cases, that the 
Court has been willing to find states responsible for such violations. 
it is therefore argued and generally accepted that the key to unlocking the usefulness 
of human rights law for women lies in the challenging of the public/private divide. 
While writers such as Roth (1994) have shown how this may be achieved, in at least 
some cases heard under the ECHR when women's issues have been re-framed in 
terms of human rights issues and when the appropriate legal language has been 
employed (i. e. vertical/horizontal effect instead of public/private) this argument has 
already been accepted to some degree. 
1.9.3 Balancing the pictures 
In addition to the cases described in this chapter and the introduction, many more 
examples can be found of where human rights law has worked 'for' or 'against' 
women. However, it is easy in a field the size of international law to pick and choose 
cases based on whether they support whichever argument the theorist is making. 
Unless research has clear criteria for case selection it runs the risk of being viewed as 
largely anecdotal (Morton and Allen, 2001). Unfortunately, most research on women 
and human rights does not have clear criteria for case selection. A large amount of 
theory has been generated with no empirical base at all and there is a pressing need 
for empirical research to guide the development of theory on women and human 
rights (Lacey, 2004). It is also possible that feminism, as a critical social movement, 
has been more likely to veer towards pessimism than optimism 63 . 
When cases are analysed systematically it would appear that there is certainly room 
for optimism in relation to some issues facing women. In the most systematic and 
exhaustive review of feminist groups' use of the Canadian Charter of Rights, Morton 
and Allen (2001) boldly state that 'no group has been inore active in using litigation 
than organizedJelninists' (pg. 56). When measuring success as the 'winner' of the 
62 Osman v UnitedKingdoin [1998] 29 EHRR 245. 63 Although adopting and expressing scepticisin can be seen as the essence of good academic 
scholarship (Tomk-ins, 2001). 
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dispute, they found that out of 21 Charter cases feminist litigants/interventions were 
successful in 67 per cent of cases. This shows not only that a feminist case was more 
likely to be successful than unsuccessful, but also that feminist cases were more likely 
to win than other cases; in a review of all cases in the first ten years of the Charter, 
claimants won just 33 per cent of cases (Morton et al., 1995). 
in the areas of pornography, immigration and abortion/foetal rights, Morton and 
Allen (2001) report that feminists have not lost a single case under the Canadian 
Charter. As examples they cite the immigration cases of Cheung 64 , where 
it was ruled 
that China's use of forced sterilisation to enforce its one-child policy constituted 
grounds for refugee status, and Mayers 65 , where grounds 
for refugee status were 
granted based on Trinidad's failure to protect women from domestic violence. In their 
analysis they found that success was lowest in the areas of sexual assault and income 
tax and highest in the areas of abortion, private sector discrimination and 
pornography. 
Under the Canadian Char-ter the picture is therefore more 'successful' than 
'unsuccessful' when analysed systematically. Unfortunately, literature containing this 
level of data is not available for any other rights charters/conventions outside of 
Canada, making claims regarding the outcomes of human rights claims sketchy and 
sometimes one sided. In addition, the situation in Canada is different to that in the 
UK; the Canadian Charter is a constitutional rather than a statutory Bill of Rights and 
Canada has public funding that campaign groups can draw on to support litigation. 
Outside of Canada where the use of human rights has been well researched, examples 
of positive judgments are rare. It is unclear whether this is because of a lack of 
success or because of a lack of research and literature. In terms of the ECHR there 
appear to have been few cases with feminist involvement as a whole, whether 
successful or unsuccessful. In her Article on women's rights and the ECHR, Palmer 
(1996) gives just one example. In the case of Open Dow- Counselling Ltd, Dublin 
Well Woman Centi-e Ltd and Others v Ii-elana'66 where women's centres successfully 
64 No case reference is given 
65 No case reference is given 
66 Open Door Counselling Lid, Dublin Well Monian Centre Ltd and Others v Ireland no 1423/88 and 
142335/88 ECHR, judgment of 29 October 1992 
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argued that Ireland's blanket prohibition on abortion counselling and information on 
the availability of abortions in Britain was in breach of Article 10 (Freedom of 
expression)67. Similarly, Easton (2002) predicts (although not using a systematic 
empirical base) that the HRA will have a beneficial impact on claims around 
recognition rather than distribution, specifically in the areas of women and sexual 
discrimination, disability discrimination, property and prisoners. 
This suggests that both the optimistic and pessimistic pictures are probably operating 
simultaneously. Dividing the literature into pessimistic and optimistic pictures has 
been useful in order to map out the broad arguments made in the area of women and 
human rights, however it has oversimplified issues somewhat. This is reflective of 
most of the literature. While many theorists have been willing to see both the pros 
and cons of using legal human rights, few have recognised that human rights law can 
result in both the 'optimistic' and 'pessimistic' pictures simultaneously. In other 
words, there are many variables that are likely to impact upon the usefulness of 
human rights law. Some charters might be more useful than others, and there may be 
more focus on some articles than others. It is important to create a more developed 
and nuanced jurisprudence that is able to take into account all these factors. 
Human rights law, as has been argued in terms of law in general, appears not to be a 
simplistic and dichotomous tool of liberation or oppression but rather a tool that can 
be inconsistent and applied 'unevenly' (Smart, 1984a, 1984b, 1985,1989). Among 
the variables that may impact on its outcomes are the issue they are used for (Morton 
and Allen, 2001; Easton, 2002; Lacey, 2004) and in what 'role' women are using 
them: 
Whether a ivoinan will benefit fi-oin entrenched rights will depend on her particular 
status, so it is hard to see rights as uniforinly repressive or liberating (Easton, 2002 
pg. 35). 
67 However, the issue of the legality of the prohibition of abortion was left open (see also Ewing and 
Gearty, 1992 for discussion). 
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1.10 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has described how the machinery of the ECHR and HRA operates. It has 
outlined the arguments that contribute towards a 'pessimistic picture' on the basis of- 
male dominated judiciaries; the public nature of human rights law; the weak anti- 
discrimination provision; and the gap between legal human rights and 'practical' 
rights. It has also shown, via the 'optimistic picture', that while there are problems in 
the area of women and human rights, it would be a mistake to completely 'write off 
rights'. Rather, the optimistic picture has explained how, by thinking horizontally 
rather than vertically, the public/private divide may be challenged though human 
rights law and the law may be an ideal place in which to transform 'women's issues' 
into 'human rights issues' through feminist jurisprudence. 
In focusing on just one issue concerning feminists, this thesis may appear narrow. It 
will certainly not be possible to make any broad conclusions about whether human 
rights law is 'good' for women, but nor does it intend to. Rather, by focusing in-depth 
on one issue and specific legal human rights, it aims to avoid some of the problems 
associated with previous literature by having a clearly defined research area and 
empirical base. In choosing rape as the 'feminist issue' upon which to study the 
impact of human rights law, this constitutes both a very specific subject area but also 
one that may be seen as not only representing but exemplifying the gendered nature 
of law and one where the rights of women, children and, to a lesser extent men, as 
victims and men as defendants are seen as particularly difficult to reconcile: 
The substantNe criminal law contains one of the most crucial balances between 
hunian rights and public protection. Never will this balance be more delicate or 
important than in a laiv ofsex offences. (Wheldon, 2000 pg. 275) 
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CHAPTER TWO: RAPE AND THE PROSECUTION PROCESS 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the last three decades, following the advent of second wave feminism, the 
cultural and legal meanings of rape have changed and rape is now widely 
acknowledged as a social problem (Chasteen, 2001). To borrow Jordan's words, 
'i-ape is an old crinie with a i-ecent past' (Jordan, 2002 pg. 319). We now have a 
substantial body of research documenting the problems that are evident in rape cases 
in England and Wales (see for example Gregory and Lees, 1999; Kelly and Regan, 
2001; Kelly, 2002; Kelly et al., 2005; Lees 1996a, 1996b, 2002; Temkin, 1997,1999, 
2002). One of the outcomes of these problems is that very few men who are reported 
to the police for rape are subsequently convicted of rape. 
Although acknowledged as a social problem that is massively under-reported to the 
police, there is disagreement over how prevalent rape is. Not surprisingly, research 
produces different findings depending on the populations surveyed and the methods 
used (Hofer, 2000; Russell and Bolen, 2000; Schwartz, 1997). This was exemplified 
in the US National Crime Victimisation Study in 1992, where the redesign of 
questions resulted in a fourfold increase in disclosures (Greenfield, 1997). Rape is a 
crime that is extremely difficult to measure in terms of incidence and prevalence, and 
statistics often say more about how crime statistics are collected and constructed than 
how many rapes have actually been reported (von Hofer, 2000). The way in which 
women are asked if they have been raped is important. For example, women may be 
more likely to disclose that they have been raped if they are asked 'have you ever 
been forced to have sex' or 'have you ever been coerced into sex' than if they are 
asked 'have you been rapedT despite the question being essentially the same (Lees, 
1996a). Additionally, the way the interview is conducted is also important. Walby 
and Myhill (2001) highlight that privacy during the interview, special training for the 
interviewer on sensitive issues and the presence of a partner or other household 
member all effect the likelihood of disclosure of rape or other forms of violence 
against women. The gender of the interviewer is thought to be particularly salient 
(Walby and Myhill, 2001), with research showing that both women and men were 
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more likely (1.27 times more likely) to disclose a sexual assault when interviewed by 
a woman than by a man (Sorenson, Stein, Siegel, Golding and Burnham, 1987). 
The first study of rape prevalence to be based on a probability sample was carried out 
in the USA in 1978 by Diana Russell (Russell, 1983). A total of 930 women were 
interviewed, and she discovered that 24 percent of women disclosed at least one 
completed rape, and 44 percent reported at least one completed or attempted rape (or 
both). Furthermore, this was a repeated experience for half of the women. In the UK 
the few non-governmental studies that have been conducted have found that 
approximately one in four women will experience rape at some stage in their lives 
(Coid et al., 2003 68; Mooney, 1994,20 0069; Painter, 199,70). In contrast, the 
government's British Crime Survey (BCS) estimates the prevalence of rape to be 
much lower, at one in nineteen women (5.2%) at any point in their lives and one in 
twenty-eight (3.6%) since the age of sixteen 71 (Walby and Allen, 2004). When penile 
penetration of the mouth without consent is included in the definition of rape 72 the 
figures rise slightly to one in eighteen (5.5%) at any point in their lives and one in 
twenty-seven (3.7%) since the age of sixteen 73 . 
There is therefore a considerable difference between rape prevalence estimates from 
governmental and non-governmental research. While the BCS should in theory be the 
more methodologically sound estimate of rape prevalence because it is the only 
research that has used a large, national, representative sample 74 , this is probably not 
the case. The BCS has always had problems with the way it measures rape. In its 
early days, very few women reported rape to the BCS, for example in the 1983 sweep 
only one woman disclosed an attempted rape (Hough and Mayhew, 1983). This led to 
a period of time where the results for rape were simply not included in BCS 
68 Coid et al (2003) asked about rape in a number of different ways. They found that 8% of participants 
reported that they had been 'raped', but a further 16% reported that they had been 'forced to have sex 
by a present or former partner' (both at the age of 16 years or above). A further 9% reported 'unwanted 
sexual intercourse in childhood'. 
69 Mooney (1994,2000) defined rape as made to have sex without consent. 
70 Painter (199 1) defined rape as having sex when they had been coerced. 
71 These figures include attempted rape. For actual rape the figures are 4.2% in lifetime and 3.0% since 
the age of sixteen. 
72 This is now included in the legal definition of rape but was not included in 2001 when the survey 
tool place. Changes to the legal definition of rape are discussed later in this chapter. 
73 These figures include attempted rape. For actual rape the figures are 4.4% in lifetime and 3.1 % since 
the age of sixteen. 
74 22,463 women and men were surveyed in the 2001 sweep 
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publications because so few disclosures were being made (Percy and Mayhew, 1997), 
until the mid 1990's when the new Computer Assisted Self-Interviewing method 
(CASI) was introduced (for discussion of this method see Mirrlees-Black, 1999; 
Walby and Allen, 2004). There are a number of reasons why rape may be under 
reported in the BCS. For example, framing the questions within the context of crime 
may reduce the likelihood of people reporting acts they do not feel to be criminal 
(Walby and Myhill, 2001) and those who are excluded from the survey (people who 
are homeless or living in temporary accommodation such as refuges and hostels) may 
be populations that experience particularly high rates of abuse (Hagemann-White, 
2001; Walby and Allen, 2004). On the other hand, it is also possible that the non- 
governmental surveys have included a disproportionate number of people who have 
been raped in their samples. For example, the tenns 'unwanted', 'nonvoluntary' and 
'forced' are all often interpreted to mean 'rape', yet empirical research using focus 
groups suggests they may not be equivalent terms (Hamby and Koss, 2003). 
Participants in the focus groups have also expressed ambiguity around the ten-n 
'coercion' (Hamby and Koss, 2003). In addition, it may be those who have 
experienced rape who are more likely to participate in such studies than those who 
have not. 
Much discussion has taken place in a quest to develop more accurate ways of 
recording rape and other fonns of violence against women (see for example 
Hagemann-White, 2001; Hamby and Koss, 2003; Schwartz, 1997; Walby and Myhill, 
2001). Hagemman-White (2001) highlights that estimates of prevalence have been a 
constant theme in the discussion of violence against women since the 1970s, as has 
the caveat that reliable data do not exist. This is still true in relation to rape because of 
the lack of national, representative non-govemmental research. Prevalence estimates 
of domestic violence tend to be more readily accepted as 'true' because the large 
number of such studies has built up a relatively consistent knowledge base. 
Despite the different findings in governmental and non-govemmental studies, it is 
clear that rape constitutes a large social problem. Even if we take the lower 
prevalence estimate (i. e. that of the BCS) and do not include penile penetration of the 
mouth without consent, this still equates to a best estimate that in the last year 47,000 
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women in England and Wales experienced rape and attempted rape, 79,000 a serious 
sexual assault and 293,000 a less sefious sexual assault (Walby and Allen, 2004). 
Regardless of methodology and prevalence estimates, research consistently shows 
that rape is most likely to be perpetrated by someone known to the victim (e. g. Harris 
and Grace, 1999; Kelly et al., 2005; Myhill and Allen, 2002; Walby and Allen, 2004). 
It is also agreed upon that most rapes are never reported to the police and never enter 
official criminal statistics (e. g. Hall, 1985; Walby and Allen, 2004). While the 
number of police recorded rape cases more than doubled in the decade between 1991 
and 2001/2 75 , the proportion of cases that reach court and result in a conviction for 
rape has steadily dropped. The most recently published non-governmental figures 
show that in a sample of rape cases reported to the police between 1996 and 2000 
only five per cent resulted in a conviction for rape (Lea et al., 2003). Home Office 
figures are similar, with the most recently published figures showing that in 2002 the 
rape conviction rate was only 5.6 per cent (Kelly et al., 2005). 
This chapter starts with an overview of some of the theories that have been put 
forward to explain 'why men rape'. The next section shows that, regardless of the 
different individual motivations for rape, it is extremely unlikely that men will be 
convicted for rape because of a number of attrition stages within the criminal justice 
system. Problems with the substantive rape law, evidential, procedural or extra-legal 
factors are then discussed, along with reforms that have attempted to overcome these 
problems. Using Greer's (1994) typology of 'unjustified avoidance of conviction', the 
next section theorises rape attrition in terms of miscarriages of justice, before looking 
at some of the reasons why men as rape defendants have argued that the rape trial is 
not fair to them. This is followed by a consideration of the due process and crime 
control models of criminal justice and how these relate to recent calls to close the 
'justice gap'. 
2.2 Theorising why men rape 
Theorising why men rape is important in the discussion of rape and human rights in 
terms of whether, to what extent and how the state can be seen to hold some 
75 From 4,045 in 1991 to 9,008 in 2001/2002 (Simmons et al., 2002) 
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accountability for men who rape. Many theories have attempted to answer the 
question of why men rape, and these theories place differing emphasis on the roles 
and responsibilities of the state, society and the individual (as victim or as offender). 
Early theories of rape tended to minimise, excuse and/or deny men's agency, and rape 
was explained in one of two ways. Firstly, men were said to rape because of 
uncontrollable internal factors, for example because of an overpowering sexual 
impulse (Glueek, 1925; Guttmacher and Weihofen, 1952; Karpman, 1951), an under- 
developed ego (Cohen et al., 1971) or as a result of unresolved sexual childhood 
desires (Freud, 1905, reprinted 1953). Secondly, rape was explained in terms of 
uncontrollable external factors, for example placing the blame on the behaviour of 
the victim (Amir, 1967,1971), his wife and/or his mother (Abrahamsen, 1960). 
According to these theories the state could have little or no impact on whether or not 
men rape or not because rape was 'not their fault' and a matter of individual 
pathology. 
Second-wave feminist theories of rape moved away from the idea that men who rape 
lack agency, and placed the emphasis of study onto men, masculinity and the social 
structures that support male power. Rape was argued to be a forin of control rather 
than a lack of control. This approach is best exemplified by Brownmiller (1975) who 
described rape in her groundbreaking book as '... nothing more or less than a 
conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state offear' 
(pg. 15). By this she meant that rape is not about individual men 'losing control' as 
the earlier theories suggested, but is actually about the conscious upholding (rather 
than exemplifying) of oppressive patriarchal structures in society. Rape, from this 
perspective, therefore serves a political function as a powerful form of social 
contro176. 
Feminist theories of rape continued to focus primarily on theorising rape at the 
societal rather than individual level. The 'feminist hypothesis' (as it is generally 
76 Research is, for the most part, supportive of Brownmiller's theory that the existence of rape in 
society keeps women in a state of fear. Women tell researchers that they fear rape more than any other 
crime (Hough, 1995; Warr, 1985) and women may devise a wide range of rituals, strategies and 
routines in an attempt to ensure or promote their personal safety (Gordon and Riger, 1988; Jeffreys and 
Radford, 1984; Radford, 1987; Stanko, 1990a, 1990b). Other research however, suggests that although 
Western women may live under the fear of rape, this may not be universal to all women (Helliwell, 
2000; Sanday, 1981). 
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referred to) was that an increase in women's equality should ultimately lead to a 
decrease in the prevalence of rape (see Baron and Straus, 1987; Peterson and Bailey, 
1992). However, in the shorter term it was acknowledged that a 'backlash' or 
'inverted feminist hypothesis' (Ellis and Beattie, 1983) might occur: 
Rape is the way some men express their hostility to wonzen. More threatened egos 
may mean more rape. In the short run, the more ivoinen who break out of the 
traditionalfeniale role and assert themseli, es in neiv ways, the nzore threatened inale 
egos there are (Russell, 1975, pg. 14). 
Whaley (2001) refers to this as the ýparadoxical i-elationship between gendet- 
inequality and rape' (pg. 531). She found support using panel data collected over 
three decades in the U. S. for the 'refined hypothesis' that while the short terrn effect 
of increased gender equality would be an increase in rape that this result would be 
short lived and be replaced by a long-term decrease in rape prevalence, however 
Whaley's research does have some methodological limitations 77 . 
The 1970s and 80s also saw the development of social learning theories of rape, led 
primarily by psychologists but generally with a strong feminist influence 78. SCUllyiS 
research is probably the best example of the fusion of psychology and feminism in the 
development of a social learning explanation for 'why men rape'. Scully (1990; see 
also Scully and Marolla, 1985a, 1985b) developed her theory of rape by interviewing 
convicted rapists in the USA and, using Mills' (1940) concept of a 'vocabulary of 
motive' (where people attempt to explain an act in acceptable tenns), concluded that: 
An iniportant part of learning to rape inchides the inasteq of a vocabulary that can 
be used to explain sexual violence against ivoinen in socially acceptable ternis (pg. 
98). 
77 There are a number of problems with Whaley's analysis; in particular her measurement of rape as 
rapes reported to the police and recorded in the U. S. Uniform Crime Reports and her extremely limited 
consideration of variables that may have confounded her results. There are a number of problems 
associated with reliance upon official rape statistics, only some of which are acknowledged by Whaley. 
Of more importance are possible confounding variables, such as changes in rape laws (in particular the 
withdrawal of the marital rape exception in most U. S. states), societal attitudes to rape and criminal 
justice responses to rape. 
78 Social learning theorists explain rape in terms of learned behaviours, where rape occurs through 
modelling (e. g. copying rape scenes from films), linking sex with violence (e. g. pornography), belief in 
rape myths ('... prejudicial, stemotyped, orfalse beliefs about rape, 1-ape victinis, and rapists'Burt, 
1980, pg. 217) and/or desensitisation to violence (whereby sexual violence is not seen as serious 
because of its prevalence on television/in computer games etc. ). 
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Scully thus explains rape in terms of both individual and societal factors; men who 
rape do so as a low risk, high reward 'act of normal deviance' (pg. 63) but the 
'rewards' vary for different men in different situations. According to this perspective 
rape, rather than directly upholding patriarchy (as suggested by Brownmiller) is 
symptoniatic of patriarchal society; if society did not have gender inequality based 
upon patriarchal structures then rape would not be rewarding for some men and rape 
would not be a low risk act. 
A further approach, advanced mostly over the last decade, is the development of 
cognitive theories to explain rape. According to cognition-based theories of rape, 
rapists are able to minimise, rationalise or even justify their behaviour because of 
cognitive distortions. For example, it is argued from this perspective that rapists may 
wrongly interpret a victim's facial expression as pleasure instead of fear (McFall, 
1990) or have empathic or social skill deficits (Covell and Scalora, 2002; Geer and 
Manguno-Mire, 1996; Geer et al., 2000). Although this perspective has some overlaps 
with social learning theories in that they seek to explain why individual men rape, 
cognitive theories of rape tend to return to an individual level of analysis without 
placing enough emphasis on the role society plays in developing and supporting such 
cognitive distortions 79 . 
Also focusing primarily on the individual level of analysis, the last decade has seen 
an increase in the development of 'typologies' of sexual offending, although attempts 
to classify 'types' of rapists dates back to the late 1970s (e. g. Groth et al., 1977). 
These typologies are generally grounded in empirical research and attempt to 
differentiate between offenders in terms of their individual motivations 80. These 
79 For example, one study compared rapists with non-rapists and found that the penile arousal of rapists 
was higher than for non-rapists when they were shown images involving the sexual humiliation of 
women (Proulx et al., 1994). While it is conceivable that the rapists had distorted cognitions that 
caused them to become aroused by images of the sexual humiliation of women, it is equally 
conceivable that social factors such as sexually degrading pornography and societal attitudes towards 
women played a part in shaping and hence distorting these cognitions. 
so It has been argued that classification is essential if we are ever to fully understand sexual offending 
(Polaschek et al., 1997), develop refined theories (Millon, 1991), develop effective 'treatment' for 
rapists (Marx et al., 1999) and conduct more accurate risk assessments (Hazelwood and Warren, 2000) 
and assist criminal profilers. They are generally developed by forensic or clinical psychologists and 
while they are not specifically feminist in nature, nor are they are not based on the 'victim-blaming' 
attitudes evident in some previous psychological theories. 
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classifications, or typologies, of rapists using multi-factoral explanations for rape 
mark a significant shift from the (generally) mono-causal feminist theories and 
reinforce the argument that men who rape do so for different reasons. 
Sinninmy 
Theories of 'why men rape' have placed different emphasis on the role of individual 
and societal factors. Feminists have been critical of theories focusing solely on 
individual motivations for rape while they in turn have been accused of focusing too 
heavily on societal levels of analysis and portraying men who rape as a relatively 
homogenous group: 
... because of their essentially societal level of analysis they cannot on their own 
account for the differential inipact of such influences at the individual level 
(Polaschek et al., 1997 pg. 126). 
Polaschek et al., (1997) suggest that a global theory that adequately explains why 
men rape is still some way off and theoretical pluralism 81 may have to suffice for the 
moment. If we accept that men rape for different motivations (such as those suggested 
by Scully, 1990 and also in the various rape classifications) we still need to consider 
the social space that allows these motivations to take place, particularly if men are 
perceiving it as a low risk, high reward crime (Scully, 1990). As rape is a criminal 
offence, defined by the government, interpreted-by and enforced by state actors, it is 
necessary to consider this wider structure within which the individual motivations 
take place. This raises the question of whether there are appropriate laws that sanction 
rape and also whether laws and policies are being properly enforced. 
2.3 Attrition in rape cases 
Research shows that while more and more men are being reported to the police for 
rape in the United Kingdom, the proportion that are convicted for rape has been 
steadily falling since records began (Chambers and Miller, 1983; Chambers and 
Miller, 1986; Grace et al., 1992; Harris and Grace, 1999; Kelly et al., 2005; Lea et al., 
81 Using different theories to explain different factors of any given phenomenon (Hooker, 1987) 
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2003; Lees and Gregory, 1993; Smith, 1989). The conviction rate for rapes reported 
to the police now stands at an all-time low since records began of around five per cent 
(Kelly et al., 2005; Lea et al., 2003). This compares unfavourably to other offences; 
the proportion of offenders brought to justice 82 for all offences in 2000/01 was around 
20 per cent (Home Office, 2002a). 
Comparative analysis shows that the pattern of increasing attrition over time in rape 
cases is not restricted to the United Kingdom. In many European countries rape 
conviction rates (as a proportion of reported cases) have fallen over the last two 
decades (Kelly and Regan, 2001; Regan and Kelly, 2003). Although direct 
comparisons can be methodologically difficult, research has found great disparity in 
attrition rates across Europe. For the period between 1998 and 2001, Regan and Kelly 
(2003) found rape conviction rates (as a proportion of reported cases) varied from an 
average of I per cent (Ireland), 7 per cent (Sweden) and 8 per cent (in England and 
Wales) at the lower end up to 54 per cent (Hungary) and 66 per cent (Latvia) at the 
higher end. However, Hungary and Latvia have not seen a consistent increase in the 
number of reports recorded as most of the countries with lower conviction rates have. 
They found the only country that had an increase in both convictions and reporting 
was Germany (with an average conviction rate of 25 per cent between 1998 and 
2001). 
Comparative analysis within England and Wales also shows disparity, with different 
geographical areas having different levels of attrition. In 2002 for example, 
Cleveland, Gwent, South Wales and South Yorkshire all obtained conviction rates of 
between 12.2 and 12.8 per cent in comparison with Gloucestershire and 
Warwickshire who obtained conviction rates of 1.75 and 1.67 per cent respectively 
(figures taken from Kelly et al., 2005 Appendix 1). Research on domestic violence 
shows that the high level of attrition is not peculiar to rape, but rather a feature in the 
prosecution of male violence against women in general (Hester et al., 2003; Hester 
and Wcstmarland, 2005; HMIC and HMCPSI, 2004; Phillips and Brown, 1998)83. 
82 Defined by the Home Office (2002a) as when an offender receives a caution, conviction or has the 
offence taken into consideration in court. 
83 Hester et al found that out of 869 domestic violence incidents recorded by the police only 31 (3.6%) 
resulted in a conviction and even fewer were given custodial sentences. This does not, however mean 
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in 2002 Kelly reviewed six rape attrition studies in the UK (as part of a larger 
research review) and identified four key attrition stages 84 : whether a woman decides 
to make an official rape report to the police (which the police decide to record); 
whether the police pass the case to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS); whether the 
CPS decide to prosecute and finally; whether the defendant is found guilty of rape. 
These stages will now be discussed in turn. 
As with other fonns of violence against women, very few women who are raped 
make an official report to the police. Research shows that the proportion of women 
that report rape ranges between five and fifteen per cent (Hall, 1985; Johnson and 
Sacco, 1995; Painter, 1991; Russell, 1983; Walby and Allen, 2004; Warshaw and 
Koss, 1994), depending on the time and place the research was conducted and the 
research methods and samples used. The likelihood of reporting may be even lower 
for women from black and other minority ethnic groups (HMCPSI and HMIC, 2002). 
There are many reasons why women do not report rape to the police. These reasons 
include that they may: not recognise that what has happened to them is rape (Kahn, 
2004; Kelly, 1988; Peterson and Muehlenhard, 2004), particularly if the rape does not 
confonn to what they view as 'real rape' (Soothill and Walby, 1991; Estrich, 1987); 
feel they will not be taken seriously by the police or worry that they will not be 
believed (Faizey, 1994); feel embarrassed for 'putting themselves in the situation' and 
blame themselves for being raped (Finkelson and Oswalt, 1995); be encouraged to 
invalidate their experiences (Kelly and Radford, 1996); and/or have recollection 
problems if they have been administered alcohol or other drug (Hindmarch and 
Brinkmann, 1999; Rape Crisis Federation, 2002)85. For an incident of reported rape to 
that the domestic violence attrition rate is higher than the rape attrition rate because not all of the 
domestic violence incidents would have been criminal offences. 
84 More recently Kelly et al. (2005) have discussed the attrition process in six rather than four stages in 
a study aimed at finding out more about attrition in the early stages of the criminal justice system. As 
the aim of this section is to provide a general overview of attrition the detail of these additional stages 
is not discussed here. 
85 Although 'date rape' drugs (primarily Rohypnol) have been the subjects of media attention, alcohol 
remains the most frequently used 'date rape' drug. In an analysis of 1,033 urine samples in rape cases 
in the USA between 1996 and 1998,37 per cent were positive for alcohol compared to less than I per 
cent for Rohypnol (Hindmarch and Brinkmann, 1999). It is unclear from the infon-nation available in 
the UK on drug-assisted rape whether this is indeed an increasing problem or whether the media has 
created a new 'moral panic' in which illegal drugs are seen to be more newsworthy than alcohol in 
rape cases (see Cohen, 1972 on the development of moral panics). Recent research found that 6 per 
cent of victims in London described them as 'drug rapes' (Ruparel, 2004) 
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enter official rape statistics the rape must also be recorded by the police (Kelly, 
2002), and although this should always happen it is not known what proportion of 
reported cases are recorded 86 . 
The second point of attrition is whether or not the police pass the case to the CPS for 
prosecution. Cases are not forwarded to the CPS if they are 'no-crimed 187 or 
undetected 88 and logged as 'no further action'. Even if an incident is 'crimed' and a 
suspect is identified and caught the police may still record it as 'no-further action' and 
not forward the case to the CPS. The possible reasons for this are laid out in a set of 
Home Office categories 89 . In her review of six research studies, Kelly (2002) 
found 
that between half and two thirds of cases were dropped in this stage. 
The third key attrition point lies with the CPS, who decide whether or not to continue 
with the prosecution passed to them by the police. For a case to proceed through the 
CPS to the court an evidential, and purportedly objective, 'test' is applied to the case. 
The evidence is reviewed in terms of admissibility, reliability and credibility. The 
main aim of this test is to ascertain whether or not there is a realistic likelihood of 
gaining a conviction in court - whether a jury would be more likely than not to find 
the defendant guilty on the evidence available. If this is the case then it must also be 
judged as to whether it is in the public's interest to continue with the case. If these 
tests are met then the case proceeds to the court, which is where the final key attrition 
90 point lies . In Kelly's (2002) review between seven per cent and 32 per cent were 
discontinued at the prosecution stage and did not proceed to court. 
86 Only around 50 per cent of domestic violence incidents that are reported are likely to be recorded as 
such (Hanmer et al., 1999), however one of the reasons for this is because domestic violence does not 
represent an individual offence and it is unlikely that the gap between reported and recorded rapes 
would be anywhere near this size. 
87 If the police believe the rape report to be false or if the complaint is withdrawn (although if the 
complaint is withdrawn this may alternatively be logged as 'no further action'). 
81 If no suspect is identified and caught. 
89 These include where a suspect has been identified but the case is not taken any further, for example 
if the offender has been formally warned by the police, a key witness refuses to give evidence or if 
there is insufficient admissible evidence to make a conviction likely. The police may also ask for 
advice from the CPS and cases may be dropped at the advice of the CPS. 
90 If these evidential tests are not met then it is possible for a private prosecution to take place, 
although these are rare and very expensive. The first private prosecution for rape was brought in 1995 
and was successful which suggests problems with CPS decision making (see Weale in The Guardian 
18.5.1995 for details of the case). 
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In the courtroom there are three main outcomes. The defendant may be acquitted of 
all charges (found not guilty), convicted on another charge (for example the lesser 
charge of indecent assault) or be convicted of rape. Kelly (2002) found that the 
proportion of men reported for rape that were convicted for rape varied between 
fifteen per cent and six per cent, with the latter figure being the most recent (Harris 
and Grace, 1999). More recent Home Office figures since Kelly's 2002 review show 
that this has now dropped further, to 5.6 per cent (Kelly et al., 2005). 
Sunimmy 
The high attrition rate has long been a major concern of feminist activists, 
practitioners and activists. It is unrealistic to expect all men who are reported for rape 
to be prosecuted and convicted for rape (i. e. 0% attrition). Sometimes there will not 
be enough evidence to prosecute and sometimes the accused will not be guilty of 
rape. However, that this is the situation in such a large proportion of cases (i. e. almost 
95%) is, for many, just as unrealistic. Indeed, the high attrition rate has led some to 
question whether rape is actually becoming decriminalised (Gregory and Lees, 1999). 
Until recently this high attrition rate occurred alongside an overwhelming lack of 
political will to change the situation, leading to arguments that rape was being 
legitimised (Los, 1990; Matoesian, 1993) and that rape was treated as an enforcement 
of the social order rather than a violation of it (Connell, 1987). The inclination for the 
state to criminalise and/or prosecute only certain 'types' of rape ('real rape') led to 
arguments that rape was being regulated rather than prohibited and that the state was 
simply setting the 'linfits of violence appropriatefor the control of women' (Radford, 
1987, pg. 43). Although this situation has now changed to some extent with recent 
changes to substantive law and legal procedures, it remains the case that most rape 
victims do not receive justice (defined here as seeing the perpetrator punished) 
through the criminal justice system. 
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2.4 Substantive rape law 
The last few years have seen a major re-organisation of the substantive law on sexual 
91 
offences . 
Until 2004 the law on sexual offences was based on legislation 
implemented in the 1950s, some of which dated back as far as the 19"' Century. 
Unsurprisingly, this legislation was grossly dated and unsuitable for the 21't Century. 
Although a number of amendments had been made since the 1950s, the result of these 
piecemeal changes led to very confusing laws, to the extent that many different Acts 
had to be accessed in order to decipher how the law stood on any given matter. The 
previous law was also plagued by anomalies, inappropriate language 92 and 
discrimination, some of which could have been construed as being in breach of 
93 Article 14 of the HRA (Freedom from discrimination) 
In order to secure a conviction for rape it is necessary to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt not only that the defendant committed an act that meets the legal definition of 
rape but also that the defendant knew that the victim was not consenting. These are 
known as the actits reus (the guilty act) and the mens i-ea (the guilty mind, or criminal 
intent). These two aspects of rape are now described in turn in ten-ns of the refonns 
that have taken place. 
2.4.1 The actus reus (guilty act) 
The actus reus of rape under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 was defined as unlawful 
sexual intercourse with a woman, which was amended under the Sexual Offences 
Amendment Act 1976 to unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent. The 1990s saw two major changes to the rape actus reus. In 1991 rape within 
marriage became illegal within common-law and this was placed into statute in the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 when the word 'unlawful' was removed 
from the definition. The second change was also encompassed within the 1994 Act 
when it was acknowledged that a male could be a victim of rape and the actus reus 
91 There is not room here to describe fully the processes, discussions and debates that took place during 
the Sexual Offences Review. See Westmarland (2004) for a more in-depth discussion. 
92 For example the use of the term 'defective' for individuals with learning disabilities. 
93 For example, it was classed as an offence for an adult male to have sexual intercourse with a girl 
under the age of 16, but it was not an offence for an adult female to have sexual intercourse with a boy 
under the age of 16. 
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was extended to include anal intercourse against a woman or another man without 
their consent. The actus reus then remained the same until the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 widened the actus reus further to penile penetration of another's mouth, anus or 
vagina without consent or reasonable belief in consent. Therefore rape was extended 
to include penile penetration of the mouth, on the basis that '... foi-ced oi-al se. x is as 
hoi-rible, as detneaning and as ti-ainnatising as othet- foi-ins of penile pelleti-ation' 
(Home Office, 2000 pg. 15). It remains the case that a man or a woman can be raped, 
but only a man can rape (because of the need for a penis). 
The second part of the actus reus, 'without consent or reasonable belief in consent', 
overlaps with the mens rea. Technically, 'without consent' refers to the actus reus and 
the 'reasonable belief in consent' refers to the mens rea and this is how they will be 
discussed here. There are generally three lines of defence used in rape cases: that 
intercourse did not take place, that intercourse did take place but not with the 
defendant, or that intercourse took place but the victim consented to it or the 
defendant believed that the victim consented to it (Baird, 1999). Baird (1999) 
highlights that there are very few cases that are 'whodunnits' and that the defence that 
sexual intercourse never took place is also rare. These defences are likely to have 
reduced since developments in DNA testing (Lees, 1996a). The issue of consent is 
therefore what many rape defence arguments focus on, and one of the aims of the 
Sexual Offences Review was to 'clarify the law on consent' 94 . 
The root of the 'consent' problem lies with the requirement of the prosecution to 
prove the absence of consent (rather than requiring the defence to prove that they had 
taken steps to ascertain consent), and in many ways this problem is unique to rape 
cases. If, for example, a person reported that their car had been stolen it would not be 
necessary to prove that it had been taken without their consent. Similarly, if an 
individual were physically assaulted, for example punched in the face, they would not 
be asked if they agreed to be punched in the face. A further problem in rape cases is 
that the only direct witness is likely to be the rape victim. If the defendant says that 
the victim consented and the victim says she did not consent then it is difficult to 
94 This was the then used as the title of Chapter Two in the white paper 'Protecting the Public' (Home 
Office, 2002b). 
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validate either person's statement of the act 95 . Because of the nature of rape it is 
unlikely there would be a third party available to directly corroborate either 
statement, making police evidence gathering and experienced police interviewers 
vitally important in rape cases. 
The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 was the first to use the term 'consent' in 
statute. However, exactly what was meant by 'consent' was never defined in statute 
and common-law approaches were confusing (see Temkin 2000b for discussion of the 
issues that led to confusion). The Sexual Offences Act 2003 addressed this confusion 
by defining consent, as 'if a person agrees by choice, and has the freedom and 
capacity to make that choice' (Section 24). It also lists six categories where consent is 
'presumed' to be absent (Section 75) and two where consent is 'conclusively 
presumed' to be absent (Section 76). When applied to children under 13, rape does 
not have the consent element attached to it. This means that the 2003 Act recognises 
that a child aged under 13 can never 'consent' to sexual intercourse and that any 
sexual intercourse with a child under 13 is now classified as a 'strict liability' offence 
(i. e. the standard for proving culpability is lowered). 
2.4.2 The mens rea (guilty mind) 
This second part of the offence of rape, the mcns rca, is based on the prcmisc that an 
individual should not be punished for an act that they did not know they were 
committing at the time of the act (the crim 
'e 
of trespass is a regularly used example to 
explain the mens rea) 96 . Although the mens rea is a component of most offences, it 
only becomes relevant when the conduct in question is ambiguous. 
Prior to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 if a man committed the actus reus of rape - the 
guilty act, but he honestly believed that the woman was consenting regardless of how 
unreasonable that belief was, he could not be convicted of rape because the mens rea 
95 Until 1995 Judge's were required to give the 'corroboration warning' in their summing up - by 
warning the jury that it is unsafe to convict a man of rape purely on the woman's uncorroborated 
evidence. Sexual offences were one of only two trials in which this warning was deemed necessary 
(the other being child witnesses). 
96 It is against the law to trespass onto another's property, but a person cannot be convicted if they did 
not know they were trespassing. For example if they walked onto someone's land while on a country 
walk which was not clearly signed as being someone's private property. NB. This example is simply to 
show how the mens rea works and not to draw any other parallels between trespass and rape. 
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- the guilty mind - was not present. This was known formally as the 'mistaken belief' 
clause 97 and infonnally as the 'rapists charter' (Temkin, 1987) or 'men's rea' 
(Cousins, 1980) because it meant that a woman could be actively non-consenting, 
even shouting 'no' and struggling to free herself, and a man could still be acquitted of 
rape. Although there has been no research on its success as a defence in the UK, it 
was presumably a defence that was very difficult, if not impossible, to rebut because 
it was based upon what was going on in the defendant's mind. 
Feminists lobbied for many years against the 'mistaken belief in consent', arguing 
either that the clause should either be removed oi- that that the belief should at least be 
a reasonable one. After much debate, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 defined the mens 
rea as if a person does not reasonably believe that the other consents (section Ic). 
Whether or not the belief is classed as reasonable is to be determined after looking at 
all the circumstances, including any steps a person may have taken to ascertain 
whether the other consented. 
Stimmag 
The widening of the definition of rape to include penile penetration of the mouth, the 
removal of the consent issue for children under the age of 13, the defining of consent 
and the need for belief in consent to be a reasonable one all significantly strengthen 
the law on sexual offences. These changes, intentionally or unintentionally guided by 
a strong feminist influence 98 , mean that accusations made in the past that the state 
was condoning rape through weak and ine ffective criminal laws (as described above) 
are reduced in terms of the substantive law. 
97 The 'mistaken belief clause was first introduced in the case of Morgan ([1976] AC 182) when a 
husband colluded in the raping of his wife by three of his friends. He allegedly told his friends that his 
wife would struggle and say 'no', as though she did not want to have intercourse with them, but that 
this 'turned her on' because she was 'kinky'. The accused men claimed that they honestly believed she 
was enjoying it and consenting and that they did not intend to rape her - in other words that they did 
not have a guilty mind. Although in the Morgan case the men were convicted, and the husband 
convicted of aiding and abetting, Aforgan set a new precedent and tile House of Lords ruled that if a 
man honestly believed that a -%voman consented, regardless of how unreasonable this belief was, lie 
could not be found guilty of rape. 
98 The external reference group set up as part of the Sexual Offences Review included established 
feminist academics, representatives from feminist organisations working with victims of rape and 
feminist activists. 
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However, the problems that have been documented around rape and the law go wider 
than the substantive law, which is one of the reasons why some have been sceptical of 
the amount of change the Sexual Offences Act 2003 can achieve. Rumney (2001), for 
example, warned that the review might lead to 'anothei-false daivn'(pg. 890) because 
of its sole focus on the 'black letter' law and others have argued that it is important 
for law reform to focus on the trial process, particularly on how rules of evidence and 
the ways in which rape cases are constructed relate to social perceptions of gender, 
coercion and sexuality (e. g. Goldberg-Ambrose, 1992). In addition, it has long been 
recognised by feminists that legal refonns can only be implemented effectively if they 
are linked to attitudinal transformations (e. g. Jeffreys and Radford, 1984), although it 
is also acknowledged that laws are probably easier to change than prejudiced attitudes 
(Gaines, 1997). This suggests that it is necessary to look beyond the 'black letter' of 
substantive rape law and look at the evidential and procedural factors associated with 
rape prosecutions, many of which are also influenced by, or even led by, extra-legal 
factors such as myths about rape. 
2.5 Evidential, procedural and extra-legal factors 
Research shows that women find the rape prosecution process very traumatic 
culminating, if the case gets that far, in the trial at court. Throughout the prosecution 
process and at the trial the role of the rape victim is as a witness, with the Crown 
Prosecution Service acting as the prosecutor on behalf of the public (except in very 
rare cases of private prosecutions 99 ). However, research has described how many 
women feel that they are not treated solely as a 'witness' or a 'victim', but made to 
feel as if they are on trial themselves (Lees, 1996a; Victim Support, 1996). In spite of 
the low conviction rate for rape, the following sections will show that the focus in 
rape trials continues to be skewed towards ensuring fairness for the defendant, 
sometimes at the expense of the victim. Lees (1993) describes this as loading the dice 
against the victim. This is not peculiar to England and Wales, with similar problems 
found elsewhere. In Scotland, Brown et al. (1993) have argued that in rape cases the 
adversarial system is an asymmetrical one and Easteal (1998a) makes the same point 
in relation to the situation in Australia: 
99 Private prosecutions may be brought under section 6 of the Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985. 
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Traditionally, in rape trials, the scales offitstice have been iveightedfar more heavily 
on the side of the defendant. (pg. vii) 
Feminists have tended to re*ect the argument that that the low rape conviction rate is 
'inevitable' because of the nature of the crime. Rather, they argue that there are 
number of factors that, if properly addressed, could make rape trials more 'balanced' 
and more 'fair' to the victim. This section describes some of the ways in which the 
'scales' of justice are argued to be skewed in rape trials towards the defendant and 
away from the public prosecutor. 
The victim has no legal advocate 
The victim has no legal representation in court or, indeed throughout the prosecution 
process whereas the defendant does have legal representation in the form of his 
defence team. In 1986 the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was created and took 
over the responsibility for criminal prosecutions meaning that the prosecution works 
on behalf of the public not the victim. This leaves the victim with no advocate, acting 
only as a witness in 'her' case. Few people understand that the CPS is acting for the 
state and not for the individual victim and this is rarely explained to victims (Fawcett 
Society, 2003b). 
The defence harrister is generally more experienced than the prosecution harrister 
Typically, the defence barrister will be paid around twice as much as the prosecution, 
which tends to result in the more experienced barristers taking on the defence work 
leaving the less experienced barristers with the lower paid prosecution work (Temkin, 
2000a). In Lees' interview with an Old Bailey judge in the Dispatches (2000) 
television programme Mrs Judge Rafferty pointed out that 'the prosecution is going 
to be outgunned and outclassed by the more seasoned petfornier' (cited by Lees, 
2002 pg. xxii) and in Temkin's (2000a) interviews with ten QCs experienced in rape 
cases she found that they were often shocked by the lack of experience held by 
prosecution banisters, with one QC describing them as an 'open target' for the 
defence. The QCs also described how their knowledge and experience of the 
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difficulties involved in prosecuting rape was used to assist their development of 
strategies to use in defence cases. 
The CPS introduced specialist rape prosecutors in 2004, however this does not mean 
that the barrister will act any differently or that the victim will have a legal advocate. 
The degree to how 'specialist' the rape prosecutors are is questionable and appears to 
vary between geographical areas. The minimum requirements to qualify as a 
specialist rape prosecutor is for a prosecutor to be 'interested' in prosecuting rape 
cases, have more than three years experience and attend one training session written 
and delivered by the CPS. 
The victim has veryfew legal rights 
Although victims of crime of course have human rights, the principle focus of human 
rights has generally been on the rights of suspects, defendants and convicted 
offenders (de Than, 2003). This is evident from the content of legal journals, in the 
case law of the ECHR and in some of the substantive Articles which are explicitly 
geared towards suspects, defendants and offenders, in particular Articles 5 (Right to 
liberty and security), 6 (Right to a fair trial) and 7 (No punishment without law). In 
contrast, there is clearly no explicit 'right to be free from rape'. The right to sexual 
autonomy remains a 'missing entitlement' (Schulhofer, 1998). 
Human rights aside, victim's rights in general have tended to take a poor second place 
to the rights of defendants (de Than, 2003). In the UK the first Victim's Charter was 
published in 1990 by the Home Office in response to the heightened awareness of 
victims needs developed throughout the 1980s. The Charter had as its subtitle A 
statement on the rights of victims of crinie', however it is now accepted that if there 
were any right contained within the document they were very difficult to find (Home 
Office, 200 1). The Charter was revised in 1996, setting out 27 'standards of sel-vice' 
that victims could expect to receive, hence removing the previous language of 
'rights'. Regardless of the revision, public awareness of the Charter has constantly 
remained very low (Home Office, 2001). In addition, as 'rights' or as 'standards', the 
provision within the Victims Charter are only 'quasi-legal' (Fenwick, 1997), 
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according to Ganz's (1987) definition of the tenn (as rules, but not ones that are 
directly enforceable in criminal/civil proceedings). 
Now to be called the 'Victim's Code of Practice', the Charter is again being revised 
in a consultation exercise due to close in May 2005. While the most recent draft does 
set out clearly what a victim of crime can expect from a range of agencies (including 
the police and CPS), it remains a quasi-legal document and is vague in places: 
JYhere a person fails to coniply with this Code, that does not, of itself, nZake him 
liable to legal pi-oceedings. '(Victims' Code of Practice Consultation section 1.2) 
'... the CPS must usually agree to ineetyou to explain why they decided not to bring 
charges ... '(Victims' Code of Practice: A 
Guide for Victims Consultation pg. 6, my 
emphasis) 
Although acknowledgement of the importance of the victim has become heightened 
over recent years with the expansion of victim support schemes, the development of 
witness support for those called to give evidence in court and the revision of the 
Victims' Code of Practice, these have been developed within a government agenda to 
increase conviction rates and decrease what they call the 'justice gap' for all offences 
(the difference between the number of recorded offences and the number of offenders 
brought to justice for these offences). While increasing the conviction rate is clearly 
important, it must also be remembered that procedural justice not only for defendants 
but also for victim witnesses is also vital. Kelly et al. (2005) found that a sense of 
procedural justice was seen by women as more, or at least as, important as the final 
court outcome when they were given proper support throughout the process. Of the 
cases that resulted in acquittals, it was found that while the women were disappointed 
at the outcomes, they did not regret pursuing the case. 
Some have argued that increasing the rights of victims is seen as synonymous with 
increasing the rights of the state: 
when the government talks about rebalancing the system, it is really about a 
rebalancing in javour of the state, giving more power to the state. That is thefi-aud in 
the government's rhetoric, the sleight ofhand. '(Kennedy, 2004 pg. 26) 
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The role of the HRA and the ECHR have been largely neglected when thinking about 
rights for victims, with the emphasis placed on the development of the Victims' Code 
of Practice. de Than (2003) suggests that the focus should be on upholding the rights 
that victims and vulnerable witnesses already hold under the ECHR rather than on the 
creation of guidelines, codes of practice and ombudsmen. 
Victims are asked intrusive questions ahout their sexual histoiy 
Research with rape victims has consistently shown that they find giving evidence and 
being cross-examined about their sexual history extremely distressing and 
humiliating, to the extent that they may change their minds about giving evidence in 
court (Lowe, 1984) or be put off from even reporting the rape to the police (Adler, 
1982,1987). In addition to the emotional impact of answering such questions, Lees' 
(1996) research shows that unnecessary questioning of a victim about her previous 
sexual experiences was used in rape trials to destroy her credibility as a witness and 
to imply that if she had had consensual intercourse in the past then she must have 
consented on the occasion in question. 
Section Two of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 ruled that women could 
only be questioned regarding their sexual history if leave from the judge was obtained 
and also that women could not be named in the media, but judges continued to 
frequently allow sexual history evidence to be used (Adler, 1982; Lowe, 1984; 
Temkin, 1993). Brereton (1997), for example, found that three quarters of rape 
victims in Australia were questioned about their sexual history when the defence 
sought to show that the victim consented. 
It was to be two decades, in 1998, before the issue of sexual history evidence was 
again reviewed. In line with New Labour's 1997 election manifesto promise to 
provide greater protection to victim-witnesses in rape and other serious sexual 
offence trials, they published 'Speaking Up for Justice', a consultation paper about 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses (Home Office, 1998). New provision was 
subsequently contained within the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, 
which limited the use of sexual history evidence to a number of specified situations. 
Some feminists, however, were still uneasy about the sexual history restrictions, 
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arguing that they lacked clarity and did not go far enough (Cook, 1999). Other 
academics argued that the restrictions were well intentioned but went too far (Birch, 
2000) and a House of Lords challenge (R v A) later weakened the restrictions further 
by allowing more judicial discretion than was intended within the Act (this case is 
discussed in more detail in Chapters Six and Seven). 
Evidence is given and victims are ci-oss-e. rainined aboutfactors that are ailned at 
discrediting andloi- intimidating the witness 
In addition to sexual history evidence, Lees (I 996a) found that most rape victims 
reported feeling that they had generally been asked irrelevant and unfair questions 
during the trial. She found that questions often centred on the complainants personal 
life, for example her use of alcohol or drugs, her living arrangements or financial 
situation and concluded that questioning around issues such as these did not elicit any 
relevant information but rather was used to discredit the witness thereby causing the 
jury to question the truthfulness of her rape allegation. Questions such as what 
underwear the woman was wearing and whether she had a vibrator were used to 
insinuate that the woman had a 'bad' reputation and questions about clothing and 
make-up (for example the colour of her lipstick or whether she was wearing a 
4petticoat') were asked, despite being of no relevance to the trial. Lees argued that 
these lines of questioning were used to imply that the woman must have consented 
because she was a 'tart' or a 'slut', that she 'deserved' to be raped, and/or to distress 
her when giving evidence. 
Lees (1996a) findings are supported by Temkin's (2000a) research, where the QC's 
described that discrediting the witness was a key strategy they used when defending 
rape cases. The aim of this was to undermine the victim's credibility, and this was 
seen as being even more important than the facts of the case: 
You'll put yozu- chap's facts and obi, iously conti-ovel-t hel- facts. Theyl-e less 
impoi-tant than undei-inining hei-pei-sonality. It sounds sinistei- but that's whatyoure 
tiying to do, make hei- sound and appew- less ci-edible. (QC interviewed in Temkin, 
2000a pg. 23 1) 
Those who had acted as barristers for the prosecution tended to accept that this would 
happen and agreed that this, rather than the facts of the case, tended to be the 'pi-ime 
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impediment' to gaining a conviction: 'Her appearance, her behaviour, her lifestyle 
ivere all Weived as obstacles' (Temkin, 2000a pg. 224). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, since defence barristers continue to use it, research shows 
that this strategy can be successful. Research using simulated rape trials have found, 
for example, that participants interpret an acquaintance rape differently depending on 
the length of the victim's skirt (Workman and Orr, 1996) and are less likely to find 
the defendant guilty if the victim had consumed alcohol (Schuller and Wall, 1998). 
Although trial judges are under a common-law obligation to prevent unnecessary 
and/or oppressive cross-examination, this regulation is argued to be inadequate 
(Ellison, 1998). In one case a judge failed to prevent a defendant representing 
himself from cross-examining the victim for six days while wearing the same clothes 
at the trial that he had worn at the time of the rape (cited by Cook, 1998). A similar 
scenario occurred in Brown in 1997 where the cross-examination was allowed to 
continue despite the trial judge acknowledging in his summing up that '[the] 
inerciless cross-exandnation [Was] clearly only designed to intinddate and hundliate 
thein [the witnesses] '(Judge Pontius, cited by Cook, 1998, pg. 3). 
Some have argued that the things that happen in a rape trial, particularly around 
cross-examination but also around attrition, are not peculiar to rape trials but rather 
are purely symptomatic of the adversarial system and its emphasis on the 
establishment of 'proof' rather than 'truth'. In Australia Brereton (1997) compared 
rape trials with assault trials and found that assault complainants were just as likely as 
rape complainants to have their character and credibility questioned, to exploit any 
inconsistencies in evidence and to be questioned about alcohol consumption and 
emotional stability. However, both evidence-in-chief and cross-examination lasted 
around twice as long in rape trials than in assault trials. In the UK, participants in 
Rocks's (1993) research on prosecution witnesses appearing at the Crown Court 
described the cross-examination process in similar terms as rape victims have, 
explaining that it made them feel degraded and as if they were the ones on trial. More 
recently, Ellison (1998) has argued that although reforms around the use of sexual 
history evidence and cross-examination in rape trials should be welcomed, rape trials 
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must be viewed within the broader framework of the adversarial system more 
generally if the treatment of rape victims is to be improved. 
Many of the criticisms made of rape trials are certainly linked to the way in which the 
adversarial system works and are true to some extent of other criminal trials. 
Countries such as France, with a strong commitment to the inquisitorial system, have 
gone to great lengths to avoid adversarialism: 
The adversarial systein ofjustice is by nature unfair and inyust. Itfavours the strong 
over the iveak-. It accentuates social and cultural differences, javouring the rich who 
are able to engage andpayfor the set-vices of one or inore layers. (Justice Minister 
Madame Guigou, 1999, cited in Hodgeson, 2004) 
Human rights take centre stage in France, with the ECHR incorporated totally and 
constitutionally guaranteed since 1974 (Hodgeson, 2004). France also appears to 
have a higher conviction rate than England and Wales (data chart 16, in Kelly and 
Regan, 2003). 
The nature of the adversarial system may therefore play a large part in the 
problematic nature of rape trials in England and Wales, and more research is needed 
on this issue and on how this links with human rights., There are also, however, issues 
that are specific to rape trials that go beyond the general features of an adversarial 
trial. For example: in no other offences do such powerful stereotypes exist to define 
what is 'real' (Kelly et al., 2005); in no other category of offences are defendants as 
likely to plead not guiltyloo (Home Office/National Statistics, 2004); and in no other 
trial do key actors within the criminal justice system routinely (and incorrectly'01) 
assume the victim to be lying: 
... I would say a good 
half that coine through are not genuine ones. (Police Officer 
interviewed in Kelly et al., 2005 pg. 50) 
100 In 2003 32 per cent of sexual offence defendants pleaded guilty at Crown Court compared with 54 
per cent of violence against the person defendants and an overall rate of 63 percent for defendants of 
all indictable offences. 
101 Kelly et al. (2005) found that in their sample of 2,643 rape cases, 3 per cent were 'probably' or 
'possibly' false. 
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... I have dealt ivith hundreds and hundreds of rapes in the lastfeiv years, and I can honestly pi-obably count on both hands the ones that I believe are tritly genuine. 
(Police Officer interviewed in Kelly et al., 2005 pg. 51) 
Problems relating to evidential requirements 
It is relatively easy to prove that sexual intercourse took place, particularly since 
DNA testing has become more widespread, however proving beyond reasonable 
doubt that the intercourse was not consensual is more difficult and leads to what often 
seems to be a 'one person's word against another's' type scenario (Lees, 1996a). 
While there are a number of problems relating to evidential requirements, there is 
only space here to discuss the two issues that are most regularly identified in literature 
as problematic. These relate to corroborative evidence and the 'mistaken belief in 
consent' defence. 
There is conftision and inconsistency about exactly what evidence can be classed as 
corroborative. Lees (1996a) points out that while a distressed state at the time of the 
rape report is seen in Scotland as being corroborative, in England and Wales it is 
simply seen as being 'consistent'. Until 1995 judges were required to give the 
'corroboration warning', warning the jury that it is unsafe to convict a man of rape 
purely on a woman's uncorroborated evidence. The warning was often 'embroidered' 
by judges with comments about women making false rape complaints (Lees, 1996a). 
Under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 it is no longer mandatory for 
judges to give the warning and it is now discretionary. Cooper (1995) warns that 
relying upon discretion will result in rape trials been conducted differently depending 
on the trial judge. There has been no research in the UK on how often such warnings 
are now given or the nature of the warning, however a review of Australian literature 
shows that the warning was still regularly given following its abolishment there 
(Mack, 1998). 
Another area that is widely cited as being problematic in evidential terms is when the 
'mistaken belief in consent' defence is used. As already discussed, the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 amended the rape mens rea and belief in consent must now be 
reasonable. It is too early to know whether this will continue to be a problem, and 
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whether the term 'reasonable' will be interpreted as reasonable 'man' or 'person' in a 
way that has previously allowed the law to apply male defined norrns to assess the 
actions of women (see for example Forell and Matthews, 2000). It must, however, be 
noted that no research has been conducted in the UK regarding the prevalence or 
impact of the defence before the change was made. Research in Australia suggest that 
the mistaken belief was used in less than one in four cases (23%) and that defendants 
were actually inoi-e likely to be found guilty when this defence was used (Law 
Reform Commission of Victoria, 1991a, 1991b). If the same was true in the UK then 
feminist campaigning for change may have been misplaced. Gans (1997), however, 
argues that the methodology of the Australian study was fundamentally flawed and 
that this led to invalid and misleading findings. Criticising the research for not taking 
into account pre-trial decisions on attrition, ignoring the role of mistaken belief within 
juror decision making and for having vague coding categories around consent and 
mistaken belief, Gans (1997) suggests that, by re-coding the data, at least 74 per cent 
rather than 23 per cent of the trials actually had at least some element of mistaken 
belief defence. All that can be concluded from this is that the mistaken belief in 
consent defence has been identified as an evidential issue contributing to the low rape 
conviction rate, but that it is not known how often it is used, how it impacts on case 
outcome or how the change to a 'reasonable' mistaken belief will be interpreted. 
The lack ofjudge andjug knowledge about rape 
Lees (2001) highlights that the effectiveness of rape law reforms is questionable 
while many lawyers, police and prosecutors remain opposed to such changes. She 
argues that the virtual lack of training about the effects of rape, imbalances in trials 
and the characteristics of rapists leaves them '... woefully ignorant andprejudiced 
about rape and sexual assaidt' (Lees, 1996a, pg. 248). 
Training, however, may not have the positive implications attached to it as it may first 
appear. In Temkin's (2000a) study of barristers she found mixed feelings about 
training. Some were against training, with one female barrister stating that it was not 
her responsibility to be concerned about the effects of cross-examination. Even more 
worryingly, barristers who looked favourably upon training did so in order to cross- 
examine witnesses more effectively from the perspective of the defence. 
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Without any knowledge about how victims respond to rape, people tend to rely on 
how they believe a 'real' rape victim should act. Research using simulated rape cases 
has found that these beliefs overlap with consent decisions. For example participants 
in one study rated women as having been more likely to have consented if they 
waited three days to report the incident to the police and were uninjured (Harris and 
Weiss, 1995). In contrast, people who have some understanding about rape victims, 
through being raped themselves or having known someone who has been raped, are 
more likely to give a guilty verdict (Wiener et al., 1989). This may be because they 
are less likely to believe rape myths about how a 'real' rape victim would behave 
following the rape. 
It has been suggested that expert testimonies, or even a general education testimony, 
could help counteract and compensate for myths held by jurors about how a rape 
victim 'should' act and behave (Tetreault, 1989). More research on the effect of this 
is needed, however Spanos et al. (1991-1992) found that when mock jurors heard 
evidence by an expert witness this increased the frequency of guilty votes but that this 
increase was reversed when the expert was cross-examined. More generally, 
however, research shows that education about rape can make both women and men 
more empathic towards rape victims (e. g. Pinzone-Glover et al., 1998). 
Judges arepredominantly white, middle class itten 
Despite minimal evidence, it is often assumed in rape cases that male judges are more 
likely than female judges to make questionable judgments, provide biased directions 
to juries and make inappropriate comments in their summing up. Some support for 
this assumption comes from popularised quotes about what misogynistic male judges 
have said in court. In 2001 when the House of Lords were required to consider the 
compatibility of the sexual history evidence provision contained within the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act's 1999 with the right to a fair trial (Article 6) of 
the HRA, the Fawcett Society challenged the legitimacy of having this decision made 
by an all male panel of judges but were unsuccessful in their challenge (described by 
Lees, 2002). 
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While it is true that some women believe and perpetuate rape myths and hold 
negative attitudes to rape victims and also that some men can be incredibly supportive 
of rape victims and anti-rape campaigns, this is not the general pattern. Men are more 
likely than women to: hold negative attitudes towards the rape victim (Ryckman et 
al., 1998), believe rape myths (Furnham and Boston, 1996; Johnson et al., 1997; 
Lonsway and Fitzgerald, 1994; Sinclair and Bourne, 1998), consider the event to be 
consensual (Harris and Weiss, 1995), find the defendant not guilty or prescribe a 
shorter sentence (Fischer, 1991; McNamara et al., 1993; Schulte and Hosch, 1997) 
and not to accept that 'vaginal intercourse with one's wife without consent' is rape 
(Kirkwood and Cecil, 2001). Some ethnicity bias is also evident. In simulated rape 
trials some participants show bias towards black rape victims or victims who had 
dated a black defendant (Willis, 1992) and recommend longer sentences for black 
men found guilty of rape (Rector and Bagby, 1995). 
Summmy 
This shows that there are many problems relating to the prosecution of rape, which all 
contribute to the fact that very few men reported for rape are convicted for rape. This 
means that substantive justice is rarely achieved in rape cases and this is what 
feminists mean when they write things like: 
The inajority of women involved in a rape trial either as a witness, supporting a 
witness or as an observer will be ivell aware thatfiistice is the last thing likely to be 
dispensed in court (Foley, 1995 pg. 54) 
As with many of the changes to the substantive criminal law and with wider criminal 
justice policies relating to violence against women, the government is beginning to 
accept some feminist arguments (without using the term 'feminist'! ). The New 
Labour government brought with them a 'tough on crime' pledge, coining the term 
'justice gap' to describe how some victims of crime are getting a raw deal when 
guilty people are not punished for crimes they have committed. The time has come 
when the scales of justice, they claim, have swung too far in the favour of the 
defendant. 
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Refon, ns to government policy to 'rebalance the scales' are aimed to benefit all 
victims and are not specific to rape or other fon-ns of violence against women. Such 
refonns have so far included a relaxation of the double jeopardy rules (a significant 
reform since the rules had previously existed in English common law since the 12'h 
century) and earlier involvement by the CPS when charging offenders. In the run up 
to the publication of the white paper 'Justice for All', PM Tony Blair explained why 
the criminal justice system needed reforming and rebalancing. The following part of 
his press release was widely reported in the press: 
It's a iniscarriage ofJustice when the police see their hard ivork thrown aivay by the 
courts who can let a inugger out on bail for the seventh or eighth tinle to offend 
again, or when courts don't have the secure acconnnodation or prison places to put 
people. It's perhaps the biggest iniscarriage ofjustice in today's system whell the 
guilty ivalk- away unpunished. 
Although the notion that victims of crime can then become victims of miscarriages of 
justice is not a unique revelation, this marks a significant diversion from popular 
discourse around miscarriages of justice, which has traditionally focused far more 
heavily on the wrongful conviction of the innocent than on the wrongful acquittal of 
the guilty. 
2.6 Theorising rape attrition in terms of miscarriages of justice 
Following a spate of wrongful convictions in the 1980s, which received a great deal 
of media attention spurred by investigative journalism, in 1991 a Royal Commission 
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of Criminal Justice was established . In its report it was accepted that miscarriages 
of justice include not only wrongful convictions (due to error, malpractice or 
procedural irregularity) but also wrongful acquittals (due to error or jury bias) 
(Runciman Committee, 1993). While this served as a powerful acknowledgement that 
victims of crime can be victims of miscarriages of justice, Greer (1994) argues that 
these categories developed by the Royal Commission are incomplete and problematic 
because of their focus on the criminal trial. The starting point for Greer's 
classification of miscarriages of justice is that miscarriages of justice can occur earlier 
in the prosecution process rather than just at the trial stage. Because we know from 
102 This was set up on the day the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction of the Birmingham Six 
(14.3.1991). 
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rape attrition research that problems gaining convictions are not limited to the trial 
but rather that the criminal justice system acts as a type of funnel throughout the 
prosecution process, this makes Greer's classification the most interesting to consider 
in terms of rape and criminal justice. 
Greer (1994) criticises the Runciman Committee for distinguishing between 'wyzist 
acquittals' and 'inyust convictions' as the basis for understanding miscarriages of 
justice, preferring to differentiate between 'zityustified ai, oidance of conilction' (of 
which he identifies four types) and 'inyustified convictions' (of which he identifies 
six types). Of the four types of unjustified avoidance of conviction he identifies, he 
relates two to structural sources (due to defects in substantive criminal law and 
defects in criminal procedure) and two relating to agency (indefensible decisions not 
to charge or prosecute and unjustified acquittals). If Greer's typology is applied to 
rape, examples can be given for each of these types of unjustified avoidance of 
conviction. 
Structural Source 1: Defects in substantive criminal law 
Greer describes miscarriages of justice under this category as cases where the 
behaviour in question is not sanctioned by the criminal law but where there is an 
argument that it should be defined as criminal and cases where conviction is avoided 
because of the 'quirkish' effect of some defences. These have traditionally been 
referred to as 'legal loopholes' by feminists rather than explicitly labelled as 
'miscarriages of justice'. Examples relating to rape that may fall under this category 
include the non-criminalisation of rape within marriage in the substantive criminal 
law pre- 1994 and the 'quirkish' effect of the Morgan ruling. 
Structural Source 2: Defects in criminalprocedure 
Under this category, Greer argues that some aspects of procedural law may result in 
unjust acquittals, although he warris that a compelling argument must be made before 
changing any procedural laws to make it easier to convict. Greer himself cites rape 
cases as examples of miscarriages of justice that may arise from defects in criminal 
procedure, citing the corroboration warning (which was mandatory at the time of 
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Greer's writing in 1994) and some of the rules of evidence (he does not specify which 
ones). 
Agency 1: Indefensible decisions not to charge orprosectite. 
Greer identifies three sources of injustice relating to police and CPS decision making 
in relation to charging and prosecution. The first source is decisions not to charge or 
prosecute because of external pressures on the system such as witness intimidation. 
An example of where this may occur in a rape case is if the rape occurred within a 
domestic violence situation and the woman was threatened with more violence to 
her/her children/her family if she did not withdraw her statement. The second source 
under this category is decisions not to charge or prosecute because of malpractice 
and/or mistakes made by the police or prosecutors, such as negligence or prejudice 
towards the victim. Although not specific to rape, an example of this occurring in a 
rape case could be if the police fail to collect all the available evidence or if the police 
or prosecutor discontinues the case because their prejudiced beliefs lead them to the 
conclusion that the victim is not telling the truth despite evidence to the contrary. 
Ultimately, there would be strong grounds for defining a case as a miscarriage of 
justice if the CPS discontinued a case that was then subject to a successful private 
prosecution. Although these are rarely brought because of the trial and prosecution 
financial costs, these have on occasion been brought and been successful in rape 
cases. For example, in 1994 two women involved in prostitution successfully brought 
a private prosecution against a man for rape, indecent assault, false imprisonment and 
actual bodily harm after the CPS had discontinued the case (Pearson, 1995). The third 
source of injustice Greer identifies under this category is decisions to downgrade an 
offence - to charge or prosecute for a lesser offence than that allegedly committed. 
An example of this would be to prosecute a rape as sexual assault rather than as 
rape 103 . 
103 This would not be the case in the new offence of sexual assault by penetration contained within the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 because sexual assault by penetration carries with it the same maximum 
sentence as rape (life imprisonment). However, rapes may still be downgraded to sexual assault 
(intentional sexual touching without consent or belief in consent) which has a lower maximum 
sentence (ten years imprisonment). 
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Agency 2: Unjustified acquittals. 
Finally, there are two sources of unjustified acquittals that Greer identifies, resulting 
from deliberate external interference through 'jury nobbling' and intimidation and 
those that stem from prejudice against the victim or the prosecution that are unrelated 
to the offence itself (e. g. gender, class or ethnicitY). Cases of 'jury nobbling' and 
intimidation are probably rare in rape cases (although there is no evidence to back up 
this assumption) but in non-stranger rape the victim may be intimidated, particularly 
if the rape is within the context of domestic violence. It is the latter source, in 
particular prejudice against the victim rather than the prosecution, which has been 
most researched and is thought to be the most relevant in terms of rape cases. This 
research was reviewed earlier in the chapter and would include cases where an 
acquittal was made based on rape myths, for example 'prostitutes cannot be raped'. 
Defence strategies to discredit the victim that can result in a complete shift from 
whether the woman has been raped to whether she is a 'rapeable' woman (McColgan, 
2000) may also result in unjustified acquittals if prejudice is created. 
Summmy 
Because of the high rape attrition rate and the difficulties discussed earlier relating to 
the prosecution of rape, it follows that there is likely to be a much higher risk of a 
rape victim experiencing a miscarriage of justice (an unjustified avoidance of 
conviction) than a rape defendant experiencing one (an unjustified conviction). 
Statistically, only five per cent of rape defendants are at any risk of experiencing an 
unjustified conviction because this is the proportion that receive a conviction. In 
contrast, over 95 per cent of rape victims are at risk of experiencing an unjustified 
avoidance of conviction. 
2.7 Rape defendants and fair trials 
The consistent pattern that has emerged so far in this chapter is one of rape victims 
being treated unfairly by the criminal justice system, having a high likelihood of 
experiencing a miscarriage of justice and a very low chance of seeing the man who 
raped them punished. There is also a second pattern however, applied equally 
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consistently, but in contradiction to the first pattern. This second pattern is of rape 
defendants claiming that rape trials are not fair to them. The following examples show 
that this often happens following reforrn to a rape law. 
Example 1. Rape victims found facing defendants in court difficult and traumatic 
(the ' victim's problem'). The government extended the use of 'special measures' 
such as screens to vulnerable victims in rape and serious sexual assault cases under 
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (the 'refon-n'). It is argued that 
this is not fair to the defendant (the 'defendant's response'): 
Iniagine you're an innocent inan and the ivoinan is still allowed to tell a pack of lies 
about you fi-om behind a screen and you cant even see her face (Barrister 
interviewed in Temkin, 2000a pg. 238). 
Example 2. Non-consensual intercourse between a husband and his wife was not 
classed as rape (the 'victim's problem'). In RvR the trial judge ruled that non- 
consensual intercourse is rape regardless of the relationship between the defendant 
and the victim (the 'reform'). It was argued (in CR v United Kingdoin) that this was 
not fair to the defendant (the 'defendant's response'). 
Example 3: The use of sexual history evidence was used in rape trials to undermine 
the victim's credibility and to humiliate and distress her (the 'victim's' problem). The 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 placed further restrictions on the use 
of sexual history evidence and reduced the amount of judicial discretion (the 
'refonn'). It was argued (in Rv A) this was not fair to the defendant (the 'defendant's 
response). 
These represent just three examples of how rape law reforms are often followed by 
the allegation that the situation is unfair to the defendant. They show some of the 
tensions not only between the victims and defendants, but also between procedural 
justice and substantive justice and between due process 104 and crime control. 
104 Due process refers to the 'umbrella undet- which various mechanisinsfor ensuringJairness 
throughout the criminalpi-ocess are classified' (Walker and Telford, 2000 pg. 12). 
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2.7.1 Due process and crinie control 
The most renowned attempt to model the criminal justice process is that by Packer 
(1968) who developed the influential 'crime control' and 'due process' models. 
Although Packer's models are now dated and have had their limitations pointed out 
over the years, his two models still forrn the basis of more recent attempts to model 
the criminal justice process (e. g. Roach, 1999). The crux of Packer's argument is that 
a tension exists within the criminal justice system between the crime control model of 
criminal justice, which is focused on societies concerns about security, and the due 
process model of criminal justice that is focused on the individual and their rights 
against the state. These two models lead, in turn, to different priorities. While the 
priority of the crime concern model is to convict the guilty, the priority of the due 
process model is to protect the innocent, even if this sometimes results in the acquittal 
of the guilty. He argued that, at the time, the criminal justice system was being turned 
from an assembly line into an obstacle course, meaning that the due process model 
was overtaking the crime control model as the main priority of the criminal justice 
system. 
Government calls to close 'the justice gap' alongside the development of regional 
targets stating a minimum of how many offenders should be brought to justice' 05 
sound warning bells for those who fear this will mean a move towards the crime 
control model and an increased risk that defendants will experience miscarriages of 
justice (e. g. Kennedy, 2004). However, it must be remembered that the justice gap 
discourse is operating alongside the new 'culture of human rights' instigated by the 
same government. Defendants have never held the same level of rights against the 
state as they hold post HRA. Using Packer's analogy of an obstacle course, the HRA 
may be seen as adding a further hurdle at the end of the course. In respect of rape 
cases, already viewed by many as an obstacle course with almost insurmountable 
hurdles, this has in turn led to concern that even fewer rape defendants will reach the 
end of the 'course': 
105 They have even developed a new term and acronym of 'Offenders brought to justice', or 'OBTF. 
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... advocating increasedjudicial intervention in the criminal trial - on the 
basis that 
it will augment fairness' - promises an uncertain fitture for rape prosecutions 
(Murphy and Whitty, 2000 pg. 146). 
2.8 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to merge feminist literature on rape with the wider 
literature on law and the rights of victims and defendants. It has described a constant 
tug of war played out in the legal field between rape victims and defendants, crime 
control and due process, substantive justice and procedural justice, miscarriages of 
justice for victims and miscarriages of justice for defendants. These categories are 
generally portrayed as being mutually exclusive with the government in the middle as 
the distributor of rights. 
Of course, the adversarial criminal trial is not a tug of war between the victim and the 
defendant, but is played out between the defendant and the state with the victim as an 
onlooker. While the government post HRA still maintains its role as the distributor of 
rights, these rights are now subjected to a new set of ground rules in the forrn of 
human rights, which judges have been given the power to enforce and interpret. Any 
shifts in power make it necessary to re-visit the position of disadvantaged groups 
(McColgan, 2000) and the fact that human rights are not held by defendants and 
victims directly against each other, but rather by both groups against the state, making 
the ECHR and HRA particularly interesting to look at in terms of rape and the 
prosecution process. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with the thesis rationale and aims and then describes the type of 
data used, the sample boundaries and ethical issues related to the data. It then explains 
generally how the data was analysed in terrns of the use of computer software to aid 
the analysis of qualitative data before going through each of the aims in turn and 
explaining the specific analysis processes and any methodological issues that arose. 
The chapter ends with a reflection on the research process. 
3.2 Rationale and Ainis 
The previous two chapters have shown that there is little knowledge about how legal 
human rights have been used in relation to rape in England and Wales or in Europe as 
a whole (at least in tenns of research published in the English language). Chapter One 
showed that while both 'optimism' and 'pessimism' exists with regard to how useful 
human rights may be to women it is important for theories to be empirically based, 
with clear sample boundaries and clear definitions of terms such as 'human rights' 
and 'success'. Chapter Two explained that there are already known problems in 
relation to rape and the rape prosecution process, which result in an extremely low 
conviction rate. As mentioned in the introduction, feminist research on violence 
against women has tended to focus more on the victim than the perpetrator, however 
this thesis aims to investigate how both rape victims 106 and defendants have used 
human rights in relation to the prosecution process 107 . This research has six aims, as 
follows: 
106 The term victim rather than complainant is used because the reports are not about criminal trials. I 
start from the position that they are victims not complainants of rape. 
107 1 use the term 'prosecution process' to mean the process whereby a victim of rape attempts to hold 
the perpetrator accountable through either the criminal justice system or under civil law. In the 
criminal justice system I define this process as starting when a report is made to the police and ending 
at the conviction stage (I do not include sentencing following conviction within this process). Under 
civil law I define this process as starting when a claim for financial damages is filed and ending when a 
judgment is made regarding whether financial compensation should be awarded (I do not include the 
amount of financial compensation within this process). Note that the human rights argument need not 
be made during the prosecution process (i. e. at the trial stage) but be about the prosecution process (i. e. 
at the appeal stage). 
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To find out how rape victims and defendants have used human rights law in 
relation to the prosecution process. 
2. To discover how successful rape victim and defendants human rights arguments 
have been. 
3. To investigate how the margin of appreciation has been used in the ECHR cases. 
4. To find out what just satisfaction has been awarded under the ECHR in relation to 
human rights violations. 
5. To discover whether the male: female gender ratio in the ECtHR chambers has any 
impact on the judgment made. 
6. To assess what policy impact human rights judgments have had and whether any 
changes are in favour of rape victims or defendants. 
The analysis process and methodological issues for these aims is discussed later in 
this chapter. 
3.3 Type of data used - using law reports in social policy research 
This research uses documentary analysis, defined widely by Jupp (2001) as 'the 
detailed analysis of docunients with a vieiv to inaking assertions about soine aspect of 
the social world ... ' (pg. 103). Content analysis is one way in which documents can 
be analysed, which involves a process of counting the number of times a given thing 
(often referred to as a 'therne') occurs and/or the identification and interpretation of 
themes. Analysis can therefore be quantitative and/or qualitative. The range of 
documents that can be used as research data is extensive and includes: official 
documents; web pages; private letters; company records; and newspapers amongst 
others. Some well-known studies where feminists have analysed documents include 
Friedan's (1963) analysis of women's magazines for 'The Feminist Mystique' and 
Kitzinger's (1987) analysis of 'scientific' literature on homosexuality to show how 
lesbianism is constructed within positivist empiricism. 
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Law reports are used here as the documents to be analysed. Two sources of law 
reports are used: a) court judgments from the European Court of Human Rights and 
b) reported and unreported judgments from courts in England and Wales. The law 
reports are analysed using quantitative and qualitative content analysis, although the 
quantitative analysis goes no further than reporting frequencies because of the level of 
data (categorical data with a relatively small sample size). 
3.3.1 What are law reports? 
In simple terrns, law reports are used to record case law, also known as 'common 
law'. In contrast with continental 'civil law' systems, law reports are crucial to 
common law legal systems. This is because such a large part of legal reasoning is 
concerned not simply with the literal words contained within legislation, but how 
such words have been interpreted and applied in previous cases (the creation of 
precedent). There are three types of law reports: official court judgments; reported 
cases; and unreported cases. This thesis uses all three categories (obtained from two 
sources). 
Offidal court judgments are law reports published by an official source. For the 
purpose of this thesis the cases that are official judgments are those from the House of 
Lords and at the European Court of Human Rights. All of the cases heard in these two 
courts are reported and the reports are classed as having an official status. 
Law reports from reported cases from the other courts in England and Wales are 
privately published, and the series entitled 'The Law Reports"08 is the only one that 
is published by an independent and charitable body (the Incorporated Council of Law 
Reporting). Commercial legal publishers publish all other reported law report series', 
for example the All England Law Reports. The Law Reports are the only reports with 
an official status and are considered to be the most authoritative of all the law report 
series' because the judge checks the reports for accuracy before publication. This 
does not happen with other law report series'. On the negative side, this means that 
108 To minimise confusion when I refer to law reports in general I use lower case initials and when I 
refer to the law reporting series 'The Law Reports' I use upper case initials. 
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publication time of The Law Reports is longer than for other series'. In the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal The Law Reports always take preference when citing 
cases, and law reports from other series' should only be used in court if the 
Incorporated Council of Law Reporting has not reported the case. 
The terrn 'law reports from unreported cases' is very misleading because the cases 
are, in fact, reported just not by one of the law reporting series'. 'Unreported cases' 
are generally published by newspapers (primarily The Times that has been publishing 
law reports since 1884) or law journals (such as the New Law Journal or the Criminal 
Law Review). These are much shorter than reported cases and are typically just a 
page or two, sometimes accompanied by a case analysis. 
Typically, 'reported' and 'official' law reports will contain the following infon-nation: 
the case name, the case citation, the name of the court in which the case is heard and 
the judges presiding'09 (and the registrar at the ECtHR), catchwords"O, the 
111 112 headnote , cases cited and relevant 
legislation and the judgment, which includes: 
a description of the material facts of the case 113 ; any submissions made by the parties 
(defence and prosecution in criminal cases)' 14; the legal reasoning that has led to the 
judgment made and the final judgment made. In ECHR judgments this is followed by 
the amount of compensation and expenses awarded if a violation of rights has been 
109 These give information about how much 'weight' the judgment holds (e. g. what level is the court? 
How many judges are presiding? ). The higher the court, the more authorative the judgment is 
considered to be. 
"('Catchwords are listed to make electronic searches for reports easier as it is possible to limit a search 
to catchwords only. Catchwords in law reports are listed in the same way as 'key terms' are in 
academic journal articles. 
111 The headnote gives a very brief summary (oftenjust one sentence) of the judgment made in the 
case. The headnote is written by the publishers of the report, and although they are generally accurate 
there have been occasions where serious errors have been made (Holland and Webb, 2001). 
112 All cases and relevant legislation cited in the court report are listed and fully referenced. 
113 The material facts of the case are those that the judge deems to be important and those that affect 
their reasoning and subsequent judgment. The facts that a judge identifies as important may not be 
those that a researcher would have chosen as the most important and this is remembered when 
analysing the law reports. The material facts are also important in terms of legal precedent because 
legal precedent is based on the concept of stare decisis which means that '... [a] court mustfollow the 
decision ofa superior court when dealing with similar cases'(Holland and Webb, 2001 p. 139). 
However, a 'similar case' may not only relate to similar material facts but also to similar legal 
reasoning on a point of law. 
1" Although this rarely has the subtitle of such, the judge then generally summarises the history of the 
case (as most are appeals) and any submissions made by the parties (their arguments). This section 
often uses the cases and legislation referenced earlier in order to build the current cases. Usefully, the 
cases relied upon are often summarised here and any legislation referenced generally has the relevant 
section(s) quoted in full. This was particularly useful in the ECHR reports because it meant I rarely had 
to look up legislation from other countries. 
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found. Occasionally a judge (or several judges) will dissent or partly dissent and the 
reasons are given in an annex to the report. 
So why choose law reports as the data source from which to study rape and human 
rights law? Previous social science rape research has tended to use interviews with 
rape victims, interviews with barristers, data obtained from the police and CPS and/or 
court observations and transcripts (where affordable) to study rape and the law rather 
than law reports. In addition, most rape research has focused on the rape trials 
themselves rather than appeal hearings. There are, however, major differences 
between rape trials and rape appeal hearings that mean different methods are needed 
to study appeals. For example, rape appeals heard at the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) last on average just an hour and a quarter, rape victim witnesses are rarely 
called to give evidence, rarely attend the appeal and may not even be aware that an 
appeal is taking place' 15 (Cook, 2002). 
The study of rape at the appellate level is very different to research conducted at the 
earlier stages of the rape trial. Law reports of appeals can be used to answer some 
research questions that other data cannot, but cannot answer a lot of the questions 
dealt with by previous research, for example how women experience the prosecution 
process. This is only the second piece of research in England and Wales to focus on 
rape at the appellate level (the first being Cook, 2002), yet according to Bibbings 
(2000), appellate courts are an ideal place to study gendered decision-making. This is 
because it is in appeals that judges give lengthy justifications for their reasoning and 
decisions, in contrast to jury decisions which can not be scrutinised and where there is 
no way of knowing how decisions have been reached. She describes how a close 
reading of law reports can be more revealing in terms of how judges justify their 
decision-making and lead to a more in-depth analysis than solely focusing on the 
judgment itself: 
... in readingjudgments, one must attend to more than the 
judges'pronouncellients 
on the application ofstatitte and case law, and consider what extra-legalfactors ivere 
115 In the future this should not be the case. The Draft Victims' Code of Practice proposes that the 
Witness Care Unit must tell victims whether the sentence or conviction is being appealed and whether 
or not the appeal was successful within five working days (two for vulnerable victims) of them finding 
out themselves. 
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influential. Thus, a lengthy and sympathetic portrayal of the victim, or an 
unnecessmy (in terms of logical decision making) reflection on somejactual detail on 
the 'evil' done or the lack of any real harm may be significant. Attempts to justify 
decisions upon public interest or policy grounds are of even more obvious 
importance, because, here, the judge is arguably admitting to abandoning even the 
appearance of logical reasoning. (pg. 258) 
Further methodological issues related to the use of law reports are discussed in the 
next section regarding the production of law reports. 
3.3.2 The production of law reports 
Finding out how law reports are produced in order to understand the limitations of 
using law reports in social science research proved difficult. It would appear that 
issues relating to data and sampling are not something that those working with law 
question very often 116 .A British library search on 
law reporting revealed nothing of 
direct relevance to this research. The few publications that were found were 
extremely dated' 17 , historical studies' 
18 and/or concerning law reporting in other 
countries' 19. As such, most of the information on the law reporting of reported cases 
was found on law reporting websites and guidance to databases. 
W. T. S. Daniel QC first proposed the need for a Council of Law Reporting in 1863. 
The proposal included a paper by Lindley (1863) that set out what a 'good law report' 
should look like. Four key points were made regarding which cases should be 
reported: all cases which introduce, or appear to introduce, a new principle or a new 
rule; all cases which materially modify an existing principle or rule; all cases which 
settle, or materially tend to settle, a question upon which the law is doubtful; and all 
cases which for any reason are peculiarly instructive (Lindley, 1863 cited by ICLR 
website). Cases passed with no discussion, which had no precedent value or were 
116 Colleagues with undergraduate law degrees told me that they were never taught anything about the 
production of law reports. 
117 Alexander the Elder Pulling's (1863) book entitled 'Our Law-reporting System: Cannot its evils be 
prevented' and Moran's (1948) collection of essays on the reporting of law cases entitled 'The Heralds 
of the Law'. 
118 Brand's 1998 Seldon Society lecture on 'Observing the medieval bar and bench at work - the 
origins of law reporting in England', Abbott's (1973) book entitled 'Law Reporting in England, 1485- 
1585' and Wells' (1994) PhD thesis on 'Common law reporting in England 1550-1650'. 
119 Holdsworth's (1941) book on 'Law reporting in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' in the USA 
and Lounder's (1982) occasional paper on 'Case law reporting in Canada'. 
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repetitive of previously reported cases should not be reported (Lindley, 1863, cited by 
ICLR website). Guidelines on what the reported cases should cover included the 
parties, pleadings, facts of the case, point contended, grounds for the judgment and 
the judgment itself (Lindley, 1863, cited by ICLR website). These reporting 
guidelines remain as the ones followed today. 
It is important for the purpose of this thesis to recognise that not all cases result in a 
law report. In other words a case may be heard in court, a judgment may be made and 
a sentence passed yet the case will never be 'reported' or even 'unreported' in the 
form of a law report. In cases such as these the only way of finding out the judgment 
would be to request records from the court, however these would only record the case 
name, outcome and sentence. No further detail would be included, for example IvIly 
the defendant was acquitted or had his appeal rejected or why a particular sentence 
was given. 
Generally speaking, cases lower than appellate level are rarely reported. In the Court 
of Appeal (Civil Division) around 70 per cent of cases are reported but in the Court of 
Appeal (Criminal Division) only around 10 per cent are reported. It is the editors of 
law report series' that decide whether or not a case is reported. In addition, between 
20 and 30 per cent of High Court judgments are reported. Judgments in the lower 
courts are very rarely reported. Although the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting 
for England and Wales (ICLR) point out that the almost universal view amongst 
English judges is that too many cases are reported (ICLR website), the universal view 
amongst social science researchers would probably be that the more cases that are 
reported the better! Because of their weight, ECHR and House of Lords cases are 
always reported. 
The fact that not all cases result in law reports becomes less of a problem for this 
research when bearing in mind how such cases are chosen, i. e. those that have 
precedent value, have some discussion and are not repetitive of previous cases. This 
means that cases that have the potential to create some kind of change (although 
many may not) should be reported. In addition, cases in the higher courts are 
especially important because their decisions are binding on lower courts. An analysis 
of law reports can show the nature of the case and any change the case creates, but 
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not how far the impact of this change goes. For example, it would be possible to say 
that the colour turquoise has been judged to be blue not green but not how many cases 
then will rely on the colour turquoise being classed as blue and/or how many 
judgments will be affected by turquoise being classed as blue. While this is not ideal, 
the methodological alternative to using law reports is completely unrealistic. For 
England and Wales cases this would entail enlisting court clerks as 'gatekeepers' to 
infonn me which of the cases were rape cases, and then there would have been no 
way of knowing whether a human rights argument would be made. Following the 
legal reasoning verbally would have been difficult as a non-lawyer, as the court 
reports had to be read many times before they were comprehensible. Finally, this 
methodology would have resulted in a limited time sample, as the data would have 
had to have been collected during the three years of a Phl). In terms of ECHR cases, 
the same argument applies but in addition the costs of travelling to Strasbourg would 
have been prohibitive. In fact, only one of the ECHR cases in my sample would have 
been within the PhD time limit and letters to the ECtHR registrar asking when the 
next rape case would be and whether it would be possible to observe the hearing got 
no response. 
3.3.3 The limitations of using law reports as data 
There are a number of different ways in which the impacts of the ECHR and HRA on 
rape cases could have been investigated. For example, interviews could have been 
carried out with 'key players' which could have included human rights campaign 
groups (such as Liberty and Amnesty International), feminist campaign groups (such 
as Campaign to End Rape, Truth About Rape, Rape Crisis Federation/Co-ordination 
Group) as well as service providers (individual Rape Crisis Centres, Sexual Assault 
Referral Centres, other rape and sexual abuse organisations). Although there are no 
specific groups that campaign on behalf of rights for rape defendants, human rights 
campaign group Liberty does work in the area of defendants rights and prisoners 
rights so could have been interviewed about how rape defendants might use human 
rights. Barristers and QC's for both the defence and the prosecution could also have 
been interviewed. The use of interviews would have resulted in a more nuanced 
picture of who uses human rights, in which circumstances and with what success. 
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However, this would have meant that the study be largely limited to the UK, losing 
most of European element of the study. 
This is the first sociological attempt to look at patterns of rape cases over time and 
place using law reports. Hence, the research involved learning about the use of law 
reports almost as much as it did about the use of human rights in rape cases. The table 
below summarises some of the advantages and disadvantages of using law reports in 
sociological research. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
"A relatively inexpensive way of 0 Only the 'official' line can be viewed 
gathering data. (what has gone on behind the scenes 
"A large volume of data can be is invisible). 
collected quickly. 0 The information is static. There is no 
" The justifications for decisions are opportunity to ask for more 
given. detail/information about particularly 
Dissenting views are given. interesting parts. 
It is possible to look at the data over 0 Because they have not been used 
time. before in this way there is no 
A wide range of countries can be literature on methods of analysis. 
studied. 0 It can be difficult to track what 
English is one of the languages that happens in the lower courts after a 
Council of Europe documents are judgement has been made at the 
printed in, so translation is not an appellate level because reporting at 
issue. the trial level is not routine. 
The views of actors other than judges 
in the process (e. g. defendants, rape 
victims) are not known. 
3.4 The research sample 
The research sample therefore consists of law reports from England and Wales and 
the ECHR. These two sub-samples were obtained from different sources and are 
described separately below after explaining the sample boundaries. A law report was 
included in the research sample if it met the following criteria: 
a) The law report included at least one rape case, regardless of how 'rape' was 
defined in the relevant country at the relevant time. Because the legal definition 
of rape varies between countries and over time it was decided that the definition 
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of rape for the purpose of this thesis would be whatever the legal code of the 
country defined it as at the time the alleged hurnan rights violation took place. 
This necessarily means that rape does not mean 'one thing' in this thesis but is 
variable. Other sexual offences however, including attempted rape and threat to 
120 rape, are excluded from the research sample 
b) The human right(s) in question had to be contained within either the ECHR or 
HRA. This means that ECHR eases could be in relation to any country that has 
ratified the ECHR (known as High Contracting Parties). The HRA cases had to be 
heard in England or Wales for them to be included. Scotland and Northern Ireland 
were excluded because they have different rape laws and because the HRA was 
enacted at a different time. 
c) The human rights issue in the rape case had to be related to the prosecution 
process (as defined above under 3.2). 
d) The rape case within the law report also had to be about human rights. All ECHR 
reports, by definition, were about human rights but the England and Wales cases 
had to be searched. In the latter cases, a specific human rights argument had to be 
made, defined as if one or more convention rights were mentioned. This meant 
that law reports with only general statements such as 'we inust renzeniber that 
hunian fights inust be taken into consideration 'were excluded from the sample. 
C) The start date of the law reports analysed was prescribed by the first date when 
law reports became electronically searchable. For England and Wales law this 
date is 1965 for reported cases and 1980 for unreported cases. Although the HRA 
did not come into force until 2000, cases from all available dates were searched to 
see if there were any cases that relied upon ECHR case law (i. e. where the ECHR 
had had an impact in England and Wales courts). All ECHR are electronically 
120 One of the reasons for restricting the sample to actual rape cases was because I was dealing with 
international law as a non-lawyer I thought it would be difficult to understand the law on a number of 
different offences in different countries. In actuality, I found most European laws much easier to 
understand and much simpler to study than the laws of England and Wales because of the codified 
legal system used in the rest of Europe (excluding Scotland and Ireland) and their tendency to use 
more 'everyday' language which is designed for citizens to understand. 
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searchable, and therefore the start date is 1966 when individual petition became 
possible (as described in Chapter One). 
f) It was necessary to impose an 'end' date to the sample to allow for analysis and 
writing up to take place within the thesis time limit. The 'end' date of the sample 
was set at February 2004. 
3.4.1 The ECHR court judgment sub-sample 
ECHR court judgments are freely available online (no subscription necessary) 
through the HUDOC (Human Rights Documents) database which is accessed through 
the Council of Europe website. Through HUDOC it is possible to search for cases 
against any selected country and/or any terms of interest. It is not necessary here to 
explain all that HUDOC is capable 0021. 
The search term 'rape' was used (it was not necessary to use 'human rights' as well 
because by definition all cases brought under the ECHR relate to human rights) for 
cases against all countries up until February 2004. This search resulted in 79 court 
judgments. Over half of these judgments (n=44) were not actually about rape even 
through they contained the word 'rape'. In these cases the tenn was used to describe 
a legal system, criminal code or sentencing guidelines 122 or the case was about 
attempted rape or threat to rape and these cases were removed from the sample. In the 
remaining 35 cases, 2 were about- protection from rape, 10 were about 
sentencing/punishment for rape and 4 related to the risk posed by rapists once they 
were released into the community 123 . This left 19 law reports relating to the 
prosecution process, which are listed below in Table 3.1. 
12 1A useful HUDOC internet manual was published by the European Court of Human Rights in 1999 
122 For example, 'In England and Wales serious crimes, such as murder, manslaughter and rape, are 
F unishable by a maximum of life imprisonment'. 
213 My original intention was to look at how human rights were used in all cases concerning rape, 
however it became clear as I started to analyse and write up the cases that the thesis needed to be more 
focused. 
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Table 3.1 ECIIR sample 
I X and Yv the Netherlands 
2 Stubbings and Others v the United Kingdom 
3 Aydin v Turkey 
4 Selmouni v France 
5 Englert v Germany 
6 MC v Bulgaria 
7 Tv Italy 
8 Stanford v the United Kingdom 
9 SW v the United Kingdom 
10 Gv France 
II Baegen v the Netherlands 
12 Trzaska v Poland 
13 Mattoccia v Italy 
14 GB v France 
15 Kucera v Austria 
16 MM v the Netherlands 
17 Mellors v the United Kingdom 
18 Matwicjczuk v Poland 
19 Korellis v Cyprus 
3.4.2 The England and Wales law reports HRA sub-sample 
A search was conducted for all cases including the terms 'rape' and 'human rights' 
within the text in 'England and Wales Reported and Unreported cases' search engine 
on the LexisNexis Professional database. This database contains reported cases from 
1865, tax cases from 1875 (although these were not relevant in my research) and 
unreported cases from 1980. Altogether, the England and Wales Reported and 
Unreported cases database contains over 150,000 cases from over 30 law report series 
including the two major law reporting services: 'All England Law Reports' 
established in 1936 and 'The Law Reports' established in 1865. 
LexisNexis is a database that requires a high subscription fee that was unaffordable as 
part of a PhD. The first LexisNexis search was conducted in July 2002 in the first 
year of my PhD via a one-week free trial offered to me at the British Criminology 
conference. A second search was conducted in February 2004 in my third year using 
a university subscription having started part time employment for a university with a 
law department. Altogether, these two searches combined resulted in 263 cases 
adding up to a huge amount of data (5,787 pages of single spaced font size 10 text). 
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Most of the cases (n=204,78% of original sample) were coded as not being relevant 
because of the same reasons as mentioned above for the ECHR sub-sample (e. g. rape 
was used as an example, was about attempted rape or threat to rape). This left 59 law 
reports. Of these 59,12 were about protection from rape or protection following a 
rape (mostly related to asylum application appeals), 23 related to sentencing or 
conditions during imprisonment (mostly related to parole applications and the 
imposition of discretionary life sentences) and 12 were about the risk posed by rapists 
once they were released into the community. This left 12 law reports relating to the 
prosecution process, which are listed below in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 IIRA sample 
I Rv DPP, ex parte C 
2 Attomey Generals Reference (No 3 of 1999) 
3 RvT, RvH 
4 Rv Rooney 
5 Rv Porter 
6 Rv Morgan 
7 RvC and others 
8 RvA 
9 RvM, Rv Kerr, RvH 
10 Rv Archibald 
II RvR and another 
12 Rv Laskey 
3.5 Ethical issues 
This research raised few ethical issues because it only used data that was already in 
the public domain. It was therefore not necessary to deal with issues such as the 
anonymising of data, gaining infon-ned consent or respondent validation. It was, 
however, important that the law reports were treated respectfully and that it was 
remembered that they are not simply words on a piece of paper or computer screen 
but instead represent real people, their lives and experiences. Beyond this, it is not 
necessary to enter into a discussion about research ethics. 
3.6 The analysis process 
Although I had attended qualitative research methods courses at both an 
undergraduate and postgraduate level I did not find these very useful when it came to 
analysing the law reports. Such courses, and indeed most qualitative research 
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textbooks tend to focus more on the methods themselves and particularly the 
advantages and disadvantages of such methods rather than the analysis of data. 
However, how the data is actually analysed and who is doing the analysis is, from an 
epistemological perspective, just as important (if not more so) than the actual 
methods used. Bearing this in mind, I intend in the next section to describe exactly 
how I analysed the law reports but first I provide a more general over-view of how 
computer software can be used in qualitative research, as they were in this research. 
3.6.1 The use of computers to analyse qualitative data 
Computer assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDA) has grown in popularity over 
the last decade. While researchers have shown that mainstream software can be useful 
when analysing qualitative data, for example Microsoft Word (see Niderbst, 2002) 
and Microsoft Access (see Meyer, Gruppe and Franz, 2002), there are now a number 
of programmes that have been specifically designed to assist qualitative data analysis. 
These are known collectively as computer assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS), and include: HyperResearch; Ethnograph; ATLAS. ti; the Qualitative 
Analyser; CI-SAID; QUALRUS; and QSR NUD*IST's N6 and NVivo amongst 
others. As it was not possible to review each form of CAQDAS in terms of my 
research needs 124 1 decided to focus my attention on two CAQDAS: N6 and NVivo. 
In addition to a brief review of wpbsites, available literature and on-line 
demonstrations for the alternative CAQDAS, these two were chosen for a number of 
reasons including: positive recommendations from colleagues; whether I had access 
to them; how up to date they were; and the software support available 125 . 
NVivo, is an upgrade package to the QSR NUD*IST software (whose current version 
is N6). I attended training sessions on both N6 and NVivo to help decide which one 
would be most appropriate for assisting the analysis of the law reports and found 
124 When choosing which CAQDAS to use it is not simply a matter of which one is the 'best' per se, 
but is to a great extent reliant on the type of data and form of analysis as well as personal preference in 
tenns of interface etc. 
125 NVivo and N6 are both CAQDAS that the CAQDAS networking project at the University of Surrey 
provide training in and, as an ESRC funded centre, they provide a free telephone help-line for 
researchers. 
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NVivo to be the superior software for my needs in this particular piece of research. In 
particular, I found NVivo to have a better user interface and, unlike N6, it is possible 
to edit text within the browser windows, it is not necessary to predefine text units 
before importing documents and documents can be imported in RTF (rich text 
format) which allows visual coding in contrast to the text only format required for 
N6. 
It is important to be clear about what CAQDA can and cannot do. Many new users 
(including myself initially) are under the incorrect impression that a CAQDAS can 
analyse their data for them (understandable since they are called data analysis 
software and in light of how quantitative data analysis software such as SPSS work). 
Although the more up to date software such as NVivo can carry out some analytic 
functions (it even has a drop down 'analyse' mcnu) the main function of such 
programmes is to 'hold' and 'organise' the data for the researcher to analyse. 
Coffey et al. (1996) point out that in reality, CAQDA adds little if anything at the 
conceptual level and that most of the processes involved in analysing data (e. g. 
coding and searching) are almost the same when using CAQDAS as when analysing 
data manually. It is rather, they argue, the speediness and comprehensiveness that 
CAQDA allows that constitutes its main benefit over manual data analysis. Because 
of the large quantity of text in the early stages of this research CAQDA was 
particularly useful from a data management perspective and it allowed more 
extensive coding than colour coding or cut and pasting would have done. It made the 
research more 'portable' in that the project 126 could be saved on a disk or laptop 
computer and it could also be argued that CAQDA allows for more ecologically 
friendly research in that it very much reduces the amount of paper and ink needed in 
research of this size. 
There are three main ways of organising documents (in this research in the forrn of 
law reports) in NVivo. They can be: 1) coded according to their 'attributes', 2) coded 
at 'nodes' (free, tree or case) and/or 3) placed into 'sets'. Attributes are used in NVivo 
to code basic information about a document or a node. Any number of attributes can 
126 A 'project' is the tenn used by NVivo to describe the collection of data and coding for a piece of 
research. 
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be applied to a document or node, but each attribute can only have one value coded 
for each document/node. For example, if the attributes related to a document which 
contained an interview with a domestic violence victim then 'gender' may be used as 
an attribute with 'male' and 'female' used as values but 'type of violence 
experienced' could not be used because people might have experienced more than 
one time of violence. Instead of using 'type of violence experienced' as an attribute 
each type of violence would have to be a single attribute, for example 'physical 
violence', 'verbal abuse' etc. The values for each attribute could then be binary ('yes' 
or 'no') or scaled ('often', 'sometimes' or 'never') or numerical. 
Nodes are the most complex and in-depth way of coding a document, similar to the 
colour coding technique often used when coding by pen and paper. Afree node is a 
node that has no structure to it; it exists as a theme in the research but is not linked to 
any other themes. Free nodes are often used in the early stages of a project where 
ideas for themes can be coded and investigated. These may remain as free nodes 
throughout the analysis or may be changed into 'tree nodes'. A tree node is a way of 
organising different nodes into hierarchical systems into categories (known as parent 
nodes) and sub-categories (known as children nodes). The number of free and tree 
nodes generally grows as the analysis is developed. Returning to the previous 
example of a project analysing responses from interviews with victims of domestic 
violence, an early coding system using free and tree nodes may look something like 
the example in Figure 3.1: 
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Figure 3.1 Example of simple node system using free and tree nodes 
Free nodes 
Feelings of anxiety 
Difficulties accessing support 
Tree nodes 
Where violence occurred (parent node) 
In the home (child node of where violence occurred) 
In the bedroom (child node of in the home) 
In the kitchen (child node of in the home) 
Outside of the home (child node of where violence occurred) 
Presence of children (parent node) 
Children witnessed violence (child node of presence of children) 
Children were in same house at time (child node of presence of children) 
When the data has been coded at nodes it is easy to retrieve all passages coded at any 
given node and further coding may be developed. Case nodes can also be used, but 
were not applied in this research because the attributes were able to handle all the 
case relevant infonnation I wanted to use. 
Sets are used to organise the data into relevant groupings and documents can be 
placed into as many sets as necessary. For example, a document of an interview with 
'Jenny' may be placed into a set containing all female victims and a set containing all 
victims who had accessed support. By placing documents into sets they are more 
easily accessible to code at nodes. 
Attributes, nodes and sets, are the three main tools used to analyse data using NVivo. 
Alongside these tools, 'memos' can be held electronically in order to keep a record of 
ideas or to make general notes relating to the documents and/or coding, retrieve 
facilities are available to allow easy searching of documents, sets, nodes and memos 
and models can be created to view the data. There are other features of NVivo, such 
as the possibility of adding DataBites (links to external data) to the project, however 
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these were not used in this research and are not explained here (see Richards, 1999 
for an overview of other NVivo features). 
3.6.2 Analysing the data in relation to the thesis aims 
This section draws upon the information given above regarding how computers can 
be used to analyse qualitative data and specifically how the various NVivo tools 
described above were used. It also discusses methodological issues relating to the 
aims. There is a lot of detail under each aim, which is given for two reasons. Firstly, 
and as previously mentioned, detailed information relating to analysis is rarely written 
up yet can be central to the research findings. The second reason relates to the 
difficulties I had with the analysis. Alongside a lack of literature on the production of 
law reports (already discussed above), I found no literature at all suggesting how law 
reports could be analysed. Even books and Articles with words such as 'analysing 
law', 'legal methods' and 'legal research' in their titles turned out to be completely 
unrelated to the development of my methodology. Instead, the focus in this body of 
literature was on how to 'find' law (including law reports), how to use law libraries 
and how legal reasoning works. As mentioned in the introduction, academic work on 
human rights has tended to take place within law rather than the social sciences, 
meaning that there is very little information on researching human rights law from a 
sociological perspective: 
... socio-legal ivork- on 
hunian rights in the national context hasfailed to inatch the 
pace and enthusiasin of doctrinal ivork-, particularly in terins of the enipirical socio- 
legal evidence necessaty to assess the clahns inadefor hilinall rights as legalpractice 
... Socio-legal analysis 
is the iveak-er party to doctrinal analysis. (Schmidt and 
Halliday, 2004 pg. 3) 
The nearest research I found to my own and whose methodologies could be drawn on 
were studies of the Canadian Charter of Rights. While these did help with some 
conceptualisation problems, the differences between the Canadian Charter and the 
ECHR and HRA meant that their methodologies coul d not be adopted for this 
research. The detail is therefore offered in the hope that this research will just be the 
starting point for research on women and human rights and that the models of 
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analysis described here may be adapted in the future to study other fon-ris of violence 
against women and possibly other policy issues as well. 
Aim 1: Tofind out how rape victims and defendants have used human rights law. 
This analysis was done by creating two sets (victim and defendant) and creating 
attributes and nodes. The attributes used and their possible values are listed in Table 
3.3. 
Table 3.3 Attributes created to analyse ai 11 
Attribute Possible values Comments 
Position of applicant Victim or defendant Also organised into sets 
Year case reported Any year within sample time frame 
Type of law report ECHR or HRA 
Who the case was against Any country that has ratified the 
ECHR (High Contracting Parties) 
HRA reports coded as n/a 
Number of applicants Number There can be more than one 
applicant per case 
Gender of applicant I Male or female 
Gender of applicant 2 Male or female Can be coded as n/a 
Gender of applicant 3 Male or female Can be coded as n/a 
Gender of applicant 4 Male or female Can be coded as n/a 
Alleged violation Article 2 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 3 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 4 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 5 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 6 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 7 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 8 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 9 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 10 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article II Yes or no 
Alleged vi lation Article 12 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 13 Yes or no 
Alleged violation Article 14 Yes or no 
The way in which the Articles were used was analysed using nodes. 'Victim's use of 
Articles' and 'Defendant's use of Articles' were created as parent nodes and the 
Articles used were created as child nodes. Further themes relating to the use of the 
Articles were coded at further child nodes if they arose. Part of this node tree is 
shown as an example below in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 Excerpt of node tree designed to analyse aim 1 
Defendant's use of Articles (parent node) 
Art .16- Right to fair trial (child node of defendant's use of Articles) 
Sexual history evidence (child node of Right to fair trial) 
Length of time taken for case to reach court (child node of Right to fair trial) 
Aim 2: To discover how successful rape victim and defendants' human rights 
arguments have been. 
Before explaining how the data were analysed in relation to this aim it is necessary to 
consider some methodological issues. As highlighted in Chapter One, it is important 
to clearly define what is meant by 'success'. The conceptualisation of 'success' was 
something that I struggled with for a long time during this research. 
The term success has been used in different ways in terrns of feminism and legal 
human rights. Morton and Allen (2001) argue that disagreements about what 
constitutes success come down to the scale of success rather than disagreements 
about success per se. They propose that there are two different scopes of success: 
intramural and extramural. Here, intramural relates to what happens within the 
courtroom while extramural refers to the impact of the judgment and the 'real world 
change' it creates. While Morton and Allen highlight the need for research to be 
conducted via an assessment of intramural and extramural success, they suggest that 
the starting point for longer term, extramural studies should be an initial focus on the 
intramural scope of success. 
This research uses two different measures of success. The first measure of success, 
and the one used when analysing this aim (the second is described under Aim 6), is 
the more basic of the two, falling within the intramural scale and consisting of a basic 
win/lose analysis. Even if research goes on to conceptualise success in a more 
complex way, analysing how many cases have been 'won' and how many have been 
'lost' (and, crucially in this research won and lost by whom), this is still an important 
starting point. 
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A similar measure of success has been used in the Canadian analyses. In the Canadian 
analyses, however, the win/lose analysis does not primarily relate to an applicant (in 
their role as victim or defendant) but rather to the 'feminist position' advocated in 
court. Because the Canadian samples are taken from cases where a feminist group 
intervened, this means that all cases had a 'feminist position' and all related to 
feminist issues. The analogy here would be if an organised feminist group were 
supporting the government by intervening in a particular case. Unfortunately, feminist 
groups in England and Wales are not able to access public funds to intervene in cases 
as they are in Canada. 
In contrast, this research sample is made up of victims and defendants and looks at in 
how many cases victims and defendants 'won' the case against the state. A report is 
classed as an applicant's 'win' if at least one Article is found to have been violated 
and therefore one part of the argument made accepted, even if other parts of the 
argument are not accepted. The reports are then described depending on who was 
taking the case (victim or defendant) in tenus of the win/lose analysis. 
Aim 3: To investigate how the margin of appreciation was itsed in the ECHR cases. 
To analyse how the margin of appreciation was used in the ECHR cases (as 
mentioned in Chapter One the margin doctrine is not applicable to HRA cases) the 
law reports were searched for the term 'margin of appreciation' to find out how many 
times the term was used and in how many reports. The results of this search were 
saved at a node. Because of the small number of reports that mentioned the margin of 
appreciation it was not appropriate to code at any further levels and the analysis 
simply consists of a description of how it was used in the reports. 
Aint 4: To find out what just satisfaction is aivarded in relation to human rights 
violations. 
Under the ECHR if a state is found to have violated an applicant's human rights the 
applicant is entitled to 'just satisfaction' (non-nally a sum of money) and also to have 
their legal fees reimbursed. This is stated as Article 41 of the ECHR: 
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If the Courtfinds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols 
thereto, and if the internal laiv of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only 
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessaly, affol-djust satisfaction to 
the ityuredparty. 
Generally the amount of money the ECtHR allocates in just satisfaction appears to be 
dependent on the type of violation, the number of Articles that are judged to have 
been violated and the impact of the violation, although there are no guidelines on the 
amount that should be awarded. In other cases however, the judgment of the court is 
seen as being just satisfaction in itself and no financial award is made. The absence of 
clear principles as to when damages should be awarded and how any damages should 
be measured has been argued to be one of the most striking features of ECHR case 
law (Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, 2000). 
The amount of money awarded, if any, was coded as an attribute in NVivo. Ideally 
the analysis would have been done via a calculation of the range and measures of 
central tendency (i. e. mean, median and mode) to look at the amount of money 
awarded to victims and to defendants. There are two complications however with 
these methods of analysis. Firstly, because the sums were awarded at different times 
it would be necessary to re-calculate the sums according to their vahtes. This would 
mean finding out what rate of inflation had occurred since the sum was awarded and 
calculating its value on a set date, for example at the end of the data collection period 
(February 2004). While this would be possible, there is a second complication. 
Awards of just satisfaction are made in the currency of the applicant's home, meaning 
that prior to the introduction of the Euro in 1999 there were different amounts 
awarded, at different times and in different currencies. Therefore, calculating a true 
value would mean converting the amount awarded in each case into a common 
currency in existence at the time and at the exchange rate at the time, then converting 
all these figures again when the Euro was introduced and then allowing for inflation. 
It is also important to remember that the relative value of money in different countries 
(for example between Turkey and Germany) is very different (Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, 2000). 
Weighing up the potential benefit of finding out the range and central tendency with 
the difficulties in calculating their true values, it was decided that it was not 
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worthwhile to follow the 'ideal' method. Instead, the amount of money is listed for 
each case and rough comparisons (not adjusted for inflation) are made for cases 
reported since the Euro was introduced. 
Ahn 5: To discover whether the niale.: female gen(ler ratio ill the ECtHR chalilher 
appears to have any impact oil thejudgment made. 
In ECHR reports the names of the judges sitting are listed with their gendered title 
(Mr or Mrs). This means that it is possible to work out how many female and male 
judges were sitting for each of the ECHR judgments. 
For each of the ECHR cases the ratio of male to female judges was coded as an 
attribute, as well as the gender of the president, vice-president (if applicable), 
registrar and deputy registrar (if applicable). These attributes were then compared 
with the outcomes of the case (using the win/lose analysis) to try and find out if any 
gendered decision-making was evident. Any sections of a report where it was clear an 
argument was being made by a male or female judge (particularly in dissenting 
opinions) and where that argument seemed to use different legal reasoning or affected 
the judgment were coded at a free node. Where the gender of the judge was known in 
the England and Wales cases (possible only for the more well known, higher judges 
such as those sitting in the House of Lords) relevant sections were coded to the same 
free node. 
Aim 6: To assess the potential creation of change created through human rights 
judgments. 
Extramural success refers to the impact of the judgment and the 'real world change' it 
creates. Morton and Allen (200 1) analysed how judgments impacted upon the policy 
status quo (although they did not look at the impact of this change), however the 
framework they developed cannot be used here for a number of reasons which 
include amongst others the nature of the cases they used (all were centred around a 
'feminist issue') and the different way that the Canadian system can create change (as 
described in Chapter One). 
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Analysing change created by the judgments proved to be very difficult and was not 
always possible. Since this thesis is concerned with two different levels of judicial 
politics (HRA/ECHR) and the potential to create policy change 127 is different (as 
explained in Chapter One) these will be discussed separately here. 
Poten tial policy changefollowingjudgments made under the ECHR 
Chapter One explained the different ways in which ECHR judgments can create 
policy change. However, these are generally described in quite vague ten-ns, and it 
was necessary for this research to 'fin-n up' these possible outcomes and provide a 
typology of potential policy change. This was developed both from literature about 
the court's powers and deductively from reading the law reports used in this research. 
The term 'potential' is used because it was difficult to monitor the actual change that 
each judgment created 128 . The potential for policy change 
following judgments made 
under the ECHR are shown below in Figure 3.3: 
Figure 3.3 Potential for policy change following judgments made under the ECIIR 
I Lose case 
No violation 
II No violation but 
. 
or 
. change suggested 
1. No potential 2. Potential 
policy change 
II 
policy change 
Win case 
Violation - individual 
II Violation - individual r measures only , measures 
& general measures 
3. No potential 4. Potential policy 
policy change 
II 
change 
127 1 use the term policy change in its widest sense to include legal changes. 
128 The ECtHR does not, in its judgment, specifically dictate the policy change that should be made. 
There is information on the impact of'judgments in three places on the Council of Europe website. The 
first is simply a page that lists cases and their impact, for example it may say 'part 3 of Criminal Code 
amended'. The second is by looking at resolution reports made by the Committee of Ministers 
responsible for the execution of remedies and the third is by scrolling through minutes of the meetings 
of the Committee of Ministers. None of these methods supplied me with the information I needed (they 
tended only to record specific, legislative changes made) so additional methods were used. These 
included a search of lawjoumals, e-mails to human rights organisations in the country in question and 
internet searches. Even so, it was not always possible to be sure what and how change was made, 
hence the use of the term 'potential change'. 
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Arguments that are unsuccessful ('lose case') are perhaps the simplest to categorise, 
in that if the human rights argument is not successful then the government in question 
are under no obligation to change their policies because they have been judged to be 
compatible with the ECHR. Hence, the judgments in these cases usually have no 
potential to create policy change (no violation - outcome 1). However, a second 
category was created to take into account cases where there was no violation of 
human rights found but suggestions for policy change were still made (no violation 
129 but change suggested - outcome 2) 
Sometimes cases may be successful ('win case') but still have no potential to create 
policy change. This was the case where only individual measures were needed to 
rectify the violation (violation - individual measures only - outcome 3), i. e. where a 
change in policy was not necessary. These individual measures were described in 
Chapter One and generally involve a financial award of just satisfaction and/or the re- 
opening of domestic proceedings. 
The type of case with the most potential to create policy change is where the case was 
successful ('win case') and where both individual and general measures were needed 
to rectify the violation (violation - individual measures and general measures - 
outcome 4), i. e. where a change in policy was necessary to prevent further violations. 
These general measures were described in Chapter One and may involve a change to 
primary or secondary legislation (either substantive or procedural), a change in case 
law (how the legislation is interpreted) and/or a change in the way the offence is 
investigated or prosecuted. 
Potentialpolicy cliatigefolloitingjii(igtiteiits Yna(le undei- the HRA 
Policy changes following judgments made under the HRA were far easier to track. 
This was not only because the scope of the change was limited to England and Wales 
rather than the whole of Europe, but because the judgment was often the change in 
129 This category was created deductively from the analysis. 
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itself (i. e. a change created through case law). Figure 3.4 (below) shows how policy 
may be changed following HRA judgments 130 
Figure 3.4 Policy change following judgments made under the IIRA 
Lose case ------- II Win case 
No incompatibility/any Make Read primary legislation 
infringement is necessary declaration of in a way that makes it 
and proportional incompatibility compatible 
III 
1. No policy 2. Policy 3. Policy 
change change change 
Stfike down secondary 
legislation as 
incompatible 
4. Policy I 
change 
I 
Unsuccessful cases ('lose case') had no potential to create any policy change because 
it was judged that there was no incompatibility and if there was any infringement on 
an individual's human rights that this infringement was necessary and proportional 
(outcome 1). If a case was successful ('win case') there were three possible outcomes, 
all of which could result in some form of policy change (outcome 2- legislative 
change; outcome 3- case-law change; outcome 4- legislative change). 
3.7 Reflecting on the research process 
There were three parts of the analysis that were particularly difficult. First, was the 
selecting of the boundaries to decide which cases to include as 'relevant' and which 
not to include. It was very tempting to include some 'interesting' cases and reject 
some 'boring' ones in the early stages. Altogether, the coding process of inclusion 
and exclusion of reports occurred five times. Firstly a sample was coded regarding 
their relevance on paper (whether they should or should not be included and why), 
then once using Microsoft Word, then once in Nudist, then once again on paper, then 
finally an amalgamation of Microsoft Excel and cutting up the case names and 
placing them into piles. Only the reports coded as relevant were then imported into 
NVivo. This process, repeated the five times on such a large initial sample, was 
incredibly time consuming. It was important to 'get to know' the data and be 
130 1 do not use the tenn 'potential' when talking about policy change under the HRA because the 
change was easier to track. 
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completely certain about my aims and the boundaries of what to include and what not 
to before I was finally happy with the sample and its boundaries. 
The second particularly difficult part was summarising the many pages in a law report 
into the 'bones' of the case in order to describe them for analytic purposes. The 
summaries provided by the report editors were of no use because for my purposes I 
needed to centre on the rape and human rights issues. In contrast, report editors' focus 
was on legal technicalities and how the case changes legal precedent. In some reports 
the tenn. rape was mentioned only once, in others human rights mentioned only once, 
and my challenge was to centre the case on these two aspects avoiding the legal 
jargon but without losing the meaning of the case or ignoring or distorting the legal 
technicalities. Quite often a report had to be read twenty times or more before I fully 
understood it and the legal dictionary was coming away from its binding! This was 
difficult because it was necessary to understand the previous hearings, all relevant 
case law and all relevant legislation in order to properly understand the case. 
The third difficulty in relation to the analysis was the emotional impact of the 
continuous reading of rape cases. It is not unusual for a researcher to feel some level 
of distress when researching rape and to be affected by the cases they study 
(Campbell, 2002; Zandt, 1998). When what you are studying draws parallels with 
previous personal life experiences this distress may be heightened (Kelly, 1988). 
Some solace may be taken simply in knowing that this is a 'normal' reaction to doing 
research on rape. The emotional impact may be managed, as it was in this research, 
by ensuring that the supervisor-student relationship is a trusting one where the student 
feels able to talk to their supervisor about such issues. Continuing involvement in 
anti-rape campaign groups, rape crisis centres and knowing women who have been 
raped also helped as it served as a reminder of the amazing strength and 
determination that women are capable of. 
3.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has explained the aims of the research, the data used to address the aims 
and how these data were analysed. It has also shown that doing social science 
research using law reports was challenging because many of the standards expected in 
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the social sciences (describing how the data was produced, having clear sample 
boundaries etc. ) have not taken into consideration by legal academics. This has 
resulted in a lack of literature about doing social science research using law reports. 
As well as setting a basis for the data analysis chapters that follow, it is hoped that the 
information contained within this chapter will be of use to others embarking on 
similar research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN USED 
4.1 Introduction 
Human rights may be used in a variety of different ways by different people. While it 
is generally agreed upon that the rights contained within the ECHR and HRA are 
geared more towards defendants than victims within the criminal justice system there 
has been no research that has systematically analysed whether or to what extent this is 
true. Similarly, there has been no systematic analysis of which Articles are used by 
defendants and victims or how they are used. This chapter addresses the first aim of 
this thesis, investigating how rape victims and defendants have used human rights in 
relation to the prosecution process. Looking at rape victim's use first, it provides an 
overview and then describes the arguments made by the applicant's under each of the 
convention rights used in their case. The same structure is then used in terms of rape 
defendants. 
4.2 Rape victims use of human rights law 
Table 4.1 lists the details of the cases that been brought by rape victims in 
chronological order. 
Table 4.1 Rape victims use of human rights law 
Case name ECHR/ Year Gender of Articles 
IIRA applicants 
Male Fern Total 3 6 8 13 14 
Torture Fair trial Family/ Effective Discrimi 
private remedy nation 
life 
X and Yv the ECHR 1985 1 1 2 
Netherlands 
Stubbings and ECHR 1996 0 4 4 V/ 
others v UK 
Aydin v Turkey ECHR 1997 0 1 1 V/ 
Selinouni v ECHR 1999 1 0 1 V/ 
France 
Rv DPP, ex HRA 2000 0 1 1 
parte C 
MC v Bulgaria ECHR 2003 0 1 1 V/ 
Totals ECIIR 2 8 10 4 3 4 3 3 
=5 
HRA 
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There have been six cases in total, brought by a total of ten applicants (two male and 
eight females) who claimed their human rights had been breached. The ECHR/HRA 
column shows that five of these cases were brought under the ECHR and one under 
the HRA. The five ECHR cases were brought against the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Turkey, France and Bulg aria. No counties had more than one case brought 
against them. The year column shows that the earliest case was in 1985, but there was 
then over a decade gap before the next one was taken. 
The average number of alleged Articles breached in a case was 2.8. This ranged 
between one (in Rv DPP, ex parte Q and four Articles (in MC v Bulgaria). Five 
convention rights were used, and these were used in similar frequencies (3 or 4 
times). These were: Article 3 (Prohibition of torture); Article 6 (Right to a fair trial); 
Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life); Article 13 (Right to an 
effective remedy); and Article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination). 
The next section discusses the convention rights that were used in turn, describing the 
arguments made as to why the right had allegedly been breached. The amount of 
information given when describing the cases varies depending on how complex the 
events were that led up to the allegation that a right had been breached. 
4.2.1 Article 3: Freedom from torture 
Article 3 was used in four cases: Aydin v Turkey 131; MC v Bulgaria 132; Selniouni v 
France 133 ; and Xand Yv the Netherlands 134. In Aydin v Turkey and Seniouni v France 
it was alleged that state actors were the perpetrators of the rape. In both cases it was 
the police who were the state actors and it was alleged that the rapes had taken place 
in custody. In both cases the alleged torture was not limited to the rape but also 
included other severe ill treatment. In Mrs Aydin's case this included being stripped 
naked, put into a car tyre and spun round and round and being sprayed with cold 
water from high-pressure jets. In Mr Selmouni's case, the other ill treatment included 
13 1 Aydin v Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997 
132 MC v Bulgaria, no. 39272/98 ECHR 2003 
133 Selinouni v France [GC], no. 25803/94, ECHR 1999 
134 Xand Yv the Netherlands, judgment of 27 February 1985 
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being beaten with a baseball bat, being attacked so badly he lost his sight from one 
eye and threatened with two blowlamps and a syringe. 
In both cases, the argument made by the applicants was that: a) the rape and other ill 
treatment amounted to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment within the ambit of 
Article 3; b) that the acts were perpetrated by state actors; and c) that the state had 
failed to appropriately investigate the allegations and punish the perpetrators. These 
cases are therefore examples of the vertical effect of the ECHR. 
In contrast, the alleged Article 3 violations in X and Yv the Netherlands and MC v 
Bulgaria are examples of the horizontal effect of the ECHR. In these cases the 
alleged rapists were not state actors, but other 'non-state' individuals. The applicants 
in X and Yv the Netherlands were Miss Y and her father Mr X, but the alleged breach 
of Article 3 applied only to Miss Y. It was alleged that Miss Y, who was living in a 
home for mentally handicapped children was raped in 1977 when she was 16 by Mr 
B, the son-in-law of the home's directrcss. Because of Miss Y's disabilities her father 
made the police complaint on her behalf, but the criminal proceedings were 
discontinued because the criminal code required the complaint to be made by the 
actual victim. Because Miss Y was not able to make the complaint and Mr X was not 
legally empowered to make the complaint, this amounted to a loophole in the 
Netherland's rape laws. That this loophole existed was accepted by the Arnhem Court 
of Appeal in the Netherlands: 
... the father's complaint ... could not 
be regarded as a substitittefor the coniplaint 
which the girl, being over the age ofsixteen, should have lodged herself, although the 
police had regarded her as incapable of doing so; since in the instant case no one 
was legally enipowered tofile a coniplaint, there was on thispoint a gap in the laiv ... 
The applicants argued under the ECHR that the rape amounted to torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the scope of Article 3 and that the state had failed to enact 
appropriate laws because it was impossible for a prosecution to take place. 
In MC v Bulgaria it was possible to make a complaint of rape and a prosecution was 
started against the two alleged perpetrators of Miss MC (a fourteen year old girl), 
however the prosecution was discontinued because the rape had not involved physical 
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force or threats; elements that were needed under the definition of rape under 
Bulgarian law: 
There can be no criminal act under Article 152 §§ ](2) and 3 of the Crinlinal Code ... 
unless the applicant was coerced into having sexual intercourse by means ofphysical 
force or threats [ ... I There is insufficient evidence to establish that the applicant demonstrated unwillingness to have sexual intercourse and that P. and A. used 
thy-eats orforce. (Report from regional prosecutors office, cited in MC v Bulgaria, 
para. 64) 
Miss MC argued that the definition of rape was written in a way that made it 
impossible in her case to have the acts against her classified as rape for the purpose of 
a criminal trial because she had responded to the rape with 'frozen fright' rather than 
resisting physically. 
In X and Yv the Netherlands and MC v Bulgaria there was therefore no direct state 
involvement in the perpetration of the rape as there was in Aydin v Turk-ey and 
Sehnouni v France, but it was alleged that the state had prevented them from seeing 
the perpetrators punished for their actions because of a lack of suitably drafted 
legislation. 
4.2.2 Article 6: Right to a fair trial 
Article 6 was used in three cases: Stubbings and others v the United Kingdom 135 , 
Aydin v Turke and Sehnowd v France. In Stubbings and others v the United Y 
Kingdoin all four applicants argued that, in completely unrelated cases, they had been 
denied access to a court to claim compensation from men who raped and sexually 
abused them in other ways while they were children. The nature of the abuse varied 
between the applicants: Ms Stubbings alleged that her adopted father sexually 
assaulted her for twelve years when she was aged between two and fourteen years old 
and that one of her adopted siblings had raped her twice when she was twelve; Ms JL 
alleged that her father abused her by taking pornographic photographs of her and 
conducting serious assaults of a sexual nature over a period of eleven years; Ms JP 
alleged that the headmaster of her primary school had violently raped and sexually 
135 Slubbings and others v UK, judgment of 24 September 1996 
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assaulted her for two years and; Ms DS alleged that she was subjected to repeated 
sexual assaults and rapes by her father for nine years. 
When the applicants were older they all attempted to use civil law to claim 
compensation from the alleged perpetrators for the abuse they had suffered as 
children. Ms DS had already sought redress through the criminal law; her father 
pleaded guilty to the sexual assaults but not the rapes and was sentenced to probation 
for one year. She instigated civil proceedings because she felt this punishment was 
too lenient. All of the applicants civil proceedings were dismissed as 'time-barred' 
under the Limitation Act 1980; the latter three cases dismissed following the House 
of Lords decision in Ms Stubbings' case. 
Under the Limitation Act 1980 rape is classed as an intentional injury, and the Act 
states that claims for intentional injuries must be brought within six years of the act 
taking place or, if the injured was a child as Ms Stubbings was when the acts took 
place, that the six years would run from when the injured turned 18 years old. This 
means that Ms Stubbings had until she was aged 24 in which to start proceedings. Ms 
Stubbings case was discontinued because she was aged 30 when she started 
proceedings. She took her case to the Court of Appeal, arguing that while she had 
always known she had been abused, she did not realise that this amounted to 
gsignificantly serious illness' (as needed to justify a claim) until she was aged 27 and 
the link was made between the abuse and her mental illness. The Court of Appeal 
accepted Ms Stubbings argument, but the*defendants applied to the House of Lords 
and the appeal judgment was overturned in their favour, with the four Law Lords 
refusing to accept that she did not make this realisation earlier: 
I have the greatest difficulty in accepting that a ivoinan who has been raped does not 
know that she has suffered a significant byzity. (Lord Griffiths in Stubbings v Mebb 
pg. 498) 
With similar material facts in the other three cases, they were dismissed on the basis 
of the Stubbings v Mebb House of Lords judgment. This led to the four applicants' 
allegations under the ECHR that they had been denied access to a court to have their 
claims heard, in breach of Article 6. 
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The Article 6 arguments made in Aydin v Turkey and Sehnouni v France are 
somewhat simpler to explain. Mrs Aydin argued that because an effective criminal 
investigation was not conducted this resulted in her being denied access to a court to 
claim compensation through the civil or administrative courts. In particular, she 
argued that the criminal investigation was ineffective because the public prosecutor: 
sent her to be examined by incompetent medical examiners who focused on whether 
she was a virgin rather than whether she had been raped; did not seek out any 
potential eyewitnesses from the village where she was taken from and; failed to 
question any of the gendarmes (police officers) at the gendannerie where the alleged 
acts took place. This lack of evidence then prevented her from proving that the torture 
took place for the purpose of a civil or administrative claim. 
In Sekouni v Fi-ance Mr Selmouni argued that he had not had a fair trial because the 
proceedings against the police officers were not conducted within a reasonable length 
of time. At the time the ECHR were required to judge whether this amounted to a 
breach of Article 6, the proceedings were still pending and bad already lasted over six 
years and seven months. 
4.2.3 Article 8: Right to respect for private and family life 
Article 8 was used in four cases: X and Yv the Netherlands; Stubbings and others v 
UK; Rv DPP exparte C136 ; and MC v Bulgaria. All of the cases were concerned with 
the state's positive obligations. In other words, the arguments made were that the 
state had failed to protect the complainants right to respect for private and family life 
rather than arguing that the state had directly done something that infringed on this 
right. 
In X and Yv the Netherlands Miss Y argued that that the inability to prosecute the 
man who allegedly raped her (as described under Article 3) meant that the 
Netherlands have failed to protect her right to respect for private and family life. As 
her father, Mr X argued that the rape of his daughter had violated his rights under 
Article 8 as well. Similarly, in MC v Bulgaria it was argued that because of the way 
136 Rv Director ofPublic Prosecutions exparte C, CO/1450/99 (Transcript: Smith Bernal) 
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consent was constructed in Bulgarian criminal law (as described under Article 3) this 
had meant that her right to physical integrity and private life had not been protected. 
In Stubbings and others v the United Kingdoin the Article 8 argument also related to 
an argument made under another Article, with three of the four applicants arguing 
that because they did not have access to a court (as described under Article 6) that this 
also meant their private life had not been respected. 
Rv DPP ex parte C was the only case in the sample where a HRA argument was 
made on behalf of a rape victim. The case was an application for judicial review of a 
decision made by the CPS to discontinue a prosecution for rape without consulting 
the complainant. Indeed, the applicant was not even informed by the CPS that the 
charge had been dropped and only discovered this when her family telephoned the 
police to report that the defendant had breached his bail conditions. 
The applicant accepted that at the time the offence was committed (in 1998) there was 
no general duty for the CPS to consult with a victim when deciding to discontinue a 
case. However, she argued that a duty could be seen to arise if a) the victim is likely 
to suffer a high level of distress, b) when there are implications regarding the 
character of the victim in terms of discontinuance or c) when discontinuing with the 
case interferes with the moral integrity of the victim's private life. This latter point, 
she argued, amounted to a violation of Article 8. 
4.2.4 Article 13: Right to an effective remedy 
In three cases: X and Yv the Netherlands, Aydin v Turk-ey and MC v Bulgaria it was 
alleged that the applicants' rights had been breached under Article 13. In each of the 
cases, as is self-explanatory under Article 13, it was alleged that this was because the 
state had not provided them with an effective remedy in respect of their claims. In X 
and Yv the Nethei-lands this was argued on behalf of both applicants (father and 
daughter). 
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4.2.5 Article 14: Prohibition of discrimination 
Three cases contained arguments that there had been a violation of Article 14: Xand 
Yv the Netherlands; Stubbings and others i, the UK, and MC v Bulgaria. As 
highlighted earlier (in Chapter One), Article 14 is not a 'standalone' Article and can 
only be used in conjunction with one or more of the standalone Articles. 
In X and Yv the Netherlands Article 14 was used alongside Articles 3 and 8 in 
respect of both of the applicants. The applicants argued that by protecting some 
individuals from sexual assault and not others, the Netherlands criminal law provided 
differential treatment. If Miss Y had been under rather than over 16 years old her 
father as her legal representative could have made the complaint on her behalf (the 
incident had actually occurred on the day after Miss Y's 16"' birthday). Alternatively, 
if Miss Y had been aged 21 or over she could have been placed under her father's 
curateele (guardianship) and he could have made the complaint. It was therefore 
argued that Miss Y had received differential treatment because of her age. 
Article 14 was central to the arguments made in Stubbings and Others v the UK. All 
four of the applicants in this case argued that their rights under Article 14 with 6 had 
been violated, and three of the applicants also argued that their rights under Article 14 
with 8 had been violated. The applicants argued that the situation was discriminatory 
because the civil law provision varied depending on whether the individual was a 
victim of intentional or unintentional injury. Because rape was classed as an 
intentionally caused injury under the Limitation Act 1980, this meant that their cases 
were time-barred by the time they realised that they had been psychologically injured 
and were able to relate this to the rape. If the injury had been unintentional then the 
time bar would not have started until the victim first knew the injury was significant 
and attributable to the defendant, and the judge would have had discretionary powers 
to extend this period. It was argued that this was not only discriminatory in terms of 
the distinction drawn between intentional and unintentional injuries, but also in terms 
of those who experienced intentional injuries which did not lead to similar 
psychological effects. These psychological effects, the applicants claimed, prevented 
them from realising that they could start proceedings until it was too late to start 
them. 
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In MC v Bulgaria, unusually, it was not stated in the judgment which of the Article(s) 
Article 14 was being used alongside but it is likely to have been 3 and/or 8. The 
Article 14 argument made was that the Bulgarian Criminal Code provided better 
protection from rape to 'homosexual children' than to 'heterosexual children' because 
of the age of consent. This was because, at the material time, the age of consent for 
sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex was 14 years but the age of 
consent for sexual intercourse with a person of the same sex was 16 years. If the age 
of consent had been 16 years in Miss MC's case then the case would have been 
classed as statutory rape or at minimum a 'strict liability' offence and there would 
have been none of the problems relating to proving a lack of consent, which were at 
the heart of the case. 
4.2.6 Summary: Rape victims use of human rights law 
Rape victims have therefore used a range of articles and made different arguments to 
frame their allegations that their human rights have been breached, with most of the 
law reports relating to cases taken under the ECHR rather than the HRA. Applications 
using Article 3 raised two key questions, both of which were raised in the literature 
under the optimistic picture; whether rape could be defined as a f6rm of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment and if so, whether this extended to a positive duty on 
the state to draft suitable criminal laws for those raped by other private individuals to 
use. 
The right to a fair trial (Article 6) has generally been associated more with defendants 
than with victims of crime, however the cases described here show that victims of 
crime can also make admissible 137 Article 6 arguments. The term 'trial' was used to 
refer to civil cases only, and all the arguments hinged on the right of access to a trial 
per se (within a reasonable length of time) rather than on thefairness of a trial. Given 
the literature discussed in Chapter Two that sought to show that rape trials are unfair 
to rape victims in a number of ways, it was therefore surprising initially that there 
were no applications that argued that a rape victim had not had a fair trial. Further 
137 If an argument had not already been classed as admissible it would not have been put before the 
court. 
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investigation revealed that this would not be an argument that could be made under 
Article 6, the relevant part being the first sentence of Article 6 section 1: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of ally criminal charge 
against him, eveiyone is entitled to afair andpublic hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
Because a victim does not have 'a ci-indnal charge against hhn', this means that the 
Article 6 provision in terms of criminal law can relate only to a defendant. This 
resulted in further investigation being needed, because Mr Selmouni's case was a 
criminal one and he was able to argue that the proceedings had not taken place within 
a reasonable length of time. In France, however, because of the different legal system 
to the United Kingdom, Mr Selmouni had been able to lodge both a criminal 
complaint and an application to join the proceedings as a civil party. Because the 
United Kingdom deals with civil and criminal complaints separately, a rape victim in 
the United Kingdom would not be able to use Article 6 in the way that Mr Selmouni 
did. 
Article 8 arguments tended to have overlaps with arguments made under Articles 3 
(that the right to respect to private and family life was because of the inability to 
make a criminal complaint or continue with a prosecution) and Article 6 (because 
there was not access to a court). 
While Article 14 was used in three cases, none of the applicants argued that they had 
been discriminated against specifically because of their gender. Rather, the reasons 
given for discrimination were age, sexuality and how intentional the injury sustained 
was. 
4.3 Rape defendants use of human rights law 
Table 4.2 lists the details of the cases that been brought by rape defendants, in 
chronological order. 
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Table 4.2 Rape defendants use of human rights law 
Case name ECHR/ 
llRA 
Year Gender of 
applicants 
Articles 
I-Nlale Fem Total 5 
Liberty/ 
security 
6 
Fair trial 
7 
No 
punishment 
8 
Fam/ 
private life 
Englert v 
Germany 
ECHR 1987 1 0 1 V11 
Tv Italy ECHR 1992 1 0 1 
Stanford v 
the UK 
ECHR 1994 1 0 1 V/ 
S[Vv the UK ECHR 1995 1 0 1 Y/' 
Gv France ECHR 1995 1 0 1 V/ 
Baegen v 
Netherlands 
ECHR 1995 1 0 1 V/ 
Trzask-a v 
Poland 
ECHR 2000 1 0 1 V/ 
Mattoccia v 
Italy 
ECHR 2000 1 0 1 
A-G Ref (Alo 
3 of 1999) 
HRA 2000 1 0 1 
RvT, R vH HRA 2001 2 0 2 
Rv Rooney HRA 2001 1 0 1 
Rv Porter HRA 2001 1 0 1 
Rv Morgan HRA 2001 1 0 1 
RvCand 
others 
HRA 2001 3 0 3 
RvA HRA 2001 1 0 1 
GB v France ECHR 2001 1 10 1 
R vM, Rv 
Kerr, RvH 
HRA 2002 3 0 3 
Rv 
Archibald 
HRA 2002 1 0 1 
Kitcera v 
Austria 
ECHR 2002 1 0 1 
R vR and 
another 
HRA 2003 2 0 2 
Rv Lask-ey HRA 2003 1 0 1 
MM v the 
Netherlands 
ECHR 2003 1 0 1 
Mellors v 
the UK 
ECHR 2003 1 0 1 V/ 
Manviejczuk 
v Poland 
ECHR 2003 1 0 1 V/ 
Korellis v 
Cypnis 
ECHR 2003 1 0 1 V/ 
Totals ECIIR=14 
1 IIRA=11 I 
31 
I 
0 
I 
31 
I 
2 
I 
21 
I 
3 
I 
3 
I 
-i 
What is immediately evident is that there have been far more cases taken on behalf of 
rape defendants than there have for rape victims. There have been 25 cases (which is 
over four times as many as have been taken by rape victims), taken by 31 applicants 
(over three times as many as the number of applicants in cases taken by rape victims). 
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All of the applicants were male. 14 of these were ECHR cases (nearly three times as 
many as rape victims) and II were HRA cases (eleven times as many as rape 
victims). The earliest case brought by a rape defendant was heard in 1987, two years 
after the first case was heard with a rape victim as the applicant. The most recent case 
in the sample was heard in 2003. Of the fourteen ECHR cases, one case was taken 
against Austria, Cyprus and Germany, two cases were taken against Italy, France, the 
Netherlands and Poland and three cases were taken against the UK. Interestingly, 
those countries which Regan and Kelly (2003) found to have the highest conviction 
rates for rape (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland and Latvia) 
are not over-representcd at the ECHR. In fact, the opposite seems to be true with the 
UK having one of the highest levels of attrition within Europe and also having the 
most defendants claiming that their human rights have been breached. 
The average number of alleged Articles breached in a case was 1.2. This is less than 
half the average number used per case by rape victims (which was 2.8). The number 
of Articles that were allegedly breached ranged from one (in 22 cases) to three (in one 
case). Four Articles were used. Article 6 was the most used Article by far, used in 21 
cases (84% of all defendants cases). The other three Articles used were 5,7 and 8, 
which were used less frequently (each used in two or three cases). 
4.3.1 Article 5: Right to liberty and security 
The two cases that used Article 5 were -both taken against Poland. In Trzaska v 
Poland 138 it was argued that the length of time Mr Trzaska spent in detention on 
remand for rape and other offences was unreasonable, at three years and six months. 
The same argument was made in Mativiejezuk v Poland 139 who was suspected of 
committing anned robbery and rape. Mr Matwiejczuk was held on remand for three 
years and two months. 
138 Trzask-a v Poland, no. 25792/94, ECHR 2000. 
139 Mahviejczitk v Poland, no. 37641/97, ECHR 2003. 
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4.3.2 Article 6: Right to a fair trial 
Article 6 arguments were made in 21 cases. For ease of description, these can be 
further subdivided into the reasons why it was argued that the trial was not fair: 
because of the length of time that had elapsed between being charged and being tried 
for the offence(s); because of an issue about the trial unrelated to evidence; or 
because of an evidential issue. 
Length of titne hetiveen charge and trial 
In five cases it was argued that the trial had not been fair because of the length of time 
that had elapsed between being charged and being tried for the offence(s). In four of 
these five cases it was argued that the period of time had been too long. In Trzaska v 
Poland Mr Trzaka was charged with seven violent offences, including rape and 
attempted manslaughter. Mr Trzaka spent a total of three years and six months on 
remand in prison before being tried and subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years 
imprisonment. In Mattoccia v Italy 140 Mr Mattoccia was a bus driver who was 
charged with the rape of one of the disabled children in his care. It took a period of 
seven years and five months from when the allegations were made against him until 
the court judgment. In Mahviejezuk v Poland there was a period of three years and 
two months between Mr Matweijczuk being taken into custody on arrest for armed 
robbery and rape and his appeal being dismissed. The criminal proceedings in 
Mellors v UK 141 lasted a total of three years, eight months and twenty-three days from 
when he was arrested for rape and the date when his appeal was finally rejected. In 
contrast to these four reports, in Rv Porter 142 it was argued that the length of time 
before the trial took place was not long enough. Mr Porter alleged that his trial was 
not fair because he had not been allowed enough time to prepare his case by obtaining 
expert reports regarding some DNA evidence. 
140 Afattoccia v Italy, no. 23969/94, ECHR 2000 
141 Mellors v UK, no. 57836/00, ECHR 2003 
142 Rv Porter [2001 ] EWCA Crim 2699 
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Issues about the trial unrelated to evidence 
Five cases related to an issue about the trial unrelated to evidential issues. Mr Korellis 
was convicted for rape and sentenced to three years imprisonment, but argued in 
Korellis v Cypi-its 143 that part of his trial was unfair because a judge was not impartial. 
In his trial at the Assize Court the defence requested that a further forensic 
examination of the complainant's knickers should be carried out and swabs from her 
vagina taken to be analysed. The trial judge granted an order for this to take place but 
the Attorney General applied for judicial review of the order and Justice Artemides, a 
member. of the Supreme Court, suspended the order made by the trial judge. Mr 
Korellis appealed against the suspension of the order and Justice Artemides sat again 
as one of nine judges at the Supreme Court. The appeal against suspension of the 
order was again unsuccessful (at 7 votes to 2) and the trial went ahead which resulted 
in Mr Korellis' conviction. Mr Korellis, having an application under Article 6 refused 
(that by not making the knickers available to the defence the trial had not been fair) 
alternatively argued that in the decision over the knickers Justice Artemides had acted 
as a judge in his own case because he was participating in appeal proceedings of his 
own decision. 
The other issue about the trial but unrelated to evidence was that the defendant could 
not fully participate in the proceedings, and this argument was made in four cases. In 
two of these cases the argument was made because they had been tried in absentia; 
they had not had the opportunity to attend the proceedings. This was the argument 
made in Kitcera v Austria 144 . Mr Kucera had been convicted for two counts of 
aggravated rape and sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. After an unsuccessful 
appeal against sentence, he argued that the appeal proceedings had not been fair 
because he had not been present at the Court of Appeal when they considered his 
case. In Tv Italy 145 Mr T argued that Italy had breached his rights when they 
convicted and sentenced him in absentia to seven years imprisonment for the rape of 
his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Mr T had not been formally notified about the 
143 Korellis v Cypnts, no. 54528/00, ECHR 2003 
144 Kzicera vA ustria, no. 40072/98, ECHR 2000 
145 Tv Italy, judgment of 24 September 1992 
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proceedings as he was working in Sudan, even though he had infort-ned the Italian 
Embassy in Khartoum of his change of address. 
In Stanford v United Kingdom 146 Mr Stanford argued that lie could not fully 
participate in proceedings because he was unable to hear all of the proceedings for his 
trial for two counts of rape and five other offences against a young girl for which he 
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Mr Stanford's trial was the first to be heard 
at the new Norwich Crown Court building, which had a glass-fronted dock. When the 
victim (who by this time was fifteen) started giving evidence she spoke in a soft voice 
with her head bowed so the judge requested that she be placed closer to himself and 
the jury. Mr Stanford had complained to his solicitor, counsel and a prison guard but 
not to the court that he could not hear what she was saying. 
The final case in this section concerned three separate applicants. In RvM; Rv Kerr; 
RvH 147 it was argued that the applicants were not able to fully participate in the 
proceedings because they were mentally unable to. Mr M and Mr H had been charged 
with indecent assault and Mr Kerr had been charged with indecent assault and rape. 
It was argued that since the defendants had mental disabilities they would be unable 
to follow the proceedings or give instructions, meaning that any trial would be unfair. 
Mr Kerr 148 had been charged with four counts of rape and fifteen of sexual assault on 
his patients between 1968 and 1988 during his work as a consultant psychiatrist. 
Under section 4a of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 a jury found him 
unfit to stand trial (following the rules of the Act the jury were not informed of what 
Mr Kerr had been charged for). A second jury then found that Mr Kerr had committed 
one of the indecent assaults, were unable to agree on a verdict on the other charges 
149 
and Mr Kerr was given an absolute discharge 
146 Stanford v United Kingdom, judgment of 25 January 1994 
147 Rv Af; Rv Kerr; RvH [2002] 1 WLR 824 
148 1 focusing on Mr Kerr here because he was a rape defendant and the other two applicants were 
indecent assault defendants. 
149 Note that this second jury could not actually find Mr Kerr guilty of the charges even if they had 
found he had committed the acts because only the actus reus of rape could ever be proved because he 
was unfit to stand trial and therefore unfit to be questioned to satisfy the mens rea requirement of the 
offence (as described in Chapter Two). 
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Evidential issues 
In twelve cases it was argued that the trial had not been fair because of an issue 
relating to evidence. In one of these cases two separate arguments were made as to 
why Article 6 had been breached (R v Rooney 150) . Both of these arguments related to 
evidential issues and the case is therefore discussed twice in the following section. 
In five of these twelve cases the evidence in question was sexual history evidence. 
The case of RvA 151 was described briefly earlier in Chapter One. The case concerned 
the alleged rape of a woman in December 2000 on a towpath close to the river 
Thames. The woman alleged she had been pulled to the ground by the defendant who 
was the friend of her boyfriend and raped. The defendant claimed that the woman had 
initiated the intercourse as part of an ongoing relationship they were having and read 
out a brief statement when interviewed by the police where he stated 'She 1vas never 
against this relationship that ive ivei-e having'. His defence in court was that she 
consented, and that if she did not, then lie thought she did. 
Referring to the new provisions within Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, the Judge at the preparatory hearing refused the defendants 
counsel leave to cross-examine or use evidence relating to the alleged previous sexual 
intercourse with either the defendant or his friend. This also meant that the prepared 
statement read at the police station could not be used as evidence because it alleged 
they had had consensual intercourse prior to the incident in question. In refusing leave 
to use this sexual history evidence, the judge recognised that that this ruling might 
result in a breach of the defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial did not go ahead on 
this basis and was referred to the Court of Appeal. 
At the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Rose ruled that the evidence and questioning 
about the defendant's alleged previous sexual relationship with the complainant was, 
in fact, admissible under Section 41 and that the judge's ruling in excluding such 
evidence had been incorrect. This was because while sexual history evidence is not 
admissible on the issue of consent, it is admissible in relation to belief in consent. As 
'SO Rv Rooney [2001] EWCA Crim 2844 
15 1RvA [200 11 UKHL 25, [200 1]I WLR 789 
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the defence was that the complainant was consenting, and if she was not, that the 
defendant believed that she was, this would have resulted in a ruling to the jury that 
they must consider the evidence only in terms of whether he believed she was 
consenting and not in ten-ns of whether she actually did consent to intercourse. Lord 
Justice Rose gave the opinion that a direction such as this may lead to an unfair and 
very confusing trial and the question was certified by the Court of Appeal to be 
considered by the House of Lords: 
May a sexual relationship between a defendant and complainant be relevant to the 
issue of consent so as to render its exchision under section 41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 a contravention of the defendant's right to a Jah- 
trial? 
The other four cases that related to sexual history evidence varied from RvA in their 
material facts. In Rv Rooney the trial was a retrial and section 41 had come into force 
in between Mr Rooney's first and second trials. He argued that it was unfair not to 
allow similar cross-examination to take place in the second trial to that which had 
taken place in the first. In particular, he pointed out that the first trial had shown that 
her statement that she had had no previous sexual experiences had been untrue 
because she had admitted under cross-examination about her sexual history that she 
bad carried out fellatio on a boy when she was 13 years old. In RvT, RvH 152 Mr T 
sought to cross-examine the victim about why she had not complained earlier about 
the abuse when making a complaint to the police about abuse from two other family 
members. In Mr H's case he sought to cross-examine the victim about an occasion 
when she had told her brother and friends that she had been raped and other questions 
which were designed to discredit her and show that she had lied in the past. Both 
applicants argued that the evidence and cross-examination was not 'about' the 
victim's sexual history but rather about her failure to complain in the past (in the case 
of Mr T) and her alleged previous lies (in Mr H's case). In RvR and another 153 
limited sexual history evidence in respect of a previous relationship was allowed 
under section 41 but was refused in relation to previous and post complaint 
consensual intercourse on the grounds that it was not relevant to the case. The 
applicants argued this had led to an unfair trial. In Rv Morgan 154 Mr Morgan's 
152 RvT, R vH[2001] EWCACrim 1877, [2002] 1 All ER683, [2002] I WLR632 153 
RvR and another [2003] EWCA Crim 2754 154 Rv Morgan [200 1] EWCA Crim 445 
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defence in court was that lie could not remember the incident because he had had a 
6complete mental blackout' but that since he and the victim were having a long-term 
sexual relationship she would have consented on the occasion in question because 
4she always consented' (this case was pre-section 41). In the police inter-view, 
however, Mr Morgan had not mentioned that he had had a relationship with the 
victim and the judge warned the jury that they may draw inferences from his failure 
to mention when questioned something that he later relied on in court. Mr Morgan 
argued he had not mentioned it when questioned by the police because he was still 
drunk at the time, and that the jury warning had meant that the trial was unfair. 
In two of the eleven cases where it was alleged that the trial had been unfair for 
evidential reasons, the argument made was that the defence had not had 'equality of 
arms' (access to all the evidence the prosecution had). In GB v France'55 the 
prosecution introduced new documentary evidence at the start of the trial that then led 
to one of the expert witnesses substantially changing his oral submission from his 
written submission. In RvC and othei-s 156 the applicants argued that the prosecution 
had failed to share evidence that shed doubt on the credibility of the victim because 
the evidence showed that the girl had previously given inconsistent statements and 
told lies to the police in a completely unrelated case where her boyfriend had been 
accused of murder. 
While most rape defendants would presumably be pleased to have their cases 
discontinued, this was not the case in Englert v Gerniany 157 . When the court 
decided 
to stay the case and withdraw the rape charge against Mr Englert he argued that this 
constituted a 'conviction in disguise' because the inability to have his personal costs 
and expenses refunded or be awarded compensation for the time he had spent 
detained on remand was contrary to his right to be presumed innocent until convicted 
via a fair trial. Had he been tried and acquitted an order may have been made for 
defence costs to be reimbursed and he may have been compensated for his time on 
remand. 
155 GB v France, 44069/98 ECHR 2001 
156 RvC and others [200 1] EWCA Crim 1529 
157 Englert v Gennany, judgment of 24 June 1987 
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The remaining arguments made in relation to evidential issues were whether a trial 
was a fair one if. unlawfully retained DNA was used as evidence (Attol-ney General's 
Refei-ence (No 3 of 1999) 158); a defendant was convicted on the basis of statements 
made by an anonymous witness (Baegen v the Netherlands'59); a complainant could 
not be cross-examined because a mental disability resulted in her evidence being 
presented on video (R v Ai-chibald; Attorney General's Reference (No 69 of 2001) 160); 
or if a fair retrial was possible after some evidence had already been given back to 
and destroyed by the victim (R v Rooney 161). 
4.3.3 Article 7: No punishment without law 
In three cases (SIV v the United Kingdom 
162 
,Gv France 
163 
and Rv Lask-ey 
164) it was 
alleged that Article 7 had been breached because the state had prosecuted the 
applicant for an act that was not a criminal offence at the time the act had taken place. 
In the case of SJV v the United Kingdoin Mr SW argued that lie should not have been 
prosecuted for raping his wife because at the time the act was not against the law in 
England and Wales (subject to certain exceptions such if as a non-molestation order 
had been in place). This judgment was passed as an identical judgment to and at the 
same time as CR v the United Kingdonz 165, which is the better-known case (known as 
RvR 166 while in the English courts) because it was the first to criminalise rape within 
marriage. Both cases had already passed through the Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) and the House of Lords before -they were heard at the European Court of 
Human Rights. The case of SW rather than CR is included in this sample because the 
latter was actually an attempted rape case. As the ECHR judgment was identical, the 
discussion in this thesis of SW applies equally to CR. 
158 Attorney General's Reference (Alo 3 of 1999) [2001] 2 WLR 56; [2001] 2 AC 91 
159 Baegen v the Netherlands, judgment of 24 October 1995 
160 R vArchibald; R vArchibald; Attorney General's Reference (No 69 qf2001) [2002]EWCACr-im 
858 
161RvRooney[200l]EWCACrim2844 
162 SJV v the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 October 1995 
163 Gv France, judgment of 31 August 1995 
164 Rv Lask-ey [2003] All ER (D) 69 (May) 
165 CR v the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 October 1995 
166 RvR[ 1991] 2 All ER 257 
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Mr SW, on being told by his wife that their marriage was over, raped her at knifepoint 
and was charged with rape, threatening to kill and assault occasioning actual bodily 
harm. He argued that although sexual intercourse had taken place without consent 
this could not be classed as rape because of the wording of the definition of rape in 
statute and a general agreement within case law that it was not possible for a man to 
rape his wife - known as 'marital immunity' to rape. He relied upon the same 
argument that was made in RvR; that Parliament were fully aware that rape within 
marriage was not illegal and had actively chosen not to define and penalise some acts 
of non-consensual intercourse as rape when they are perpetrated towards certain 
groups (e. g. wives, other men). The Criminal Law Revision Committee had presented 
a report in 1984 that recommended that immunity should be maintained (with a new 
exception). Parliament had then had the opportunity to remove the word 'unlawful' or 
introduce new provision for non-consensual intercourse in 1988 when considering 
revisions to the 1976 Act but bad chosen not done so. In September 1990 the Law 
Commission provisionally recommended that immunity should be abolished through 
an act of parliament but any debate was pre-empted by RvR. As judges do not have 
the power to change the law and parliament had not changed the law, it was therefore 
argued that he had been prosecuted and convicted for an act that was not against the 
law. The same argument was then made again in 2003 in Rv Laskey when Mr Laskey 
argued at the Court of Appeal that he should not have been prosecuted for raping his 
ex-wife on two occasions, the first on a date not known around 1988 and the second 
in 1995. 
In the last of the Article 7 arguments in this sample, Mr G claimed in Gv France that 
he had been prosecuted using a new rape law that only came into force after he 
committed the acts. While he admitted that in his role as a driving test examiner he 
had used coercion to force a woman with a mental disability to submit to acts of 
buggery he argued that at the time such acts had been classified as indecent assault 
rather than rape. Specifically, that the new law introduced on 23 rd December 1980 
was applied even though he committed the act on the 14"' November 1980. 
143 
4.3.4 Article 8: Right to respect for private and family life 
Article 8 arguments were made in three cases: MM v the Netherlands 167 , Matitieiczuk 
v Poland and Attorney General's Reference No 9 of 2003. In MM v the Netherlands it 
was alleged that Mrs S had been sexually assaulted by Mr MM while acting as the 
defence lawyer for Mrs S's husband who was being held on pre-trial detention for an 
unrelated matter. Mrs S was reluctant to make a statement against Mr MM because 
she was worried that she would not be believed because there was only her word 
against his. The police suggested that Mrs S tape record her telephone conversations 
with Mr MM to collect evidence and the police provided her with a tape recorder, 
showed her how to operate it and came to collect the recordings from her. Two other 
women then came forward and reported that they had been raped and sexually 
assaulted by Mr MM and he was convicted for sexually assaulting two of the women 
and acquitted for the rape and sexual assault of the third. Mr MM argued that the 
tapping of his phone by the police constituted 'interference by a public authority' in 
breach of his right to respect for private and family life. 
Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1999) was mentioned briefly under Article 6 in 
relation to whether unlawfully retained DNA evidence could be used as evidence in 
court. In the trial it was alleged that the defendant had broken into an old woman's 
house, assaulted, anally raped and burgled her before locking her in a cupboard for 12 
hours until she was found. Swabs were taken from the woman following the rape and 
the results were placed on the national DNA database. From this database, a suspect 
was identified. The suspect was on the database for a case in which he was a suspect 
for burglary (but found not guilty of) when he had had saliva swabs taken. The 
frequency of the occurrence of such a match, if the DNA on the swabs had come from 
someone other than the defendant, would have been one in 17 million. However, 
despite the strength of this evidence, the defendant was acquitted because his DNA 
should have been destroyed after he had been acquitted on the burglary charge. The 
DNA evidence had therefore been obtained as a result of improper retention. The 
defendant had argued that if he was convicted this would breach his rights because 
the interference with this right would not be 'in accordance with law' (Article 8 (2)) 
167 AfAf v the Netherlands, no. 39339/98 ECHR 2003 
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and was acquitted on this basis. A defendant charged with murder had recently had 
his conviction overturned in similar circumstances (in Rv Weir 168 ). The Attorney 
General referred the case to the House of Lords for consideration on a point of law. 
It is not necessary here to explain the Article 8 argument made in Mahviejezuk v 
Poland because it relates to imprisonment. The case is included in the sample because 
the other arguments made fit within the sample boundaries. 
4.3.5 Summary: Rape defendant's use of human rights law 
More rape defendants than rape victims argued that their human rights had been 
breached, however they used a smaller range of Articles and hence proportionately 
fewer arguments were made. Some arguments were made under Articles 5,7 and 8 
but the vast majority used Article 6. 
Rape defendants' use of Article 5 overlapped with one of the arguments made under 
Article 6; that they had been held on remand for an unreasonable length of time (i. e. 
the Article 5 argument) because their trial had not been conducted within a reasonable 
length of time (i. e. the Article 6 argument). The other arguments made under Article 
6 were that the trial had been unfair because of issues related to the trial but unrelated 
to evidential issues or that the trial had been unfair because of evidential issues. In 
line with the pessimistic picture of rape and human rights described in Chapter Two, 
defendant's argued that if evidence was -not allowed that related to the woman's 
credibility then they had not had a fair trial. This included challenges to section 41 of 
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 as described earlier in Chapter 
Two. In some cases the arguments challenged legislation that, on first sight, would 
appear unrelated to rape law, but which still had as its main aim the introduction of 
evidence relating to credibility or belief in consent. 
The arguments made under Article 7 seem to run contrary to both substantive and 
procedural justice. However, the strict following of legal reasoning (alongside 
inappropriately drafted legislation in the United Kingdom) meant that rape defendants 
168 Rv Meir [200 111 WLR 421 
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were able to put forward strong arguments that sexual intercourse without consent 
was not rape when the act took place against a defendant's wife and against a girl 
with a mental disability. Article 8 was used to argue that to obtain the evidence 
needed to prove rape had occurred the state had failed to respect the defendant's right 
to a private and family life. 
4.4 Chapter conclusions 
Far more rape defendants than rape victims argued that they had had their human 
rights breached, with defendants over four times more likely to use human rights law 
than victims. There are three explanations as to why this may be the case, which may 
not be specific to rape victims and defendants. Firstly, because one of the main issues 
raised in the literature is about the fairness of the trial, and Article 6 can only be used 
if the applicant is either the criminal defendant or either party in a civil trial. This 
means that rape victims in criminal trials cannot use this Article. This is likely to be 
more limiting in England and Wales where criminal and civil law are more separate 
than in many countries in continental Europe. 
Secondly, rape defendants might have more to benefit by using human rights. For a 
rape victim, much of the harm has already been done by the time she may be able to 
use her rights in relation to the prosecution process. The rape has occurred and she 
has been through a traumatic trial. Because finding a breach of her human rights 
would have no impact on the defendant, but simply provide her with some financial 
compensation and the acknowledgement that the state had breached her human rights, 
this may not be her main concern. In other words, the defendant rather than the state 
may be her main concern at this time. Although finding a breach of human rights may 
go on to create change for other rape victims in similar situations and some rape 
victims go on to be extremely active in anti-rape movements, including those pushing 
for legal reform, applications under the ECHR must be made within six months of the 
alleged breach taking place and this may be too early for rape victims to start thinking 
about using human rights as a forin of activism. Some may never reach this stage, 
wanting to put the whole ordeal behind them and move on with their lives. In 
contrast, rape defendants potentially have a lot to gain. If they have been convicted 
for rape it is likely they are in prison while they are making their human rights 
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argument. Although finding that human rights have been breached does not 
automatically equate to an acquittal, the state is expected to do something if the 
breach means that the conviction is not a safe one, particularly in relation to Article 6 
breaches. The finding that a defendant has not had a fair trial is therefore likely to 
result in either a retrial if a fair one is possible or an acquittal. 
Finally, the third reason is related to the way the criminal justice system works. In 
relation to the HRA, only one rape victim made a human rights argument compared 
to eleven rape defendants. In Chapter Two it was explained that it is the crown that is 
the prosecutor in most criminal trials and the crown that has the legal representation. 
Hence if the rape victim, at this point a witness in the crown's case against the 
defendant, did want to argue that her human rights had been breached then she would 
have no channels at all during the trial to make this argument. Of course, it is unlikely 
that the 'victims' and 'defendants' themselves would have enough knowledge about 
human rights to be able to make such an argument 169 and the legal representatives 
would make the argument. Because the victim has no legal representative at the trial, 
the only way she can allege a human rights abuse is after the trial and then only if 
permission is granted for an application for judicial review (a review of the 
lawfulness of a public body's act or failure to act). The application must be made 
within three months, there is no guarantee that legal aid will be made available and 
there are fees that must be paid on application. Without some form of legal advice a 
victim is unlikely to know that this route is even available. In one case in particular, a 
strong argument could have been made by a rape victim which, if successful, could 
have created legislative change that would have pre-empted defendants' human rights 
claims. For example, rape victims who were married to the rapist could have argued 
that the state failed to prevent them from torture (Article 3), that they did not respect 
their right to private life which includes sexual autonomy (Article 8), that there was 
no effective remedy (Article 13) and that this situation was discriminatory because a 
prosecution could have been brought if they had not been married or if they fell into 
any of the pre-defined categories around separation (Article 14). If this case had been 
brought then rape within marriage may have been criminalized earlier and, crucially, 
169 Although in AW v the Netherlands described earlier in the chapter Mr MM was a convicted rapist 
and also a defence lawyer when he made his human rights argument, this is clearly an exceptional 
case. 
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through statute rather than the evolution of case law, and the case of SJV 1, UK could 
not have been brought. This may also have implications for strategies for 
campaigning, and it may be that governments would have been more receptive to 
enact legislative change if the argument was framed within legal human rights terms 
than in moral rights terms. 'Hinnan rights discourse is a powetful tool with which to 
criticize states' (Coomaraswamy, 1997 np. ). 
Without knowledge about how human rights may be successfully used by rape 
victims (which this thesis starts to provide) and funding and training for legal 
advocates to help victims become empowered to use their rights, human rights are 
likely to continue to be used more frequently by rape defendants than rape victims. 
Another finding to emerge from this chapter about how human rights were used 
relates to the legislation at issue in the arguments. When the thesis proposal was 
written it was assumed that the cases would be about rape law. Instead, most of these 
cases are about rape and about law but not specifically about rape law. While this 
has little relevance specifically in relation to rape and human rights, what it does 
show is that in challenging their rape convictions men will use a wide range of 
legislation and that rape campaigners and researchers may have focused too heavily at 
times on the issues within rape laws when the problem seems to be a wider one. 
This chapter has shown how rape victims and defendants have used human rights. 
However, the use of human rights does not imply success. The next chapter looks at 
the judgements made in relation to these human rights arguments, considering how 
and why they were or were not successftil. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE OUTCOMES OF VICTIM'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
ARGUMENTS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses how successful rape victim's human rights arguments were (as 
described in Chapter Four) in tenus of their intramural success; whether they 'won' 
or 'lost' the case. This relates to Aim Two. It also analyses the use of the margin of 
appreciation (Aim Three), compares the win/lose analysis with the gender ratio of 
male to female judges for the ECHR cases (Aim Five) and looks at the amount of just 
satisfaction awarded in the cases that were successful (Aim Four). 
5.2 How successful were rape victim's human rights arguments? 
Table 5.1 (below) shows whether the overall cases and arguments made under 
individual Articles were successful or unsuccessful, coded by 'win', 'lose' or 'N/C' 
(argument not considered). The column on the right relates to whether or not the 
decisions were unanimous. A blank cell means that no argument was put forward in 
respect of the convention right. The question of whether the judgment was unanimous 
was applied only to the ECHR cases. 
Table 5.1 Win/lose analysis - victims use of human rights 
Case name Overall 3 6 8 13 14 Unanimous? 
Torture Fair trial Fam/private Effective Discrimination 
life remedy 
Xand Yv the Win N/C Win"o NIC NIC Yes 
Netherlands 
Stubbings and Lose Lose Lose Lose No 
others v UK 
Aydin v Win Win NIC Win No 
Turk-ey 
Sehnouni v Win Win Win Yes 
France 
Rv DPP, ex Lose Lose 
parte C 
AfC I, Win Win Win NIC NIC Yes 
Bulga - 
Totals Win 4 3 1 2 1 0 Yes 3 
Lose 2 0 1 2 0 1 No 2 
N/C - 1 1 01 2 2 
170 Miss Y only. Not considered in relation to Mr X's Article 8 claim. 
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Overall, cases brought by victims were twice as likely to be won than lost (four were 
won and two were lost). Four of the five ECHR cases were successful and the only 
case taken using the HRA was lost. In three of the five ECHR cases the judges were 
unanimous in their verdicts. In terms of the individual convention rights, arguments 
made using Article 3 were most likely to be successful (in three out of four cases) and 
arguments made under Article 14 were least likely to be successfill (none of the three 
cases were successful on these grounds). Arguments made using Articles 13 and 14 
were least likely to be considered by the court (two out of three cases for each were 
not considered). 
5.2.1 The outcomes of Article 3 arguments (Freedom from torture) 
Three out of the four Article 3 arguments were successful and the fourth was not 
considered. This means that none of the Article 3 arguments were actually judged to 
be unsuccessful. The case of X and Yv the Netherlands was the first to be taken 
under the ECHR by a rape victim and therefore also the first Article 3 argument to be 
made. This was the case, however, that did not have its Article 3 argument 
considered. Dismissing the argument as not necessary to consider because a breach of 
Article 8 had already been found, there is no way of knowing whether the ECtHR 
would have accepted the first ever argument that rape could be classed as 'inhuman 
and degrading treatment' as the applicants submitted. There is no justification given 
as to why one Article is considered before another; in this case why Article 8 was 
considered before Article 3. If Article 3 had been considered before Article 8 then it 
is possible that the decision may have been reversed, and Article 3 could have been 
found to have been breached and 8 dismissed as not necessary to consider. It is also 
probably the case that an Article 3 breach may have held more weight than the Article 
8 breach. This is because of the international stigma that is attached to the tenn 
'torture' (Article 3), reflected in the fact that Article 3 is non-derogable. In contrast, 
Article 8 has wide restrictions and states can argue their margin of appreciation (as 
discussed in Chapter One). 
It is disappointing that the ECHR did not consider whether rape could be classed as 
falling under the ambit of Article 3 because it was to be twelve years before another 
Article 3 argument was to be made within the sample boundaries used in this 
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research. It is possible that other rape victims may have felt more empowered to take 
their cases to the ECHR if X and Yv the Netherlands had contained a discussion 
about whether and in what circumstances rape could fall under Article 3. 
In 1997 and 1999 two separate Article 3 arguments were made, both were considered 
and both were successful. In both of these cases the alleged perpetrators were 
policemen (state actors) so they do not answer the questions raised in X and Y 1, the 
Netherlands where Miss Y was raped by a non-state actor. Nonetheless, Mrs Aydin's 
claim in Aydin v Turkey that her experiences of rape and other forrns of ill treatment 
by the Turkish police fell under the ambit of Article 3 was still important because it 
was the first to consider rape in terms of Article 3. 
In deciding whether the rape should fall under the ambit of Article 3 and if so, 
whether it should be classed as 'torture', 'inhuman treatment' or 'degrading 
treatment' the ECtHR applied the distinction made in Ireland v the United 
Kingdoin 171 ; that because of the special stigma associated with the term 'torture' it 
should only be applied to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel 
suffering. In judging whether this criteria had been met in Mrs Aydin's case the 
ECtHR acknowledged the psychological, physical and emotional consequences of 
rape: 
Rape of a detainee by all official of the State inust be collsidered to be all especially 
grave and abhorrentforin of ill-treatinent given the ease ivith which the offender call 
exploit the vithierability and weakened resistance of his victim. Furthernlore, rape 
leaves deep psychological scars oil the victini which do not respond to the passage of 
tilne as quickly as otherfornis ofphysical and inental violence. The applicant also 
experienced the acute physical pain offorced penetration, which inust have left her 
feeling debased and violated both physically and eniotionall (Aydin v Turkey, para. Y- 
83) 
It was judged that the rape and other physical abuse did amount to torture and hence 
that Article 3 had been violated (at fourteen votes to seven). This was therefore an 
important judgment because it was the first time that rape was labelled as torture 
under the ECHR. 
171 Ireland v the United Kingdom [ 1979-1980] 2 IEHRR 25 
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At fourteen votes to seven however, this was clearly not a judgment accepted by all, 
with a third of the judges holding partly dissenting opinions. The differences of 
opinion were not related to whether the acts amounted to torture however, but 
whether the acts had actually taken place: 
There can be no doubt that the inatters alleged ivoidd, if proved, constitute all 
extrenzely serious violation ofArticle 3 of the Convention ... without being able to say 
what the "truth " of the niatter was in this case, I ain far fi-oin convinced that the 
applicant's allegations have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. I therefore 
conclude that no violation of Article 3 of the Convention call be found, for ivant of 
sufficient proof of the facts relied upon. (Partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion 
of Judge Matscher in Aydin v Turkey) 
In coninion with my colleagues in the ininority, I consider that the investigation did 
not provide the necessmy certainty that the events alleged really took place, as 
custonzarily required by the Court's case-law. If the facts had been established 1vith 
certainty, it is obvious that there would have been an extremely seriolls violation. 
(Partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti in Aydin v Till-key) 
This has some overlaps with Article 6 in terms of whether an effective investigation 
was conducted, but as it was given as a reason by a third of the judges as to why they 
could not vote that Article 3 had been breached it is important to briefly consider the 
reasons here. 
The judges voting that Article 3 had been breached placed the onus on Turkey to 
prove that the acts did not take place, while the judges voting that Article 3 had not 
been breached placed the onus on Mrs Aydin to prove that they did take place. For 
example, the majority criticised the public prosecutor for failing to collect suitable 
medical evidence from Mrs Aydin. While she had been medically examined by three 
different doctors, the first two were not experienced with rape cases and stated that 
they could not provide any conclusions as to why bruising existed on the insides of 
Mrs Aydin's thighs. One even suggested it might have been because she rode a 
donkey! The third doctor was experienced in rape examinations but the examination 
took place so long afler the event it was not possible to reach any firm conclusions. In 
addition, the majority judges criticised the fact that all the examinations focused on 
whether she was a virgin rather than whether or not she had been raped. The 
dissenting judges, however, preferred to criticise Mrs Aydin rather than the Turkish 
public prosecutor for the lack of suitable medical evidence: 
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It is a pity that she did not, immediately after the alleged ill-treatment, likelvise 
considt a more diligent, better-qualiflied or better-equipped doctor than Dr Ak-k-its and 
Dr (7etin. (Joint dissenting opinion of Judges WcRIU, Matscher, Pettiti, De Meyer, 
Lopes Rocha, Makarczyk and Gotchev in Aydin v Turkey). 
The other criticisms made of the investigation will be considered under the discussion 
of the outcomes of Article 6 arguments. The point here is that the majority of judges 
were willing to accept that in the absence of evidence to the contrary the torture did 
take place while the minority were not convinced without evidence that showed 
beyond reasonable doubt that Mrs Aydin had been tortured. 
Mr Selmouni, in Selinouni v France, also won his argument under Article 3, however 
his argument was accepted in terms of the physical ill treatment he had suffered rather 
than the alleged rape. While there was medical evidence to show that he had 
experienced physical ill-treatment which was sustained during the period of time he 
was in police custody, including wounding with a weapon and assault causing 
pennarient disability the only evidence of rape came from his criminal complaint: 
... one of theln said 'You Arabs eiyoy 
being screwed' They took hold of tile, nlade tile 
undress and one of theni inserted a sniall black truncheoll into illy alills. NB. Ozell 
Mr Seh? iouni relates that scene, he starts ctying. (Criminal complaint made by Mr 
Selmouni, cited in Seh7iouni v France, Para. 24. Comment about crying made at the 
time by police officer) 
After making the criminal complaint Mr Selmouni was medically examined in 
relation to the alleged rape 172 , but the examiner stated that there were no lesions that 
could corroborate or invalidate his statement because of the length of time that had 
elapsed. The doctor noted that Mr Selmouni had not mentioned the rape in his earlier 
medical examinations while in police custody because he said he felt ashamed of it. 
The French government argued that the acts did not meet the level needed to class 
them as 'torture' following ECHR case law, however the ECtHR pointed out, in 
172 Although the act described above would not be classed as rape in England and Wales the definition 
of rape used in this sample is how rape was defined in the country the allegation was being made 
against (see Chapter Three). 
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labelling his experiences as torture, that the ECHR is a 'living document' (see 
Chapter One): 
... the Court considers that certain acts which ivere classified in the past as 
"inhuniall 
and degrading treatment" as opposed to "torture" could be classified differently in 
fittitre. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area 
of the protection of human rights and fiindamental liberties correspondingly and 
inevitably requires greaterfirmness in assessing breaches of thefinidamental vahies 
ofdemocratic societies. (Sehnotini v France, para. 10 1) 
In evidential tenns, the judges accepted unanimously that the onus was on the French 
police to show that they had not perpetrated the acts rather than on Mr Selmouni to 
prove that they had: 
... where an individual is taken into police custody in good 
health but is found to be 
hyttred at the tinie of i-elease, it is inciunbent on the State to pi-ovide a plausible 
explanation of how those iiYuries ivei-e caused. (Selinouni v France, para. 87) 
There was no medical evidence though that the rape had taken place, as in the Aydin 
case. The ECtHR managed to side step this issue because they judged that the other 
acts in themselves had constituted torture; the rape was superfluous. It is interesting to 
note, however, that they appear to have accepted that other acts had taken place 
without any medical evidence (e. g. the blowlamp and syringe threats and the 
allegation that a police officer had shown Mr Selmouni his penis and said 'here, suck 
this' before urinating on him) and also that the consistency of evidence relating to his 
other allegations was not described as being corroborative evidence for the rape. 
In MC v Bulgaria the Article 3 argument was also successful, but differed from the 
Aydin and Sehnouni cases because the alleged rapists were not state actors. The 
argument in MC v Bulgaria relied upon the horizontal effect of the ECHR, making it 
closest to the argument that the Court had failed to consider in X and Yv the 
Netherlands. With MC v Bulgaria being the latest of the cases in this sample and X 
and Yv the Netherlands being the earliest, it was nearly two decades before the issue 
of the horizontal effect of Article 3 was examined in this context (there were 18 years 
between the two cases). Miss MC's argument, was not that there was no legal 
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protection against rape and sexual abuse as Miss Y's argument had been, but rather 
that the legal protection was not effective. 
The European Court accepted Miss MC's argument that she had 'frozen' in fright 
when she was raped on two subsequent days by two different boys known to her. Two 
Bulgarian experts had provided written expert evidence to the public prosecutor that 
had substantiated that this was a common reaction to being faced with rape, 
particularly by children and young people. In judging whether Bulgarian law was 
ineffective, the Court compared the Bulgarian rape law, particularly that relating to 
consent, with rape laws in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Gen-nany, 
Slovenia, the United Kingdom and various American States. They took into 
consideration recommendations from the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe on the protection of women against violence and the United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and looked at how 
consent had been understood in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. 
In reviewing these criminal codes and recommendations, the Court accepted that 
there had been a move away from narrow interpretations of consent and that in most 
European countries it is no longer necessary that a victim must physically resist. A 
breach of Article 3 was found in this respect. There were no discussions over whether 
the rapes should be classed as torture, degrading or inhuman treatment as in the Aydin 
and Sehnouni cases, and it appears to have been taken for granted that two rapes of a 
fourteen year old girl should automatically be classed as torture under the ambit of 
Article 3. 
5.2.2 The outcomes of Article 6 arguments (Right to a fair trial) 
Of the three Article 6 arguments, one was not considered, one was successful and one 
was unsuccessful. Aydin v Turkey was the case that was not considered, where the 
ECtHR judged (at 20 votes to 1) that it was more appropriate to examine Mrs Aydin's 
claim that the criminal investigation had been inadequate under her Article 13 claim 
(Right to an effective remedy). In Selmolini v Fi-ance the argument that his right to a 
fair trial had been violated because the proceedings in respect of his torture complaint 
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had not been conducted within a reasonable length of time was successful. The 
judges' verdict was a unanimous, and the French government in their submission 
accepted that they had not conducted the proceedings in a reasonable length of time. 
In Stubbings and others v the United Kingdoin the Article 6 argument was not 
successful. The ECtHR did not accept that because the applicants could not pursue 
their complaints of rape using civil law after the limitation period set out in the 
Limitations Act 1980 that this denied them access to a court as guaranteed by Article 
6, highlighting that it falls within the state's margin of appreciation to decide holv 
their citizens have the right of access to a court. This decision was not unanimous 
though, at seven votes to two. The majority agreed with the submission made by the 
United Kingdom government, who argued that the applicants did have access to a 
court to commence proceedings for six years following their eighteenth birthdays and 
that the limitation period of six years served in all cases to prevent stale claims from 
getting to court (where witnesses memories may have lapsed), provide finality and 
legal certainty and therefore that the limitation period served a legitimate aim. 
Furthermore, they agreed with the government that the applicants still had access to a 
criminal court with no time limitations if there was enough evidence to proceed with 
the case. 
... taking into account in particular the legithnate ainis served 
by the rides of 
lindtation in question and the inargin of appreciation afforded to States in regulating 
the right of access to a court ... the Courtfinds that there has been no violation of Article 6para. I of the Convention taken alone. (para. 57) 
Hence, the Court argued that the 'essence' of the right was not breached, that the 
limitations pursued a legitimate aim that were proportional to the means employed 
and the aim achieved. 
Even in the majority verdict, the view was expressed that the policy chosen by the 
United Kingdom government may not be the most appropriate for victims of 
childhood sexual abuse: 
There has been a developing awareness in recent years of the range of problems 
caused by child abuse and its psychological effects on victims, and it is possible that 
the rides on limitation of actions applying in member States of the Council ofEurope 
156 
inay have to be anzended to inake special provision for this group of clainiants ill the 
nearfitture. (Stubbings and others v the United Kingdonz, Para 56) 
Those voting that Article 6 had not been breached were of the opinion that it was not 
the role of the ECtHR to substitute its view as to what would be the most appropriate 
policy in place of that of the UK. However, the two dissenting judges disagreed with 
this interpretation of their role, voting that Article 6 had been breached because the 
right to access to a court was not an effective one and therefore that the margin of 
appreciation had been interpreted too widely in the majority judgment. 
Judge Foighel accepted that in itself the imposition of a fixed limitation period did not 
constitute a violation, nor was the six years allowed from the date of their eighteenth 
birthdays an unreasonable period. However, he argued that the margin of appreciation 
could not be used to justify depriving an individual of the right in question altogether. 
He argued that this was the case in the current situation where the applicants bad no 
realistic opportunity to access a court at an earlier stage, meaning that the very 
essence of the right had been violated which could not be justified by the margin of 
appreciation. 
Judge MacDonald agreed, arguing that the specific nature of the injury meant that the 
six year limitation period was disproportionate to the aims achieved, in that many 
victims of childhood sexual abuse are unaware for periods of time of the causal link 
between the abuse and the damage suffered. He argued this meant that the denial of 
right to access to a court was unreasonable and went beyond the State's margin of 
appreciation. 
5.2.3 The outcomes of Article 8 arguments (Right to respect for private and 
family life) 
All of the arguments made under Article 8 were considered. Two were successful and 
two were unsuccessful. Violations of Article 8 were found in X and Yv the 
Netherlands and MC v Bulgaria. In X and Yv the Netherlands the Netherlands 
government accepted that these were important loopholes in the parts of their criminal 
code relating to sexual offences and started preparing a bill which would make it an 
offence to made sexual advances towards a mentally handicapped person. However, 
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the government argued that just because there were no criminal sanctions in place that 
Miss Y could use, this did not prevent her from using civil law to seek damages from 
or an injunction against Mr B. The Court did not agree that the potential use of civil 
law was adequate in this situation. They accepted that the ineans by which the 
Netherlands chose to secure compliance with Article 8 fell within their margin of 
appreciation and that recourse to criminal law is not necessarily the only way of 
protecting Article 8 rights but accepted the applicants argument that the civil law did 
not provide a sufficient degree of protection from rape which could only be found in 
criminal law. The Court judged unanimously that Miss Y's right to private life, which 
includes the physical and moral integrity of the person and their sexual life, had been 
breached because of the impossibility of having criminal proceedings instituted 
against her alleged rapist. They noted that although Article 8 is aimed at protecting 
the individual from interference from public authorities there are also positive 
obligations that may involve the adoption of measures to enable respect for private 
life between individuals. Having found a breach of Miss Y's Article 8 rights the 
ECtHR decided that it was not necessary to investigate her father's (Mr X) claim that 
his Article 8 rights had also been breached. 
In MC v Bulgaria the Court followed the legal reasoning they used when finding a 
breach of Article 3, judging that the rapes amounted not only to torture but also as an 
infringement to personal integrity under Article 8. By considering Articles 3 and 8 
simultaneously, this meant that both Articles were considered, in contrast to X and Yv 
the Netherlands where only one was considered. One of the judges thought this was 
so important that she chose to emphasise it in a concurring opinion: 
I considei- that it was iniportant and significant that the Cow-t should exandne the 
case under both Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention. Rape infringes not only the 
right to pei-sonal integrity (both physical and psychological) as guai-anteed by Article 
3 but also the i-ight to autonoiny as a coniponent of the Hght to i-espectforprNate life 
as guaranteed by Article 8. (Concurring opinion of Judge Tulkens, MC v Bulgaria) 
The margin of appreciation was taken into consideration and the ECtHR pointed out 
that the ineans by which the state secure compliance lies within their margin of 
appreciation, but that nonetheless their must be effective deterrence through criminal- 
law provisions which are effective to protect against 'grave acts' such as rape, 
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particularly where children and vulnerable adults are concerned and therefore that the 
actions of Bulgaria did not fall within their margin of appreciation. 
The Article 8 arguments made in Rv DPP, exparte C and in Stubbings and others 1, 
the United Kingdoin were unsuccessful. In Rv DPP, ex parte C the two judges at the 
Queens Bench Division ruled that although it was 'regrettable' that Miss SC had not 
been informed by the CPS about the decision to discontinue the prosecution 
(described as being common courtesy at the time in the Code of Practice for Crown 
Prosecutors and in the Victims Charter), that there was no entitlement for Miss SC to 
be informed or consulted before this decision was made and there had been no breach 
of her human rights. The judgment that Mrs Stubbings and the other applicant's 
Article 8 rights had not been breached was unanimous, finding that the United 
Kingdom had protected the applicants' respect for private life under their criminal 
laws. Again, when making their (unanimous under this article) judgment that Article 
8 had not been breached, the ECtHR emphasised the choice of means a state has to 
protect the right to private life. 
... in view of the protection afforded 
by the donzestic laiv against the sexual abuse of 
children and the margin of appreciation allowed to States in these inatters, the Court 
concludes that there has been no violation ofArticle 8 of the Convention. (para. 67) 
5.2.4 The outcomes of Article 13 arguments (Right to an effective remedy) 
Three cases made Article 13 arguments, but only one was considered. X and Yv the 
Nethei-lands was not considered because the lack of a legal remedy was at the heart of 
Miss Y's successful Article 8 argument. It was also judged in MC v Bulgaria that no 
separate issue arose under Article 13, presumably because of the same reason as in X 
and Y. 
Having not considered Mrs Aydin's Article 6 argument because of its overlaps with 
Article 13, in 4ydin v Turk-ey the Article 13 argument was considered. Although 
successful, as with the Article 3 judgment, there was disagreement between the 
judges. Sixteen judges were of the opinion that Article 13 had been breached and five 
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were of the opinion that there had been no breach. This is still quite a high level of 
disagreement, but is not as high as in the Article 3 judgment (which was made at 
fourteen votes to seven). Their views on the inappropriateness and incompetency of 
the medical examinations were discussed earlier in the chapter. In addition, the 
majority judges criticised the inquiry for not attempting to collect any corroborative 
evidence and for taking no meaningful measures to establish the veracity of the 
allegation. 
The dissenting judges had two main arguments. Firstly, that domestic remedies had 
not been exhausted and hence that it was too soon to talk of an abuse of process and 
secondly, that Mrs Aydin had contributed towards the lack of effectiveness of the 
investigation: 
Adinittedly, the reinedy has not been effective so far, but the responsibility for this 
lack of effectiveness is to soine extent a shared one ... (Partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti) 
In addition to Mrs Aydin's failure to collect her own medical evidence, the dissenting 
judges criticised Mrs Aydin for not making a criminal complaint until eight days after 
the alleged acts took place and for fleeing the area soon after the event. They also 
criticised the Human Rights Association she went to for assistance for not trying to 
find any witnesses that were present at the time of her arrest and for failing to 
instigate civil or administrative action. As with Article 3, the dissenting judges hence 
placed more onus on Mrs Aydin's actions than on the actions of the Turkish 
government: 
... the applicant 
did no inore than coniplain of the alleged facts, n1ol-eover ill all 
inconiplete inanner, and did nothing else to assist the pi-osecutor's investigation. Not 
only was she of no assistancefor that pitipose but she also did eveiything she could 
to hanipei- the proceedings by disappearing for nearly a yeai- without leaving ally 
address. (Individual dissenting opinion of Judge G61cilklil in Aydin v Turk-ey) 
Hence, the dissenting judges expected Mrs Aydin to play a role in making the remedy 
an effective one. 
160 
5.2.5 The outcomes of Article 14 arguments (Freedom from discrimination) 
Three cases made Article 14 arguments, but only one was considered. The Article 14 
with 8 argument in X and Yv the Netherlands was not considered on the basis that a 
breach of Article 8 had already been found and the Article 14 with 3 argument was 
not considered because it had already been judged that it was not necessary to 
consider Article 3. This means that Miss X's argument that the position she was in 
was discriminatory was never investigated. The same was true in MC v Bulgafia, 
where breaches of Articles 3 and 8 had already been found. 
Having already failed in their Article 6 and 8 arguments, in Stubbings and others v 
the United Kingdom the Article 14 argument was considered but also was 
unsuccessful. In considering their Article 14 argument in relation to Articles 6 and 8, 
the ECtHR pointed out that in order to prove discrimination it must be shown that 
others in an 'analogous or sinzilar situation' (Para. 72) would receive preferential 
treatment and that the states margin of appreciation can be used in assessing which 
differences justify different treatment in law. They judged (at eight votes to one) that 
there had been no violation of Article 14 (with 6 or with 8) because the victims of 
intentional and unintentional injuries could not be seen as analogous and that even if 
they could, that this issue would fall within the state's margin of appreciation. 
5.3 The impact of the judges' gender in rape victims' cases 
Table 5.2 below shows the cases brought by victims and compares information 
already known from earlier in this chapter (whether the case was won or lost and 
whether the judgment was unanimous) with the number of male and female judges 173 
as well as the gender of the Registrar and Deputy registrar (where applicable). 
173 The number ofjudges hearing cases has varied over time depending on how the court was 
structured. Once a complaint is deemed admissible (previously this was decided by the commission, 
currently it is decided by a committee of three judges) the case is heard by either a Chamber (currently 
seven judges) or a Grand Chamber (currently 17 judges). Generally speaking, whether a case is 
decided by a Chamber or a Grand Chamber is dependent on the gravity of the complaint. A further re- 
structure is imminent which will change this structure again - Protocol 14, which was adopted in May 
2005 and will come into force when it has been ratified by all signatory states. 
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Table 5.2 G nder of judges i rape victims cases 
Case name Overall Unanimous? Alale 
udges 
Female 
judges 
Reg Dep Reg 
X and Yv the 
Netherlands 
Win Yes 7 0 Mate Male 
Stubbings and others v 
UK 
Lose No 9 0 Male Male 
Aydin v Turkey Win No 20 1 Male Male 
Selinouni v France Win Yes 14 3 Female 
AIC v Bulgaria Win Yes 4 3 Male 
Totals 54 7 Alalc=3 'INIale=4 
Fcmalc=1 
In two of the five cases there were no female judges at all in the chamber (X and Yv 
the Netherlands and Stubbings and others v the United Kingdom). Where there were 
female judges, the ratio of male to female judges ranged from 20: 1 (Aydin v Turkey) 
to 1.3: 1 (MC v Bulgaria). No pattern emerges as to whether the judgment was 
unanimous based on the gender ratio. In the cases where there was a Registrar the role 
was always performed by a male and in four out of the five cases the Deputy 
Registrar was male. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the 
Registrar and Deputy Registrar's gender is that they are predominantly male. It would 
not be expected that the gender of the deputy/registrar would have any impact on the 
judgment because they hold no vote. 
It is difficult to see if the gender ratio has any impact on whether the case was won or 
lost from Table 5.2, so cumulative figures are shown below in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Gender rati in rape victinis cases 
INIale Judges Female Judges Ratio 
Wins (n=4) 45 7 6.4: 1 
Losses (n=1) 9 0 9: 0 
Overall (n--5) 54 7 7.7: 1 
The overall gender ratio of male to female judges was 7.7: 1. In the cases that were 
won this ratio drops to 6.4: 1 and in the one case that was lost this ratio rises to 9: 0. 
While this means that the rape victim was more likely to win their case when the 
proportion of female judges was higher, no conclusions can be drawn from this 
because of the low sample size; in particular that only one case was lost. 
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5.4 Just satisfaction awarded in response to breaches 
Looking at those cases that were successful under the ECHR (i. e. the only cases that 
can be awarded just satisfaction), Table 5.4 shows the non-pecuniary damage 
awarded (if any) and the costs and expenses awarded. The Articles that were found to 
have been violated are also listed. 
Table 5.4 Just satisfaction awarded in response o violations of rap victims rights 
Judgment Year Violations Non-pecuniary Costs & expenses 
damage 
X and Yv the Netherlan(Is 1985 8 (Fam/private life) 3,000 Dutch Not stated 
Guilders 
Aydin v Turkey 1997 3 and 13 (Torture and E25,000 E37,360 minus FRF 19,145 
effective remedy) legal aid (French francs) 
Sehnouni v France 1999 3 and 6 (Torture and FRF 500,000 FRF 113,364 (French 
fair trial) (French francs) francs) 
MC v Bulgaria 2003 3 and 8 (Torture and EUR 8,000 EUR 4,110 
fam/private) I I 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Three, there are a number of methodological 
problems related to this aim, in particular the lack of comparability between the 
currencies. Bearing this in mind and given the lack of common currency in any of the 
cases brought by victims it is not possible to draw any conclusions solely from this 
data. An analysis of the preceding text to the award of just satisfaction being made, 
however, suggests two tentative (though fairly obvious) findings. Firstly, that when 
the rape was committed by a private individual rather than a state actor it seemed to 
be the case that the victim was not being compensated for the rape itself but for the 
states failings: 
The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress and psychological 
trauma resulting at least partly fi-om the shortcomings in the authorities' approach 
found in the present case... (MC v Bulgaria, para. 194) 
The Government ... 
did not challenge the allegations as such, but they argued that the 
suffering was the result of the act committed by Mr. B and not of the violation of the 
Convention. (Xand Yv the Netherlands, Para. 38) 
A vague estimation of the value of the money awarded in the rape victim's cases 
supports this, with higher awards given when the rape was perpetrated by a state 
actor. This finding is as would be expected because these are the cases where the 
traditional, vertical, 'public' effect of human rights is evident. 
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Secondly, and again not surprisingly, there was some evidence that both applicants 
and the ECtHR found it difficult to calculate how much money should be awarded to 
rape victims in light of the ongoing han-n the applicants might experience: 
The applicants left it to the Court's discretion to determine a standard foi- 
compensation. The damage in question does not lend itsel(even to an approximate 
pi-ocess of calculation. (X and Yv the Netherlands, para. 40) 
... 
having regai-d to the sefiousness of the violation of the Convention suffered by the 
applicant while in custody and the enduring psychological harm which she may be 
considered to have suffered on account ofbeing raped ... 
(Aydin v Tw-k-ey, para. 13 1) 
Although somewhat of a 'non-finding', this is supportive of other research that has 
concluded that it is very rare to find a decision relating to just satisfaction that 
articulates the reasons behind the assessment: 
One former judge of the European Court of Human Rights states: Ve have no 
principles'. Anotherjudge responds, Ve have principles, ivejust do not apply them'. 
(Shelton, 1999 pg. 1) 
It is interesting to note, although again direct comparisons cannot be made, that the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority calculate damages for rape as ranging 
from f 11,000 for non consensual vaginal or anal intercourse involving one attacker 
with no serious injuries up to E33,000 if the rape results in serious internal bodily 
injury with pen-nanent disabling mental illness confirmed by psychiatric prognosis 
(Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, 2001). 
5.5 Chapter conclusions 
Most of the cases brought by rape victims were successful in intramural terms. Under 
Article 3 the Court accepted that the psychological, physical and emotional nature of 
rape means that it is a particularly grave and abhorrent form of ill treatment that 
meets the level required to define it as torture. This was the case regardless of 
whether the rapist(s) was a state actor or a private individual whose actions the state 
had failed to prosecute due to defects in substantive criminal law. While there were 
disagreements about whether it was the role of the states to provide evidence that the 
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torture did not occur or the role of the victim to show that it did occur, the majority of 
judges accepted that the onus was on the state to provide an explanation for any 
injuries sustained while in police custody, although the issue was sidestepped slightly 
in relation to the rape allegation in Sehnouni i, France (by not considering the rape 
allegation in its own right because the other acts alone amounted to torture). 
Article 6 was used in three cases and considered in two. Only Mr Selmouni's 
argument that the trial did not take place within a reasonable length of time was 
successful, although in Stubbings and others v UK the Court did point out that the 
way the United Kingdom interpreted the right to a fair trial may not be the most 
suitable in relation to women who were raped and sexually abused when they were 
children. Two Article 8 arguments were successful and both related to the positive 
duty on the state to protect individuals rather than arguing that the state had directly 
done something that did not respect their right to a private and family life. 
Chapter One described what McCafferty (2003) calls the 'no need' approach to 
Article 14, whereby arguments relating to discrimination were not always considered 
if a breach had already been found in relation to the Article that was being used 
alongside Article 14 (as Article 14 is not a 'standalone' Article). Although based on 
small numbers, the data from this research is supportive of McCafferty's argument 
with two out of the three cases making Article 14 arguments not being considered. 
However, this finding was not limited to Article 14. The same was true of Article 13 
(two of the three cases did not consider the Article 13 argument). The no need 
approach was also used once in relation to Article 3 and once in relation to Article 6. 
Although the Court is notoriously overworked with a backlog of cases that they will 
174 probably never get through without further reforrn to its systems , the possible 
consequences of not considering arguments should not be ignored. One possible 
consequence is solely a financial one, in that a higher level of just satisfaction may be 
given if a higher number of Articles have been breached. A second, more far reaching 
consequence relates to the discussion in Chapter One about the potential for women 
to create their own jurisprudence. If, for example, rape by a non-state actor had been 
judged to fall under the ambit of Article 3 the first time it was made in 1985 (in X and 
174 The last reforrn took place in 1998 when they abolished their two-tier system of a Commission and 
a Court. 
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Yv the Nethei-lands where the argument was not considered) then further cases may 
have been brought by applicants against other countries regarding loopholes in their 
rape laws. 
The margin of appreciation was mentioned in three of the six judgments (where it was 
mentioned a total of 17 times). In Stubbings and others v United Kingdoin the margin 
of appreciation was crucial to the judgment. No further conclusions can be made in 
terms of the outcomes of rape victims' use of human rights until they can be 
compared with the outcomes of rape defendants' use. Further discussion of rape 
victims' cases will take place after the data analysis relating to defendants has been 
considered (at the end of the next Chapter). 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE OUTCOMES OF DEFENDANT'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
ARGUMENTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Table 6.1 (below) shows the same information considered in the previous chapter on 
rape victims for rape defendants in terms of the case in intramural terms. 
Table 6.1 Win/lose anal sis - defendants use of liuman rights 
Case name Overall 5 
Liberty/security 
6 
Fair trial 
7 
No 
punishment 
8 
Fam/private 
life 
Unanimous? 
Englert v Germany Lose Lose No 
Tv Italy Win Win Yes 
Stanford v UK Lose Lose Yes 
SJVv UK Lose Lose Yes 
Gv France Lose Lose Yes 
Baegen v the 
Netherlands 
NIC NIC Yes 
Trzask-a v Poland Win Win Win Yes 
Mattoccia v Italy Win Win Yes 
A-G Ref (No 3 of 
1999) 
RvT, R vH Win Win - 
Rv Rooney Lose Lose - 
Rv Porter Lose Lose - 
Rv Morgan Lose Lose - 
RvC and others Lose Lose - 
RvA Win Win 
GB v France Win Win Yes 
RvM, Rv Kerr, R 
vH 
Lose Lose 
R vArchibald; A-G 
Ref (No. 69 of 
2001) 
Lose Lose 
Kitcera vA ustria Lose Lose Yes 
RvR and another Lose Lose 
Rv Laskey Lose Lose 
MM v Netherlands Win Win No 
Mellors v the UK Win Win Yes 
MaIiviejczttk v 
Poland 
Win Win Win Win Yes 
Korellis v I'lls Lose Lose Yes 
Totals Win 9 
(38%) 
2 
(100%) 
8 
(40%) 
0 
(0%) 
2 
(100%) 
Yes 12 
(86%) 
Lose 
- 
14 
(58%) 
- 
0 
(0%) 
11 
(55%) 
3 
(100%) 
0 
(0%) 
No 2 
(14%) 
I1 
-K/ C 
1 
1 
(4%) , 
0 
(0%) 1 
1 
(5%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 1 1 
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Table 6.1 shows that overall, rape defendants were more likely to lose their case than 
to win (58% compared with 38% respectively). This was the opposite in rape victim's 
cases, where they were more likely to win than lose their case overall. The decisions 
made in cases taken by rape defendants were more likely to be unanimous than in 
decisions regarding rape victims (86% compared with 60% respectively). Only one 
argument was not considered, and the reason for non-consideration was related to the 
defendant rather than to the Court. 
All three Article 7 arguments were unsuccessful. Both Article 5 arguments and both 
Article 8 arguments were successful. The Article 8 argument in Attorney General's 
Reference (No 3 of 1999) is not coded as being successful or unsuccessftil for the 
defendant because he had already been acquitted for rape and the case was heard to 
clarify a point in law. 
6.2 The outcomes of Article 5 arguments (Right to liberty and security) 
Both of the Article 5 arguments were taken under the ECHR, both were unanimous 
judgments and both were successful. In Trzask-a v Poland the Court judged that two 
parts of Article 5 had been breached because the length of time he was detained on 
remand was contrary to his right to be brought to trial within a reasonable time 
(Article 5§ 3) and that the proceedings regarding the lawfulness of his detention 
while on remand were unfair (Article 5§ 4). In Mahviejczuk v Poland the Court also 
agreed that the length of pre-trial detention had been excessive and found that Article 
5 had been breached. 
6.2.1 The outcomes of Article 6 arguments (Right to a fair trial) 
The outcomes of Article 6 arguments is again split into sub-categories as they were 
when describing how the Article had been used. Again, this is because of the high 
number of cases. 
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Length of time between charge and trial 
The four cases where it was argued that the length of time before the case reached 
court was too long were all successful (Trzaska v Poland, Mattoccia v Italy, 
Mahviejczuk v Poland, Mellors v the United Kingdom). In each case the ECtHR 
judged that the delay had been excessive and unreasonable and each of the judgments 
were unanimous. This means that the breach of two separate Articles (i. e. 5 and 6) 
were found in Rzaska v Poland and Mativiejczttk v Poland based on related issues; if 
the length of time before the case reached court had not been unreasonable then their 
pre-trial detention would not have been unreasonable. 
In Rv Porter the argument that the length of time before trial had not been long 
enough was not successful. Although the Court of Appeal described the trial judges 
decision not to allow an adjournment as 'unwise' and also accepted the defendant's 
argument that a warning should have been given to the jury, they did not accept that 
this made the trial unfair because of the weight of evidence against Mr Porter. Judge 
Rafferty explained: 
... the Crowns case against Porter was oil any Weiv compelling. There was not only 
the evidence of the complainant but also that of her ininzediate distress and hysteria, 
her hyttries, the tape, the traces of her body hair upon it, and the presence ill theflat 
of the metal pipe ... Ill ow-judgment, the evidence as it eniergedfounded so strong a 
case that ive are satisfied that the conviction is safe. (R v Pot-ter, para 25) 
Issues about the trial unrelated to evidence 
Four of the five cases that were about the rape trial but were not directly about 
evidence were not successful. In Korellis v Cyprits, the ECtHR judged unanimously 
that even though a judge acted as part of an appeal panel that reviewed his own 
decision, this did not render the trial unfair because the outcome of the appeal panel 
(whether a re-examination of the victim's knickers could be carried out) did not play 
a decisive role in the evidence against Mr Korellis: 
... the Court gives special weight to thefact that the conviction of the applicant was 
inainly based on the oral testimony of the complainant, uho was described by the 
Assize Court as "completely ci-edible ". The presence of Vaseline on the complainant's 
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k7dckei-s was only one of thi-ee subsidimy elements of evidence coi-i-oboi-ating the 
complainant's testimony. (Koi-ellis v Cypi-its, para. 35) 
The ECtHR hence viewed the trial as a whole in judging whether it had been a fair 
one rather than judging that even if one part had been unfair then this necessarily 
resulted in the whole trial being unfair. 
In Kucei-a v Austria the ECtHR used case law to show that a defendant's attendance 
at an appeal should only occur if their presence is necessary in the interests of justice, 
judging that this was not the case in Mr Kucera's case. In RvM, - Rv Kel-l-, RvH, the 
argument that the trial would not be fair because of the mental disabilities of the 
defendants was judged to raise no human rights issues. Because the trial in their case 
could only result in an acquittal and hence no penalty could be imposed this was 
incongruent with the objective of human rights; to protect citizens from the abuse of 
their rights by the state. The problems Mr Stanford had hearing the victims evidence 
in Stanford v the United Kingdom were found not to have been the fault of the state 
who were able to show that acoustic design targets had been met in the building of the 
new court and that they should not be held responsible for the decision the accused 
legal team made in not alerting the court to the problem at the time. The one 
successful case in this subsection was in Tv Italy, where it was judged that Italy did 
not make sufficient effort to locate Mr T (particularly since Mr T had recently 
renewed his passport) before declaring him untraceable and trying him in absentia. 
Evidential issues 
Three of the five arguments made in relation to sexual history evidence were 
successful. Of the two unsuccessful cases, it was judged in R 1, Rooney that although 
section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 came into force after 
his first trial but before his retrial the sexual history evidence he wished to cross- 
examine the victim on was not central to the re-trial and hence that the trial was a fair 
one. Rv Morgan was also unsuccessful, with the court judging that the judge had 
been correct to warn the jury that he should have stated when questioned by the 
police that he had had a previous sexual relationship with the victim if he wished to 
rely on it in court and that the jury could draw inferences from this if they did not 
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accept that lie was still drunk when questioned by the police (the police interview had 
taken place 18 hours after Mr Morgan was taken into custody). 
RvA was one of the three successful cases relating to sexual history evidence and 
influenced the decision of the other two successful sexual history evidence cases. 
Following the certified question that the House of Lords were asked (quoted earlier 
on pg. 133), a decision was needed as to whether section 41 could be read down 
(using Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998) to be compatible with Article 6 of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 or whether a declaration of incompatibility would be 
required (using Section 4). 
Acknowledging the previous problems that had existed pre-section 41, and accepting 
that most of section 41 was compatible with the right to a fair trial (e. g. to prevent 
sexual history evidence being used in relation to men other than the defendant), they 
argued that sexual history evidence relating to the victim's relationship with the 
defendant may sometimes be necessary to ensure a fair trial: 
As a matter of common sense, a prior sexual relationship between the complainant 
and the accused may, depending oil the circumstances, be relevant to the issue of 
consent. It is a species of prospectant evidence which may throw light oil the 
complainant's state of inind. It cannot, of course, prove that she consented oil the 
occasion ill question ... 
But it is logically relevant to that issue. After all, to be 
relevant the evidence need merely have some tendency ill logic and common sense to 
advance the proposition ill issite. It is trite that each decision to ellgage ill sexual 
activity is always made afresh. Oil the other hand, the mind does not usually blot out 
all memories. What one has been engaged oil ill the past may inflitence what choice 
one makes oil a fittitre occasion. Accordingly, a prior relationship between a 
com lainant and all accused may sometimes be relevant to what decision was made p 
oil a particular occasion. (R v A, para. 3 1) 
It was therefore ruled that sexual history evidence may be relevant in some cases 
other than those specified in section 41 and that to disallow that evidence may result 
in the defendant not having a fair trial in breach of Article 6, despite recognising the 
fights of the complainant in general terms: 
It is plain that a balance nuist be sti-tick- between the i-ight of the defendant to a jah- 
ti-ial and the 1-ight of the coniplainant not to be subjected to unnecessaly hundliation 
and disti-ess when giving evidence. (R v A, para. 5 1) 
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However, the Law Lords argued that this did not mean that a declaration of 
incompatibility was needed. Rather, they stated that judges should 'read down' 
section 41 in cases where it was necessary to admit such evidence in order to ensure a 
fair trial for the defendant. This, they argued, could be done using section 41(3)(c) 
which states that sexual history evidence may be used if the court is satisfied it is 
relevant, within the following parameters: 
It is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the coniplainant to which the 
evidence or question relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so sindlar 
that the shnilarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
The words 'in any respect' and 'similar' were particularly emphasised by the Law 
Lords: 
... there should 
be a similarity in any respect between the two incidents of sexual 
behaviour which cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. It is only a 
similarity that is required, not an identity ... The taskfor thejudge is to examine the 
evidence proposed to be led and see ifsuch a similarity in some respect can befound. 
The matter comes eventually to be one of the circumstances of the particular case. 
(Lord Clyde in RvA, para. 13 5) 
This is clearly an extremely wide reading of section 41, and one that arguably is 
contrary to what parliament intended. The playing with the apparently inelastic 
wording of section 41(3)(c) and the many parliamentary debates pre-section 41 has 
led Spencer (2000) to highlight his 'wonderment at the change that section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act ivrought': 
Four of the five Law Lords ivere clear that /section 3 of the H" gives the courts 
power to bend an Act tofit the requirements of the Convention, even where the Act is 
not anibiguous. Me may be on the threshold of exciting thnes! (Spencer, 2001 pg. 
454) 
Similarly, Sandy (2001) questioned whether this meant the death of the declaration of 
incompatibility. 
It is also important to note that two third party interventions were made in RvA. The 
first was a written intervention by Rape Crisis Federation of England and Wales, the 
Campaign to End Rape, The Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit and Justice for 
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Women which explained how complainants feel when they are questioned about their 
sexual history evidence in court and stated the reasons why previous sexual conduct 
was not relevant in rape cases (this intervention was permitted). A second application 
to intervene was made by the Fawcett Society who argued that any decision would be 
biased because of the all male House of Lords (this intervention was not allowed and 
no reasons why were offered). How much impact it actually had is very difficult to 
assess; although only one of the judges referred to the written intervention, it is 
possible that it assisted the otherjudges by contextualising the issue (Samuels, 2005). 
RvA was followed in RvR and another, judging that while a strict interpretation of 
Section 41 would preclude the sexual history evidence the defendants had wanted to 
use, its exclusion deprived the defendants of a fair trial and that the HRA now 
provided a 'gateway' to allow the evidence. Taking the decision of RvA into 
consideration, the Court of Appeal in RvT; RvH ruled that questions about previous 
false sexual offence complaints or the failure to complain in the past could be allowed 
even if they went principally to credibility because the questions were essentially 
about past statements and not 'about' sexual behaviour. In doing so, as in RvA, the 
judges were keen to point out that they accepted that victims have rights and 
interestingly this is the only case where the rights of the victim are clearly stated in 
specific convention terms rather than in general terms. Nonetheless, it was still 
decided that the rights of the defendant outweighed those of the victim: 
... ive recognise that victims of crime 
have rights as well as defendants and that ill 
cases of sexual offences the complainant has a right to respect to a private life under 
art 8 of the convention which wouldinclude privacy ill respect of herprevioussexual 
conduct and experiences ... in the present cases the 
balancing exercise must 
recognise the gravity of the charges faced by these two appellants and the serious 
consequences which they mayface if convicted. (R v T; RvH, para. 3 8) 
Of the two cases where it was alleged the defence had not had equality of arms 
(access to all the infon-nation the prosecution had), one was successful and the other 
unsuccessful. The ECtHR held that the introduction of new evidence at the start of the 
trial which led one of the expert witnesses to alter their oral evidence from their 
written submission had breached Article 6 in GB v Fi-ance. Where the defence had 
found out that the victim had previously lied to the police in an unrelated matter, this 
was not found to breach the right to a fair trial in RvC and othei-s. The Court of 
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Appeal noted that during the trial a 'wholescale assault' on the victim's credibility 
had been mounted even without the additional evidence, and commented that the case 
did not rely on issues of credibility anyway because of the strength of other evidence. 
Of the five remaining cases, the Article 6 argument was not considered in Baegell 1, 
the Netherlands. This was because Mr Bacgen failed to respond to correspondence 
from the ECtHR to confirm he wanted to take part in the proceedings and designate a 
legal representative. As explained earlier, in Attoi-ney Generals Reference (3 of 1999) 
the defendant had already been acquitted and so the case could not be successful or 
unsuccessful. The remaining two cases in this section were both unsuccessful. In 
Englert v Get-inany the ECtHR did not accept (at 16 votes to 1) that the 
discontinuance of his prosecution constituted a 'conviction in disguise' because the 
discontinuance did not indicate guilt or innocence but rather a 'state of suspicion'. In 
Attorney Genei-als Reference (69 of 2001) the argument that the victim's evidence 
being given by video breached the right to a fair trial was dismissed, with the judges 
ruling that it had no impact at all on the fairness of the trial. 
6.2.2 The outcomes of Article 7 arguments (No punishment without law) 
None of the three Article 7 arguments were successful. In Gv Fi-ance the court 
judged unanimously that there had been no breach of Mr G's human rights. Although 
he had been prosecuted for acts classified as rape rather than as indecent assault with 
coercion, the latter being the classification of the acts when they took place, the re- 
classification had actually downgraded the offence. The ECtHR ruled that although 
the application of the new law had been retrospectively applied, this had actually 
operated in Mr G's favour. 
The two marital rape cases were also unsuccessful. It is necessary to look at the first 
of these cases, SIV v the United Kingdonz in detail because of the legal commentary 
that surrounds the judgment. Within feminist social science literature and the feminist 
movement as a whole Mr Justice Owen's decision in R i, R to abolish the marital 
immunity to rape, has been heralded as a success story. Following the Crown Court 
verdict, an appeal against conviction was dismissed at the Court of Appeal, where 
Lord Lane stated the opinion of the court: 
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We take the Weiv that the thne has now arrived when the laiv should declai-e a 1-apist 
a iapist subject to the crindnal laiv, iri-espective of his relationship ivith his victim. 
The decisions made at the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal were subsequently 
supported at the House of Lords: 
Hale's pi-oposition involves that by mai-riage a wife gh, es hei- ii-revocable consent to 
sexual intercourse with hei- husband under all ch-cunistances and irt-espective of the 
state of hei- health oi- how she happens to befeeling at the tinze. In modern times ally 
i-easonable pei-son must regat-d that conception as quite unacceptable... 
For feminists what was of primary concern was that the decision made by Justice 
Owen to criminalise rape within marriage was upheld. However, discussions within 
the legal field had a different focus. While not disputing the notion that sexual 
intercourse without consent within marriage should be a criminal offence, it was 
argued that it was not within the courts power to make this decision; that the role of 
the judge is to interpret law rather than to create it. This is why the human rights 
challenge in STV and CR v the United Kingdom have been described as 'seemingly 
strong coniplaints' (e. g. Norrie, 2001 pg. 266) and why the outcome of the ECHR 
case has been questioned. 
Many believe that the very fact that the case was about rape coloured the judgment 
and led to a different case outcome to what would have been obtained had the act 
been a less serious one and/or one that there was no pressure to criminalise. Change 
the act from one of rape within marriage to a different act, and the argument made by 
legal academics becomes clearer. Imagine for example that you do an act that does 
not appear in any legislation as a criminal offence and you are arrested and 
prosecuted for this act. You know that other people, in some cases very recently, have 
also been prosecuted for this act but have been acquitted in court because the judge 
said that the act was not a criminal offence, you know that parliament had recently 
had the chance to make the act a criminal offence but they had not done so and you 
also know that the Law Commission had reported that legislation would be needed to 
make it into a criminal offence. Imagine then that two appeal courts upheld your 
conviction and when you complained under the ECHR that you had been convicted 
for an act that was not a criminal offence at the time you did it, something specifically 
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prohibited under Article 7, but the ECtHR judged that your human rights had not 
been breached. Following established rules of legal interpretation, upholding RvR 
and then finding no breach at the ECtHR seems illogical. 
The act in question in SJV v United Kingdom was a violent attack on another 
individual's psychological, physical and sexual integrity. Both of these points, the 
illogical legal reasoning used to reach a decision that Mr SW's human rights had not 
been breached and the nature of the act are reflected in how legal academics have 
interpreted the case: 
... even if the outcome of these cases is to be welcomed considerable 
disquiet should 
be raised by its method of achievement (Ghandi and James, 1997 pg. 17). 
The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords did what had to be done. If the 
methodology wasfaulty, the Y-esult was not. (Temkin, 2002 pg. 85) 
So how did the ECtHR manage to justify the decisions made in domestic courts 
without finding a breach of human rights? Agreeing with the United Kingdom's 
government, they stated that there had been an evolution of the offence of rape 
through case law, reflective of changes in the way women were perceived in society, 
which meant that it was reasonably foreseeable that the act would become a criminal 
offence. They highlighted that although Article 7 requires criminal offences to be 
clearly stated, that there would always be some degree of judicial interpretation in a 
common law legal system and refused. to accept that the courts had acted as 
legislators and created a new criminal offence. They acknowledged the rights of 
victims of rape only in passing and in general convention terms: 
... the abandownent of the unacceptable idea of a husband being ininuale against 
pi-osecution foi- i-ape of his ivifie ivas in confoi-inity not only with a civilised concept of 
inarfiage but also, and above all, ivith the finidaniental objectives of the Convention, 
the veiy essence of which is respect Jbi- hunian dignity and hunian fi-eedoin. (SJV v 
UK, pg. 16) 
It makes little sense from reading the report neither why the appeal in Lask-ey (the 
second of the marital rape cases) was allowed nor why it was reported because it 
raised the same issue already decided in CR v UK. Not surprisingly, this was a very 
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short law report, little over a page, in which the court ruled that RvR applied and that 
there had been no breach of human rights because the ECtHR had previously upheld 
the House of Lords decision in RvR in CR v UK and SJV v UK. 
6.2.3 The outcomes of Article 8 arguments (Right to respect for private and 
family life) 
Where it was possible for a defendant to 'win' or 'lose' an Article 8 argument, both 
cases were successful. Again, it is not necessary to look at the Article 8 claim made in 
Mahviejczttk v Poland because it relates to an imprisonment issue. 
In MM v the Netherlands the ECtHR judged that Mr MM's rights had been breached 
because supplying the rape victim with a tape player and suggesting she tape 
telephone conversations represented a direct state infringement into his right for 
respect for private life. All but one of the judges (at six votes to one) rejected the 
Netherlands argument that because it was the rape victim who actually activated the 
tape recorder there was no state infringement. The dissenting opinion, given by the 
only female judge in the chamber, also showed a clearer understanding of the 
vulnerable position the rape victim was in: 
The situation in which Mrs S. found herself is unfortunately not an unusual one. It is a 
well-known fact that in cases which concern sexual harassinent and violence against 
wonzen it is difificidtfor the ivoinan to be believed. Her word stands against that of the 
perpetrator. In the present case she was all the more vithierable as her husband was 
in jail and the peipetrator was the husband's lawyer. I see the police action, as the 
Supreine Court did, as a suggestion or inforination to Mrs S. that one way ofgetting 
evidence would befor her to use her legal right to tape-record an incoining telephone 
call. It was left entirely to her to decide whether she wanted to inake 11se of the 
recorder and the tapes. (MM v the Netherlands, dissenting opinion of Judge Palm) 
It is still possible to discuss the judgment made in Attorney Generals Reference (No 3 
of 1999) even though it was not possible for the rape defendant to 'win' or 'lose' the 
case because he had already been acquitted. The Cou rt of Appeal, on its second 
referral by the Attorney General, reversed the decisions made by the trial judge and 
the first Court of Appeal, ruled that if the DNA evidence had been allowed in the trial 
that this would not have amounted to an unlawful interference with the defendant's 
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right to a private life and hence would not have breached Article 8. They refused to 
accept the argument that because a DNA sample should be destroyed following an 
acquittal that the use of such evidence could then never be 'in accordance with law', 
arguing that such interference would be necessary in a democratic society to ensure 
the prosecution of crime, stating firmly Thei-e is plainly no breach ofArticle 8' (Lord 
Steyn, section VIII) and highlighting what they called the 'triangulation of interests': 
It must be borne in mind that respect for the privacy of defendants is not the only 
value at stake. The pinpose of the criminal law is to pemit eveiyone to go about 
their daily lives withoutfear of harm to person or property. And it is in the interests 
of everyone that serious crime should be effectively investigated and prosecuted. 
There must be fairness to all sides. In a criminal case this requires the court to 
consider a triangulation of interests. It involves taking into account the position of 
the accused, the victim and his or herfamily, and the public. (Atto"ley General's 
Reference (No 3 of 1999), Section VI) 
Essentially, what the House of Lords ruled was that both the murder defendant and 
the rape defendant should not have been acquitted but by this stage it was too late. 
The decision is, however, important for future cases. 
6.3 The impact of the judges' gender in rape defendant's cases 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below look at the same factors considered above for rape victims 
in tenns of rape defendants. 
Table 6.2 Ge der of judges n rape defendants cases 
Case name Overall Unanimous? Male Female 
judges 
Reg Dep reg 
Englert v Germany Lose No 16 1 Male Male 
Tv Italy Win Yes 9 0 Male Male 
Stanford v UK Lose Yes 9 0 Male Male 
SJVv UK Lose Yes 9 0 Male 
Gv France Lose Yes 8 1 Male 
Baegen v the 
Netherlands 
N/C Yes 8 1 Male Male 
Tnzaska v Poland Win Yes 5 2 Male 
Alattoccia v Italy Win Yes 5 2 Male 
GB v France Win Yes 6 1 Female 
Kitcera vA ustria Lose Yes 5 2 Male 
MAI v the Netherlands Win No 6 1 Female 
Afellors v the UK Win Yes 6 1 Female 
Alativiejczuk v Poland Win Yes 5 2 Male 
Korellis v Cypnis Lose Yes 5 2 Female 
Totals 102 16 I%Iale=10 
Female=3 
Alalc=4 
Femalc=1 
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Table 6.2 shows that in three of the fourteen cases (21%) there were no female judges 
at all in the chamber (T v Italy, Stanford v the United Kingdom and STV v the United 
Kingdom). Where there were female judges, the ratio of male to female judges ranged 
from 16: 1 (Englert v Gennany) to 2.5: 1 (Trzaska v Poland, Mattoccia v Italy, Kucera 
v Austfia; Mahviejcziik v Poland, and Koi-ellis v Cyprus). No pattern emerges as to 
whether the judgment was unanimous based on the gender ratio. Again, the registrars 
and deputy registrars were most likely to be male. 
It is difficult to see if the gender ratio has any impact on whether the case was won or 
lost from Table 6.2 so cumulative figures are shown below in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Gender ratio i n rape defendants cases 
INTale Judges Female Judges Ratio 
Wins (n=7) 42 9 4.7: 1 
Losses (n--6) 52 6 8.7: 1 
Totals (n= 13) 94 15 6.3: 1 
_J 
Table 6.3 shows that overall, when a case was considered, the gender ratio of male to 
female judges was 6.3: 1. In the cases that were won this ratio drops to 4.7: 1 and in the 
cases that were lost the ratio rises to 8.7: 1. What this shows is that rape defendants 
were more likely to win their case when the proportion of female judges was higher. 
In total, mate judges sat far more often, outnumbering female judges by 148 to 22. 
Because judges are chosen by lot this reflects the gender imbalance of male to female 
judges as a whole and is not specific to rape cases. No meaningful conclusions can be 
drawn from the data on the impact of gender on the outcomes of cases because both 
rape victims and rape defendants were more likely to win their case when the 
proportion of female judges was higher than average. 
Analysis of the dissenting opinions is also inconclusive, largely due to the small 
number of cases where female judges were sitting and where the judgment was not 
unanimous. While the only judge who was female in MM v the Netherlands was also 
the only judge who dissented, stressing how difficult it is to get evidence that rape 
occurred, more data would be needed, for example by widening the sample 
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boundaries to all forms of violence against women, to be able to show whether this is 
a pattern or not. 
6.4 Just satisfaction awarded in response to breaches 
Taking into account cases that were successful at the ECHR (i. e. the only cases that 
can be awarded just satisfaction), Table 6.4 shows the non-pecuniary damage 
awarded (if any) and the costs and expenses awarded. The Articles that were found to 
have been violated are also listed. 
Table 6.4 Just satisfaction awarded in response to violations of rape defendants rights 
Judgment Year Violations Non- Costs & 
pecuniary expenses 
damage 
Tv Italy 1992 6 None awarded None awarded 
(Fair trial) (Legal aid 
claimed) 
Trzask-a v Poland 2000 5 and 6 (Liberty/security and None awarded PLN 6,000 
fair trial) (Polish zlotys) 
Afattoccia v Italy 2000 6 (Fair trial) ITL ITL 15,000,000 
27,000,000 (Italian lire) 
(Italian lire) 
GB v France 2001 6 (Fair trial) FRF 90,000 None claimed 
(French 
Francs) 
AfAf v the Netherlands 2003 8 (Fam/private life) None claimed EUR 10,000 
Mellors v the UK 2003 6 (Fair trial) EUR 2,800 EUR 2,800 
Mahviejczztk v Poland 2003 5,6 and 8 (Liberty/security, EUR 2,000 EUR 790 
fair trial and fam/private 
life) 
As discussed earlier in Chapter Three, there are a number of methodological 
problems related to this aim, in particular the lack of comparability between the 
currencies. 
6.5 Chapter conclusions 
Overall, defendants were more likely to be unsuccessful than successful in terms of 
their human rights arguments. However, both of the arguments based on Article 5 
regarding the length of pre-trial detention were successful, as were the four arguments 
made under Article 6 that the length of time before the trial was unreasonable. Some 
arguments to allow sexual history evidence were successful, with the House of Lords 
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creating in RvA what was referred to as a 'gateway' to allow such evidence in RvR 
and anothei% Where the collection of evidence of rape was seen to infringe on a 
defendants right to respect for private life his Article 8 rights were found to be 
breached in MM v the Netherlands. 
Where there was some unfairness but that unfairness did not mean that the trial 
overall was not a fair one, Article 6 arguments were unsuccessful. In Korellis v 
Cyprus it did not matter that a judge had judged his own decision about the relevancy 
of further examination of the victim's knickers at the appeal stage because the 
knickers were not central to the trial; in Rv Rooney it did not matter that he could not 
cross-examine the victim about an alleged sexual experience in his re-trial because it 
was not relevant whether it was true or not; in RvC and othei-s it did not matter that 
the defence were not provided with infon-nation the prosecution had about the victim 
lying to the police in an unrelated incident because the case did not hinge on 
credibility; and in Attorney Generals Refei-ence (69 of 2001) it had no bearing to the 
fairness of the trial whether the victim's evidence was given via video. 
Article 7 arguments were also unsuccessful, however legal commentary on STV v the 
United Kingdom shows ambivalence towards the judgment in legal terms but not in 
social terms. 
The Courts 'no need' approach was used more frequently in relation to arguments 
made by rape victims than defendants. Only one argument (in one case) made by a 
rape defendant was not considered by the ECtHR in comparison to eight arguments 
(in three cases) made by rape victims (this includes the two arguments made by Mr 
X). Hence, the 'no need' approach was used in one out of fourteen defendants cases 
and three out of five victims cases. In the one defendants case however, the Court did 
not consider Mr Baegan's argument against the Netherlands because he had not 
replied to correspondence from the ECtHR rather than taking the 'no need' approach. 
This means that the 'no need' approach identified by McCafferty (2003) was far more 
likely to be used in relation to arguments made by rape victims than rape defendants. 
It is likely that this is because rape victims generally used more convention rights 
than rape defendants did in their cases; all five ECHR cases taken by rape victims 
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used more than one convention right in comparison to only two of the fourteen rape 
defendants cases. This suggests that the use of human rights in cases involving rape 
victims is a less clear area of jurisprudence and that there is more space for 
developments. This may also be true of jurisprudence relating to victims more 
generally. As the 'no need' approach would not be taken in cases where only one 
argument was made under one convention right (if there was no need to consider the 
only argument made it would have been inadmissible), this means that the likelihood 
of it occurring would be higher the more arguments were made (i. e. in the rape 
victims cases). 
Even so, there were some examples where all of the rape defendants arguments were 
considered even when there was considerable overlap between them; one of the 
reasons given for there being no need to consider arguments in victims cases. The 
best example of this is in Trzaska v Poland, where Mr Trzaska had two arguments 
considered and breaches found under Article 5 and one related argument considered 
in Article 6 regarding the length of time taken before trial and the length of time spent 
in pre-tri al detention. In contrast, in X and Yv the Netherlands only one of Miss Y's 
four arguments was considered and neither of Mr X's were considered. It is important 
to remember that all of these arguments had been judged admissible. There also 
seems to have been change over time. In Xand Yv the Netherlands in 1985 there was 
'no need' to examine arguments made under both Articles 8 and 3: 
Havingfound that Article 8 (art. 8) was violated, the Court does not consider that it 
has also to exandne the case under Article 3, taken alone (art. 3) or in colyzinction 
with Article 14 (art. 14+3). (X and Yv the Netherlands, para. 34) 
Yet in MC v Bulgaria in 2003 the need to consider both of these arguments was seen 
as so important that it should be explicitly highlighted in a concurring opinion (these 
are rarely given at the ECtHR): 
... it was impoi-tant and significant that the Cow-t should examine the case undei- both Ai-ticle 3 and Ai-ticle 8 of the Convention. (Concurring opinion of Judge Tulkens, MC 
v Bulgaria) 
This may represent a growing recognition of the importance of examining all 
arguments, but alternatively it may simply represent the view of one (female) judge 
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who put her case strongly to the rest of the chamber. There is no other research that 
could support either of these positions. 
Judgments at the ECtHR were more likely to be unanimous in rape defendants than 
rape victims' cases. Three out of five cases (60%) were unanimous in their judgments 
in respect of all Articles in relation to rape victims compared with twelve out of 
fourteen rape defendants' cases (86%). Additionally, the scale of disagreement was 
also higher in rape victims' cases. In Aydin v Turkey there was disagreement 
regarding two Articles, with seven out of 21 judges dissenting in relation to Article 3 
and five out of 21 judges dissenting in relation to Article 13. In the other victims' 
case and the two defendants' cases only one judge dissented in each case. 
In intramural terms using the 'win/lose' analysis of success, arguments made by rape 
victims were inore likely to be successful than those made by rape defendants. 
However, this is proportional and based on a small sample of cases taken by rape 
victims. Because there were more cases brought by rape defendants, numerically 
more breaches were found in respect of defendants' rights. This means that the 
picture of success painted in solely intramural terms is mixed, and emphasises the 
need to look at success in more than intramural terms and consider the potential 
policy change created by the judgments. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE 
7.1 Introduction 
Described as a 'iveb of decisions' (Easton, 1953 pg. 130), it is notoriously difficult to 
capture the complexities involved in the making and interpretation of policy. Pre- 
HRA, the impact that international human rights had on the policy making process 
was extremely difficult to assess because it was largely discussed beyond the closed 
doors of government (Feldman, 2004b). It is easier to assess the impact of human 
rights on policy post-HRA. However, just as social scientists have tended to overlook 
the ECHR (Greer, 2004), the impact of the HRA has not been subject to the social 
and policy analysis that it is arguably worthy of. 
Bearing in mind the limitations outlined in Chapter Three, this chapter addresses Aim 
6 and looks at the potential policy change that may have been created by the 
judgments discussed in the previous chapters. Judgments that resulted in no policy 
change are considered first, followed by judgments where there was the potential for 
change. 
7.2 No policy change 
As described in Chapter Three, judgments resulted in no policy change if the case 
was unsuccessful or if the measures needed to address the breach were only 
individual ones. 
7.2.1 No change: applicant lost case 
Cases that were lost under the ECHR or HRA generally had no potential to create any 
change. This is because it was judged their human rights were not breached so no 
change was necessary. 
Victim's cases 
Two victims cases were lost, however in one of these cases (Stubbings and othel-s v 
the UK) it was suggested that change might be needed even though the current 
situation did not result in a breach of human rights (so this case is discussed in a 
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different section). The other case that was lost (R v DPP, expai-te C) had the potential 
to create policy change which would have resulted in rape victims in certain 
situations being consulted before the CPS discontinued the case, however the change 
was not realised because the case was lost. Instead, the judge chose to reinforce the 
policy status quo. If the change had been made this may also have reduced the 
likelihood of a rape victim experiencing a miscarriage of justice of the 'indefensible 
decisions not to charge or prosecute' type. This is because the rape victim had not 
completed her police interview because she ran to the toilet crying. Had she known 
that the case was to be discontinued on the basis of a lack of evidence she may have 
felt able to try again to finish the interview, hence potentially giving more evidence. 
Importantly, this would have reduced the victim's likelihood of experiencing a 
miscarriage of justice without impacting on the fairness of the trial and hence without 
impacting on any of the defendant's rights (either general due process or human 
rights). The new CPS policy for prosecuting cases of rape states that they will offer to 
meet with the victim to provide a full explanation if they decide to drop or 
substantially reduce a rape charge (CPS, 2004). This new policy is unlikely to have 
been influenced by the human rights argument made in Rv DPP, ex parte C, firstly 
because the argument was unsuccessful and secondly because the new policy relates 
to an 'explanation' rather than a 'consultation'. 
Defendant's cases 
Fourteen defendants cases were unsuccessful and led to no potential policy change. 
Some of these cases did not have the potential to create any policy changes anyway 
because they could only have resulted in individual measures had they been 
successful. All of the Article 7 claims fall into this category; indeed all of the Article 
7 arguments arose fi-oin a policy change that the applicants argued should not have 
been applied in their case. For example, in the cases where it was argued that they 
should not have been prosecuted for rape when it was against their wives (SJV v 
United Kingdoin and Rv Lask-ey) it was not the policy itself they argued breached 
their human rights, but rather the way in which the new policy had been unfairly 
applied. Hence, if they had won their cases they may have had their conviction 
overturned and been awarded financial damages but the policy itself (that rape within 
marriage is a criminal offence) would not have needed changing in order to prevent 
further breaches. 
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None of these cases, if they had been successful, could potentially have resulted in 
legislative change. Some may have resulted in case-law chan&, but these case-law 
changes would not have been specific to rape. For example, in Kitcera v Austria 
where it was unsuccessfully argued that Mr Kucera should have been allowed to 
attend his rape appeal hearing, the case law change potentially would have been that 
convicted people have the right to attend their appeal hearing rather than that men 
convicted for rape have this right. Another example of this is in Englert v Germany 
where Mr Englert unsuccessfully argued that he should have had his expenses 
reftinded and received compensation when his rape charge was withdrawn. Again, 
the potential change here would have related to all defendants. 
Summary 
None of the defendant's cases where there was no change because the case was lost 
would have had the potential to create legislative change if won. Some had the 
potential to create non-rape specific case-law change and others, particularly Article 7 
arguments, could only have resulted in individual measures. In contrast, the rape 
victim's case could have created policy change if it had been successful. It is not 
known how far reaching this policy change could have reached (rape victims only, all 
vulnerable victims or all victims). 
7.2.2 No change: applicant(s) won case 
Where the applicant(s) won their case but there was no change this was because 
general policy change was not needed; the judgment meant that only individual 
measures were necessary. 
Victim's cases 
There were no cases brought by victims that were successftil but created no policy 
change. 
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Defendant's cases 
Five cases brought by rape defendants were successful but cannot be said to have 
potentially created any specific policy change. These were the four cases where it was 
successfully argued that the length of time was excessive (Rzaska v Poland, 
Mattoccia v Italy, Mellors v United Kingdoin and Mativie/czuk v Polancý and the one 
where there was no equality of arms because new evidence was introduced at the start 
of the trial with no adjournment (GB v France). These may have fallen under the 
category of case-law change but it is presumed that none of these countries actually 
had a policy to take as much time as possible before trying a defendant or for the 
prosecution not to share evidence with the defence and therefore the judgments can 
not actually change the policy because there was not one to change. The issue was 
instead about the implementation of policy, most often in relation to procedural law. 
7.3 Policy change 
As described in Chapter Three, there was potential for policy change if a case was 
lost but change was suggested within the judgment or if the case was won. 
7.3.1 Possible policy change 
Victim's cases 
Stubbings and othei-s v United Kingdom had the potential to create change and the 
ECtHR hinted that change might be necessary even though the current policy did not 
actually breach any of the convention rights: 
There has been a developing awai-eness ill recent yeai-s of the range of pi-oblems 
caused by child abuse and its psychological effects oil victims, and it is possible that 
the niles oil limitation of actions applying in membei- States of the Council ofEurope 
may have to be amended to make special provision Jbi- this gi-oup of claimants ill the 
nem-fiaw-e. (Stubbings and othei-s v the United Kingdom, para. 56) 
Following the judgment in September 1996, the Law Commission published a 
consultation paper in January 1998 entitled 'Mak-ing the laiv on civil limitation 
periods simpler andfairer' (Law Commission, 1998). As this was published just 16 
months after the judgment, it is likely that this was started at the time, if not before, 
the judgment in was made in Stubbings and others. In their consultation paper, the 
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Law Commission acknowledged the particular problems faced by victims of child 
sexual abuse and also took into consideration the unsuccessful human rights 
arguments in Stubbings and others. They considered a number of options, including: 
that claims by victims of child sexual abuse should continue to be subject to a 
limitation period because the principle that the possibility of litigation should be 
stopped at some point to ensure a fair trial was still valid; that victims of child sexual 
abuse should have an extended limitation period; or that there should be no limitation 
period at all for victims of child sexual abuse. A report was published following the 
consultation period (Law Commission, 2001) in which around 90 per cent of 
respondents agreed that claimants in sexual abuse cases should be subject to a 
limitation period, with the majority (65 per cent) agreeing that it should be the same 
length of time as in any other case. Three respondents 175 suggested that if sexual 
abuse claims were given special treatment that this might be discriminatory to 
claimants who experienced non-sexual abuse as children: 
... it is 
difficult to justify giving special treatment to sexual abuse claims alone, 
without according similar protection to, for example, non-sexual assaults against 
children. Sexual abuse Inay, in the current clinlate, be regarded as uniquely 
unacceptable but other non-sexual abuse of children inay bejust as damaging. Yet it 
ivould be difficult to argue that all attacks against children should be exemptedfronz 
the limitation regime. (Law Commission, 2001 pg. 106, summarising the comments 
of three respondents) 
The Law Commission do not indicate whether they agree or disagree with the 
comments made by these respondents, but as they do not challenge or suggest a 
contrary view it may be assumed that they are in general agreement. It would be 
difficult to dispute that some non-sexual abuse can be just as damaging as sexual 
abuse 176 . However, is not the level of damage that is the issue when considering the 
impact of limitation periods on child sexual abuse claimants. Rather, it is the 
difficulties in acknowledging child sexual abuse, overcoming the myths surrounding 
sexual abuse and children, feeling able to disclose the abuse to someone and being 
175 Prof Andrew Tetterbom, Michael Lerego QC and His Honor Judge John Griffith Williams QC 
Iresponding on behalf of the Wales and Chester Circuit) 
176 A prime example of the damage non-sexual abuse can cause being the murder of eight-year-old 
Victoria Climbi6 who died in 2000 from hypothermia after suffering months of neglect and physical 
abuse by her great aunt and her partner. 
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able to link 'damage' in later life with abuse in childhood. Physical abuse in 
contemporary society is much more acceptable to talk about than sexual abuse 
Two respondents to the consultation 177 argued that no limitation period should be in 
place for victims of child sexual abuse because of the incidence of dissociative 
amnesia 178 in survivors of sexual abuse. The Law Commission dismissed this 
argument, pointing out that if proceedings could not be commenced within the 
limitation period because of a disability then they would be afforded the same 
protection (an extended limitation period) as any other claimant. The final 
recommendation made by the Law Commission in relation to child sexual abuse cases 
was that such claims should be '... subject to the core i-eginze as inodified in relation 
to otherpei-sonal ii! jtuy clahns' (pg. 108). In 2002 the Government accepted the Law 
Commissions recommendations in principle and the reforms are currently awaiting 
implementation (Law Commission, 2004/2005). 
The high number of consultation papers that have been published under the current 
government has opened up the policy process to groups and individuals who may 
previously have been excluded. The list of respondents to the Law Commission's 
consultation spans four pages consisting of. members of the judiciary; academic 
lawyers; practitioners (barristers and solicitors); government departments; doctors; 
individuals; insurers; and other organisations. None of the established feminist 
organisations are listed under 'other organisations' as responding. Indeed, only two 
overtly victim focused groups responded 179 and even victim support - often heralded 
as the 'national voice of victims' - are not listed as having responded. It is 
understandable why some groups may not have responded. Although the high number 
of consultation papers has opened up the policy process, it must be noted that 
preparing a response can be very time consuming. Like many consultation papers the 
Law Commissions was lengthy and difficult to read because of its (mostly necessary) 
legal language. Without funding to be involved in the policy process, many 
individuals and organisations will find it difficult to participate as fully as they might 
177 Lee Moore and Pannone and Partners 
178 A recognised psychiatric condition that prevents a person from recalling information of a stressful 
and traumatic nature. 
179 Action for Victims of Medical Accidents and the Liverpool and District Victims of Asbestos 
Support Group. 
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wish to. Having said that, it is probably the case that feminist groups have missed an 
ideal opportunity to influence policy following a human rights judgment. Although 
the argument made in the human rights case was unsuccessful, the ECtHR did suggest 
that change may be needed and the Law Commission appeared to be willing to 
consider a range of possible changes. 
Defendant's cases 
There were no cases brought by rape defendants that fell into this category. 
7.3.2 Policy change: legislative 
Victim's cases 
Legislative change stemmed from two of the rape victim's cases. In the successful 
case of X and Yv the Netherlands positive change was created for rape victims. 
However, it was the bringing of the human rights case rather than specifically the 
judgment that effected this change. By the time the case reached the ECtHR the 
Netherlands had already drafted new legislation to fill the gap in the law identified by 
this case. Hence, it was accepted by the Netherlands that the gap in the law was a 
problem that needed remedying without the acceptance that they were at fault. This is 
one of the only cases from the thesis sample where the change is documented via a 
resolution report. It states that the Netherlands had paid Miss Y's lawyer the money 
awarded to her by the ECtHR in just satisfaction and that by an Act of 27'11 February 
1985 which entered into force on Is' April 1985 the Dutch Criminal Code had been 
amended to allow a legal representative to file a complaint on behalf of a mentally 
handicapped person (Appendix to Resolution DH (89) 3). By rectifying the gap in 
law, this judgment is likely to have reduced the likelihood of rape victims 
experiencing miscarriages of justice in terms of defects in substantive criminal law 
without impacting on the fairness of the trial and therefore without reducing the rights 
of the defendant. 
In MC v Bulgai-ia there was also the potential to create legislative change. 
Additionally, the impact is potentially a wide one because if any other countries who 
are signatories to the ECHR had similar rape laws it means (presumably successftil) 
cases could be brought against them if changes were not made. Although all of the 
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countries whose legislation was reviewed in the judgment already had rape laws that 
were compatible it would have implications for new countries joining. The exact way 
in which Bulgaria have altered/intend to amend their rape laws to make them 
compatible with the ECHR is not known. A review of minutes from meetings of the 
Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers show that the matter is still outstanding, 
an internet search, law journal search and e-mails to a variety of agencies in Bulgaria 
shed no light on the exact change that has or is planned to be put in place. 
Nonetheless, the nature of the judgment dictates that they will need to change the 
definition of non-consent so that it is not only limited to physical force or threats. 
Defendant's cases 
Legislative change had already been enacted in respect of the case of Tv Italy, 
however this change had already been made by the time the case was heard, 
following another ECHR case where an applicant from Italy had been tried in 
absentia (Colozza v Italy). Tv Italy is the second of the two only cases where there 
was a resolution recorded by the Council of Europe (although the resolution was 
simply a reference to Colozza). The new Code of Criminal Procedure refon-ned the 
rules regarding leave to appeal out of time against an in absentia judgment and the 
Committee of Ministers found that this new rule had already been successfully 
applied in Italy (Resolution DH (93) 64 of 14 December 1993). 
7.3.3 Policy change: case law 
Victim's cases 
There were no cases brought by rape victims that fell into this category. 
Defendant's cases 
The case of RvA created the most substantial policy change in relation to England 
and Wales. Chapter Six described how the law lords interpreted the wording within 
section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act to allow sexual history 
evidence to be allowed in court in situations where Parliament did not intend it to be 
allowed. Even Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor who introduced the Human Rights 
Bill in the House of Lords back in 1997 has conceded that the reading down in RvA 
was 'extreme': 
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This was an expansive use of section 3, and one which surpi-ised inany obsei-i, ei-s. It 
appears to have been the nzost e. 'ictieine use of the inteipi-etative polvel- ... (Lord Irvine of Lairg, 2002, no pg no. ) 
Chapter One described how the HRA has retained parliamentary sovereignty and how 
the rights have been adopted within a statutory Act rather than as part of the 
constitution. Yet it would appear that Parliament were far from supreme in the case of 
RvA or in the cases that followed its judgment. As with the New Zealand situation as 
described by Allen (2001) (and discussed earlier in Chapter One of this PhD) it would 
appear from this case not only that Clark Kent did indeed turn into Superman but also 
that he did it very quickly. This is to say, not only did the Law Lords take more power 
than was arguably intended by parliament, they did it very quickly. This was not a 
gradual increase in power, but one of the first HRA cases to be decided at the House 
of Lords. 
Rewinding to a few years earlier, some feminists criticised the new sexual history 
evidence limitations as being vague and not going far enough their main worry was 
the time and effort needed to create further change: 
... it is a chilling prospect that it could take another 20 years, and nulnerous 
filrther 
research projects to achieve another legislative reforni. (Cook, 1999 pg. 2) 
If that was a chilling prospect then the reality post-R vA places the situation in the 
deep freeze cabinet. This is because while the HRA is in place no legislation with 
similar restrictions can be put into place. Although the Conservative party have made 
indications that should they regain power they would review the HRA with the 
possibility of removing it from the statute books, it must be presumed that the HRA is 
here to stay and the Conservative party is speaking mostly in its role as the 
opposition. It also means that the years spent lobbying the Government to reforrn the 
previous sexual history limitations have largely been wasted because ultimately it was 
five male law lords who had the last say on the matter. This calls into question the 
whole issue of Government lobbying and suggests that the higher echelons of the 
judiciary may be just as important if not more to direct attention at. 
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In Chapter One Allan's (2001) argument was cited that there are few differences 
between the policy changes that judges could potentially accomplish under a statutory 
Bill of Rights compared with what they do accomplish under constitutional models. 
In R i, A this arguably went even further. If the House of Lords had made a 
declaration of incompatibility then Parliament would have had the opportunity to 
change legislation to make it compatible with Article 6 while still doing what they set 
out to do - restrict individual judges from deciding on a case by case nature when 
sexual history evidence should be allowed. My argument here is not related to a view 
on whether the Section 41 restrictions struck the right balance between the rights of 
victims and defendants, but rather that in reading Section 41 in the way they did, the 
House of Lords has probably re-instigated the air of confusion over when sexual 
history evidence should and should not be allowed. In this case legal interpretation 
moved so far into politics that the judges moved beyond a purposive approach and 
actually changed the meaning of the legislation. The impact of this is as yet uncertain. 
Liz Kelly and her colleagues at London Metropolitan University have investigated the 
impact of RvA but the Home Office have not yet published the findings. 
7.3.4 Change: investigative 
Victim's cases 
In the successful cases of Aydin v Turk-ey and Sehnouni v France some potential 
change was possible whereby the states may be more likely to conduct future 
investigations into rape by state actors in a more effective manner in order to avoid 
any more adverse judgments against them from the ECtHR. This may also have 
emphasised Europe-wide the need to conduct effective investigations and highlighted 
that rape cannot be 'pushed under the carpet' because of a lack of evidence when that 
evidence has not been sought. This was further emphasised in another judgment 
against Turkey in relation to threat to rape and other torture where a breach was found 
but the reasoning behind it was based on it being a 'procedural' breach rather than an 
actual breach. This led to a particularly strong critical and sarcastic dissenting opinion 
put forward by one of the judges: 
Expecting those who claini to be victinis of torture to pi-ove theii, allegations 'beyond 
reasonable doubt'places on them a burden that is as impossible to ineet as it is unfah- 
to request. Independent obsei-vei-s ai*e not, to iny knoit, ledge, usually invited to witness 
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the rack-, nor is a transcript ofproceedings in triplicate handed over at the end of 
each session of torture; its victims cower alone in oppressive and painful solitude, 
while the team of interrogators has ahnost unlimited means at its disposal to deny the 
happening of, or their participation in, the gruesome pageant. The solitaq victim's 
complaint is ahnost invariably confronted with the negation 'corroborated' by many. 
(Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bonella, Sevtop Veviedaroght v Turkey 180) 
For the court to expect fi-om torture victims any 'hard' evidence, beyond the 
eloquence of their hyuries, is to reivard and invigorate the 'inequality of arms' 
inherent in most torture situations. (Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bonella, 
Sevtap Veviedaroght v Turkey) 
Turkey is notorious for not paying just satisfaction to successful applicants as directed 
by the court and it follows that they may not necessarily have taken steps to improve 
the way in which torture within custody is investigated. However, it would appear 
that the Aydin judgment and others similar to it did in fact create change, but that this 
change was a negative and inappropriate one. If it seemed impossible for the actions 
of the Turkish police to get any worse, this is what happened in YF v Turkey' 8 1. After 
being taken from her home by Geredermines under the same circumstances in both 
Ms Aydin and Ms Sevtap Vezendaroglu, Ms F was tortured and threatened with rape. 
Over eager not to be accused of rape, the police forced her to have a gynecological 
examination despite her refusal, staying on the premises while Ms F was examined 
vaginally and anally behind a curtain without her consent. Her husband complained 
under the ECHR and the Court unanimously judged that Article 8 had been breached. 
Hence, Turkey responded by creating change but this change was negative in that it 
created a ftirther breach of human rights. 
No information could be found regarding any changes to the investigative procedure 
following Sehnoind v Fi-ance. 
1 so Seviap Veviedaroght v Turk-ey no. 32357/96, judgment of I Ph April 2000. This case is not in the 
original sample because it concerns the threat to rape. It is included here because it relates to the policy 
impact of a sample case. 
181 YFv Turk-ey no. 24209/94, judgment of 22 nd July 2003. This case is not in the original sample 
because it concerns the threat to rape. It is included here because it relates to the policy impact of a 
sample case. 
194 
Defendant's cases 
The judgment in MM v the Netherlands; that the use of a telephone-tap by a rape 
victim to collect evidence on her alleged attacker breached his human rights means 
that investigations in the future should not seek to collect such evidence. This case 
could open up debates over what would happen if it were a non-state actor (e. g. a rape 
crisis centre) rather than the police who were suggesting the telephone-tap to the rape 
victim. In the UK however, the newly enacted s 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 now bans all telephone-tap evidence regardless of the lawfulness by 
which it was collected. 
7.4 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter has shown that human rights can impact on policy in a number of ways, 
at different levels and different stages. Many of the policies discussed do not at first 
glance appear to be related to rape (e. g. Limitation Act 1980, Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000) and it may be that feminist groups have focused on 
sexual offence laws to the exclusion of other relevant legislation when campaigning 
for legal change. The impact of some of the judgments have the potential to reach 
much further than rape cases, particularly where the change was a case law one. In 
the same way, it is possible that the judgments in some human rights cases unrelated 
to rape (and therefore not examined in this thesis) might have had an impact on rape 
and the prosecution process. 
Attempting to systematically track all the changes created by the ECHR judgments 
was, in retrospect, an impossible task. The general changes made were often of a non- 
specific nature, which even the Council of Europe is not able to record or definitively 
classify. HRA cases were simpler to find out what change was created and therefore 
easier to deal with as a research sample. This is largely because the change is 
generally an instant, case law one. In other words, the judgment is itself the change. 
None of the cases resulted in a declaration of incompatibility being made, although 
any change created following a declaration would also have been relatively easy to 
track. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This research has found that rape defendants have been more likely than rape victims 
to use the ECHR and HRA, but that rape victims have been more likely to be 
successful in intramural terms (i. e. they were more likely to win their case). Cases 
involving rape victims contained arguments using more Articles, but were less likely 
to have their arguments considered or for the judgement to be unanimous at the 
European Court when compared with cases taken by rape defendants. 
8.2. The development of pan-European standards in rape cases 
Although only a few cases have been taken on behalf of rape victims, those that have 
been taken have created important new pan-European standards in rape cases that will 
be far reaching in their scope. These standards include: 
9 The need for rape complaints to be thoroughly investigated, in a timely manner, 
with suitable forensic medical examinations offered (Aydin v Turkey and 
Sehnouni v France). 
e The need for nation states to provide adequate protection from rape through the 
criminal law (X and Yv the Netherlands and MC v Bulgaria) 
9 That the act of rape can not be defined only in terms of the victims physical 
resistance (MC v Bulgaria) 
9 That the state has a responsibility in protecting individuals from other non-state 
actors (X and Yv the Netherlands and MC v Bulgaria) 
These standards might sound quite basic when thinking about rape laws in England 
and Wales. However, they are likely to be more use to new countries joining the 
Council of Europe, particularly from former communist countries that might have less 
developed rape laws. 
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8.3 Few human rights arguments have been made on behalf of rape victims 
Internationally, feminist activists have become adept at using the vocabulary of 
human rights at the UN level, and the violence against women movement has been 
central to the success of this process (Kelly, 2005). However, this has not happened in 
England and Wales at the local level of the HRA or at the regional level of the ECHR. 
Far from 'hijacking' or 'hoodwinking' the judiciary (Fudge, 2001), there have been 
few moves to use the language of the HRA/ECHR to improve the criminal justice 
response to women who have been raped. Feminist groups have only intervened in 
one case under the HRA (R v A) and only one HRA case has been taken on behalf of 
a rape victim (and this case did not involve feminist campaigners/NGO's). Research 
is needed into why there have been so few cases involving rape victims compared 
with the large number of cases involving rape defendants. However, the reasons are 
likely to include: 
a The way the criminal justice system works in England and Wales, where only the 
defendant has access to a legal representative. This means that rape defendants are 
more likely than rape victims to be made aware of human rights arguments that 
might be applied in their case. 
That rape victims have anonymity in the press might mean that lawyers interested 
in helping take test cases might not be easily able to make contact with them. 
Men suspected or convicted of rape might have more to gain by using human 
rights than rape victims (i. e. they might avoid conviction or be released from 
prison). 
9A lack of knowledge within feminist campaign groups/NGOs about how rape 
victims might be able to use the human rights contained within the HRA/ECHR. 
This may partly be because of a focus on CEDAW as the convention for securing 
women's rights and DEVAW as the declaration of rights in relation to violence 
against women. 
9A lack of finances for feminist campaign groups/NGOs to draw on to make third 
party interventions. 
a The inability for a victim in the UK to use Article 6 in reference to a criminal case 
because of the division between civil and criminal legal procedures. 
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9 That when the HRA came into force the main feminist campaign groups were 
involved in consultations with the Home Office about the Sexual Offences Act 
2003. Therefore, feminist campaign groups were in a historically unique position 
in terms of their relationship with the state. Because feminist groups had had so 
much input into the new legislation, it is not surprising that they are not rushing to 
the courts with challenges. 
9A lack of information and procedures about how third party interventions are 
made in HRA cases and under what circumstances interventions will and will not 
be allowed. 
8.4 There is a good understanding at the European Court of the impact of rape 
and the difficulties proving rape by both male and female judges 
Some individual judges at the European Court have shown a very good understanding 
of the impact of rape and the difficulties faced in the prosecution process. Chapters 
Five and Six showed how there seemed to be no difference between judgments made 
in rape victims cases and rape defendants cases depending on the ratio of female to 
male judges in the chamber, with both victims and defendants more likely to win their 
case when the number of female judges in a chamber was higher than average. From 
the quotes given in Chapters Five and Six it is clear that some female judges have 
strongly articulated their views, whether in agreement or disagreement with the 
majority: 
... rape infringes not only the right to personal integrity (both physical and 
psychological) as guaranteed by Article 3 but also the right to autonomy as a 
component of the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 8. 
(Concurring opinion of Judge Tulkens, MC v Bulgaria) 
The situation in which Mrs S. found herself is unfortunately not an unusual one. It is a 
ivell-known fact that in cases which concern sexual harassinent and violence against 
ivoinen it is difficidtfor the ivoinan to be believed. (MM 1, the Netherlands, dissenting 
opinion of Judge Palm) 
However, even when female judges were massively outnumbered by men (in the 
example below only one of 21 judges were female) the majority judgement were 
often able to acknowledge the impact of rape in what might be defined as feminist 
terms: 
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... mpe 
leaves deep psychological scai-s on the victim which do not i-espond to the 
passage of time as quickly as othei- fonns of physical and mental violence. The 
applicant also expei-ienced the acute physical pain offoi-ced peneti-ation, which must 
have left hei-feeling debased and violated both physically and emotionally. (Aydin 1, 
Tw-k-ey, para. 83) 
There are times when the development of case law relating to rape victims has been 
somewhat stilted when the Court has failed to consider some arguments put forward, 
particularly those relating to Articles 13 (Right to an effective remedy) and 14 
(Freedom from discrimination). This has been a feature of cases taken by rape victims 
far more than in cases taken by rape defendants. While this may be reflective to some 
degree of the higher number of Articles used in cases taken by rape victims, the 
importance of considering all arguments made is heightened since the introduction of 
the HRA. Because national courts have to take judgments made under the ECHR into 
consideration, any positive judgments made at the European Court have the potential 
to have a top-down effect on national courts. 
8.5 There is still an ongoing problem regarding equal representation in the 
judiciary 
The HRA represented a shift of power from the legislature to the judiciary. How 
much impact this shift has is dependant on how much power judges actually take. 
This, in turn depends on how sections 3 and 4 of the HRA work in practice; how far 
judges will be prepared to 'read down' a piece of legislation (under section 3) before 
declaring it incompatible with the HRA (under section 4). While it is too early to 
show overall patterns on how sections 3 and 4 are used, it is widely acknowledged 
that the case of RvA pushed the boundaries of section 3 as far as they possibly could 
go, and perhaps a bit further than they should go: 
The decision of the House ofLords in RvA is the inost radical exaniple sofar of the 
use ofsection 3 to adopt a construction ofa recent statute, that appears tofly ill the 
face ofParlianzent's intention ... (Rose and Weir, 2003 pg. 45) 
An analysis of how judges are interpreting section 41 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act (i. e. the section under question) post RvA is yet to be 
published by the Home Office, so the full impact of the decision is not yet clear. 
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What is clear is that judicial attitudes have become increasingly important as the 
relationship between the courts, the executive and Parliament shift in favour of the 
courts (Samuels, 2005). The issue then of judges getting involved in areas where 
parliament has already legislated must be problematised in this light (Conaghan and 
Millns, 2005). This is a particular problem when the gender and ethnicity make-up of 
the judiciary is taken into consideration and means that the need for equal 
representation in the judiciary is higher than ever before. Although there is 
disagreement on the impact women judges have in changing case outcomes, far more 
research is needed on this topic. As stated earlier, research in the USA has found that 
differences between male and female judges and attorneys are greatest in the areas of 
rape and domestic violence (Martin et al., 2002). This suggests that equal 
representation is particularly important in cases involving violence against women. 
Added to this is the increased potential to make law (under sections 3 and 4) rather 
than just to merely interpret it and it becomes more essential and urgent that more 
female judges (as well as more judges from black and minority ethnic groups) are 
appointed at the appellate level in order to maintain the legitimacy of, and increase 
confidence in, the judiciary. 
8.6 Clarity of procedures and funding for third party interventions are needed 
The Public Law Project has found that the lack of rules and guidelines deter potential 
intervenors, as do fears about liability for costs. This is something that needs to be 
addressed: 
Clearly, if thirdpartyintervention in the publicinterest is perceived to peiform an 
importantfiniction in litigation under the HRA, then it is crucial to ensure that those 
who can assist the court are not deterredfi-om providing it to the court because of 
ignorance ofprocedures orfears about costs. (Lieven and Kilroy, 2003 pg. 133) 
NGOs providing services for women who have been raped are notoriously under- 
funded. Rape crisis centres generally have long waiting lists, and some even need to 
close their waiting lists on a regular basis because they are unable to meet the level of 
demand for their services. Most funds are 'restricted', meaning that they can only be 
spent on certain things (e. g. counselling, training). In the absence of a strong 
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women's voice in the judiciary, funding and clear procedures for third party 
interventions are even more important. 
8.7 Time for feminists to start thinking 'horizontally' 
The text of the ECHR shows a primary concern with the regulation of the public 
sphere and protection of (as opposed to %vithin) the private sphere. This was 
described in Chapter One. However, Chapter One also described that the ECHR and 
the HRA are 'living instruments', able to take the contemporary societal context into 
consideration when making judgments. When the ECHR was introduced back in 
1950, recognition of the prevalence of rape and other forms of violence against 
women was low particularly within a domestic violence context. As a living 
document the ECHR should then be able to move with the new knowledge base and 
increased awareness that second-wave feminism has created. 
Chapter One described how second-wave feminism also questioned the arbitrary 
divide often made between 'public' and 'private' spheres, calling for increased rights 
and state protection for women and children. As far back as 1985 the European Court 
has accepted that a state can be held responsible for the violation of an individual's 
human rights based on harm perpetrated by a non-state individual if it has failed to 
fulfil its positive obligations to protect human rights. That the first case of this nature 
was a rape case (X and Yv the Nethei-lands) may be reflective of the problems within 
rape trials, reflective of the work of second wave feminism or purely coincidental. 
Theorists in the 1990s argued that the key to unlocking the usefulness of human rights 
for women lies in challenging the public/private divide, particularly in relation to 
violence against women (e. g. Copelon, 1994; Roth, 1994). In terms of the ECHR it is 
clear that this has already been unlocked and has been for some time. Despite the 
ECHR and HRA focus on civil and political 'first generation' rights, arguments about 
gender and violence can be reformulated and 'squeezed' into the framework on offer 
(Conaghan and Millns, 2005). The case of MC v Bulgaria provides evidence that this 
approach is not only possible, but is happening as part of an ongoing process of the 
development of feminist jurisprudence in the area of human rights. 
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8.8 A time and space to challenge existing discourses 
Chapter Two described the tensions that exist between procedural justice and 
substantive justice, due process and crime control and the rights of victims and 
defendants. These tensions have led to a number of incorrect equations that may have 
stifled discussions around improving the rape prosecution process. 
The first of these false equations is that miscarriages of justice for victims and 
defendants mirror each other; that a reduction in miscarriages of justice for victims 
ffreeing the guilty') mirrors an increase in miscarriages of justice for offenders 
('convicting the innocent') and vice versa. This position suggests that there is little 
that can be done to improve the situation of victims while maintaining a fair trial for 
the defendant: 
There are iniscarriages ofjustice in the freeing of the guilty and in the convicting of 
the innocent. The problein is that, other than better police investigation, there is no 
way of reducing theforiner without increasing the latter. Eveiy tilne ive play with the 
rides to inake it easier to convict the guilty, ive inake it easier to convict the innocent. 
(Kennedy, 2004 pg. 30) 
When there is talk of 'rebalancing' the criminal justice system and 'reducing the 
justice gap', it is often assumed that guarantees of more rights for victims and calls 
for more offenders to be brought to justice will necessarily mean a move away from 
the due process model to move closer to the crime control model. From this 
perspective, 'victims rights' are falsely equated with a lack of concern for due 
process: 
... 11 VI . ctun's rikhts" 
has produced an einerging structure of criminal law and 
procedure that closely resenibles the "crinie control" inodel so antithetical to liberal 
thought (Henderson, 1985 pg. 953) 
Specific cautions have been given in feminist writing directed towards other 
feminists. Lewis et al. (2001) argue that where crimes such as rape, sexual abuse and 
other forms of violence against women and children are concerned feminists have 
focused more of their attention on gaining convictions and heavy sentences than 
ensuring that the trial is fair for the defendant. They warn: 
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This inconsistency ignores the very real issites of offenders' civil liberties, of which 
feminists on the left are generally mindful, except when considering men who offend 
against women and children when concerns about civil liberties seem to disappear. 
(pg. I 10). 
Along with the wide variety of groups covered under the shorthand tenn of the 
'victims rights movement', the idea that such tensions cannot be reconciled is a 
dangerous one: 
... there is a 
danger ofpolarisation in the debate, supportfor victim's rights being 
associated with traditional conservatives who are hostile to criminology's concern 
with dueprocess and the rights ofprisoners (Fenwick, 1997, pg. 319) 
In fact, it is entirely possible to 'play with the rules to make it easier to convict the 
guilty', as Kennedy (2004) puts it, but without making it any easier to convict the 
innocent. Even those opposed to other changes such as tight restrictions on the use of 
sexual history are able to suggest ways in which it may be easier to convict the guilty 
by making it more fair for all rather than just the defendant: 
Complainants should routinely give their evidence with the public and the press 
excluded: something the 'Jair trial " requirements in Article 6 permits. And what is 
wrong, surely, is that the complainant can be asked if she regularly consents to sex 
without the defendant having to admit - ifsuch be so - that he has previously forced 
others to have sex with him without it. (Spencer, 2001 pg. 455) 
Indeed, rape law refonn does not necessarily mean that there will be an increase in 
convictions 182 but may lead to a less traumatic court process for rape victims (Easteal, 
1998b). 
The human rights model overlaps with the due process model because they are both 
concerned with individuals' rights against the state and protecting the innocent from 
conviction. Given this, it is not surprising that human rights groups (for example 
Liberty) have tended to focus more on defendants than victims. Once we question the 
182 Two evaluations in Australia found that there was actually a decrease in the number of rape 
convictions following reform (Heath and Naffine, 1994; Heenan and McKelvie, 1997). Similarly, 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s in the USA created no significant change in the number of convictions. 
(Spohn and Horncy, 1992). Both of the Australian studies, however, did find that victims reported a 
reduction in the overall distress felt during the trial process and an increase in guilty pleas. 
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dichotomy between due process and crime control and realise that due process is 
essential for crime control (McBarnet, 1981) the role human rights can play for 
victims becomes clearer. 
8.9 Where next? 
Using a human rights framework to understand the rape trial means a move away 
from the concept of 'balancing'; a tenn that some have argued should be banned in 
general (Ashworth, 1996) and others have suggested is untenable in rape trials 
(Easteal, 1998b). To 'do justice' for a rape victim is currently constructed in an 
incredibly narrow sense, related mainly to the criminal justice system and in 
particular to the gaining of a criminal conviction and lengthy custodial sentence. 
Procedural justice for victims, including the provision of counselling for victims of 
rape, is seen at best as an 'add on' to criminal justice and at worst as an 'optional 
extra'. 
A radical rethink of criminal justice responses to rape (indeed to violence against 
women as a whole) is needed before any dramatic improvements are likely to be seen. 
Advances such as the changes made following the review of sexual offences 
legislation are certainly to be welcomed in the short term, but are unlikely to provide 
either quick fixes or long term solutions. This research has shown that using human 
rights law to challenge state responses to rape is one way of achieving change and 
such change may be substantial, resulting in the establishing of new pan-European 
standards for rape prosecutions. Legal human rights can therefore act as a powerful 
implement in the feminist toolbox. Fair trial jurisprudence has traditionally focused 
on procedural justice for the defendant,. and only recently has the importance of 
procedural justice for rape victims been emphasised (Kelly et al., 2005). 
Acknowledging the importance of gaining convictions and narrowing the justice gap 
should continue to be of importance for rape law and policy, but respecting human 
rights means going further than this. Justice for rape victims means engaging with a 
broader concept of justice; possibly following the lead of parallel justice programmes 
in the USA (where society is held responsible not only to hold the offender 
accountable for barrns caused to the victim but also to honour a separate obligation to 
repair any harms to the victim). 
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The UK violence against women movement has often called for others to be trained 
in violence against women (e. g. the CPS, judges, police). It is now time that we 
looked to other specialists (human rights lawyers, human rights campaign groups) to 
help fill the knowledge gap that has emerged between the violence against women 
and human rights movement in the UK. Lessons can be learrit from the global 
women's human rights movement at the level of the UN, and from human rights 
groups such as Amnesty International. Addressing the knowledge gap now may be 
crucial to be closing the justice gap and to help create a new vision of justice in rape 
cases that is respectful of victim and defendant's human rights. It is hoped that this 
thesis will be of use in that endeavour. 
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APPENDIX ONE: HUMAN RIGHTS CONTAINED WITHIN THE ECHR 
Article 2- Right to life 
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b) in order to effect a lawftil arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
Article 3- Prohibition of torture 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
Article 4- Prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
3. For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall 
not include: 
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a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed 
according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional 
release from such detention; 
b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in 
countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military 
service; 
c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or 
well-being of the community; 
d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
Article 5- Right to liberty and security 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law: 
a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
b) the lawftil arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order 
of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an 
offence or fleeing after having done so; 
d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision 
or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal 
authority; 
c) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
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f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view 
to deportation or extradition. 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph Le 
of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by 
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or 
to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
Article 6- Right to a fair trial 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests ofjustice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
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2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
a) to be inforrned promptly, in a language which lie understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests ofjustice so require; 
d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; 
e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. 
Article 7- No punishment without law 
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than 
the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilized nations. 
Article 8- Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 9- Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Article 10 - Freedom of expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart* infon-nation and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
fights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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Article 11 - Freedom of assembly and association 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to fonn and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the an-ned forces, of the police or of the 
administration of the State. 
Article 12 - Right to marry 
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
Article 13 - Right to an effective remedy 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
Article 14 - Prohibition of discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
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